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ABSTRACT
EXTRACTIVISM AND RESISTANCE: MEDIA, PROTEST AND POWER IN
ECUADOR
MAY 2017
DIANA CORYAT, B.F.A. NEW YORK UNIVERISTY
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by:
Sonia E. Alvarez
Martha Fuente-Bautista

This dissertation examines the symbolic and material dimensions of media power and
social movement cultural production in a Latin American post-neoliberal context,
through the case study of Yasunidos –an anti-extractivist, youth social movement– and its
fight to stop the Ecuadorian government’s plans to drill for oil in the Yasuní region of the
Amazon. The project is located within two bodies of literature: cultural analysis of social
movement media and cultural production within new waves of global protest, and studies
of extractivism and post-development in Latin America. It advances the concept
of mediated cultural politics to tell the story of a movement that, through creative media
practices, protest and direct democracy, mobilized society over these issues. At the same
time, the study analyzes how a so-called progressive Latin American government uses
different forms of statist media power to halt the movement. The research design includes
a qualitative, mixed-methods ethnography of the movement, as well as archival work,
analysis of media texts on the struggle, and visual analysis of movement-based cutlural
production. The analysis reveals the contradictions of 21st century socialist states, and the
implications that extractivism and statist media power have on processes of
democratization in Latin America. It offers some reflections on the post-development
imaginaries emerging from contemporary anti-extractivist movements.
Keywords: Amazon, Ecuador, extractivism, Latin American social movements, media
power, mediated cultural politics, post-development, Yasunidos, Yasuní ITT
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CHAPTER 1
NEW WAVES OF PROTEST IN ECUADOR’S CITIZEN REVOLUTION
1.1 Introduction: The end of the Yasuní ITT initiative gives rise to a new movement
On August 15, 2013, Ecuadorian President Correa announced the suspension of
one of his signature projects, Yasuní ITT.1 This project, conceived by Ecuadorian
ecologists, was adopted by President Correa in June 2007 shortly after he assumed office.
The goal was to raise sufficient funds from the global North to leave 920 million barrels
of oil in the ground in the Yasuní National Park. In addition to being one of the most biodiverse regions in the world, the Yasuní is home to several indigenous pueblos and
nacionalidades (peoples and nationalities), including nomadic groups that have avoided
contact and colonization since European contact.2 Claiming that the initiative had not
raised sufficient funds, President Correa announced that the government would proceed
with “Plan B,” oil extraction of this beloved national treasure.
The evening that the announcement was delivered, thousands of citizens gathered
peacefully in the Quito’s historic center and plazas around the country to hold candlelight
vigils for the Yasuní. Vigils had begun even before the announcement, as rumors spread
about the government’s change of direction. Two days later, on August 17, 2013, nationwide protests erupted across the nation. Collective disillusionment about the
abandonment of the Yasuní ITT project spread rapidly across Ecuador through word-ofmouth, traditional media and social networks. Public forums, marches and protests were
quickly organized in cities and towns across Ecuador, similar to the way word spread
1

ITT refers to oil blocks Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini, named after rivers in the Yasuní.
The presence of the Taromenare and Tagaeri had been acknowledged in the government’s Yasuní ITT
documents, but once plans changed, maps were adjusted and their presence was subsequently denied.
2

1

during Occupy Wall Street and other recent waves of protest across the globe. The
following day, on August 18, 2013, the Yasunidos collective was founded by urban
young people in Quito. Yasunidos would go on to build an unprecedented, enduring,
mediated field of protest that would challenge the Correa government on its extractive
politics in the Amazon and elsewhere.
The strong reaction by citizens to the government’s decision to exploit the Yasuní
was due, in part, to the success that Ecuadorian social movements had in the late 1990s
and early 2000s in rejecting the neoliberal order that had become the law of the land.
Later, those movements participated in crafting the path-breaking, progressive 2008
Constitution, which include the rights of Nature (the first Constitution in the world to
declare Nature a subject of rights); territorial rights for indigenous peoples; and
obligatory previous consultation in territories where extractive activities were proposed.
All of these rights were at stake in the Yasunidos case.
Ironically, national and global indignation was also fueled by the resounding
success of the government’s Yasuní ITT media campaign, which, since 2007, had
passionately communicated the irreplaceable value of the Yasuní for Ecuador and the
global community. The radical, post-neoliberal proposal to “keep the oil in the ground”3
fostered pride and ecological consciousness in many Ecuadorians, and brought positive
international attention to President Correa. Now, in an apparent reversal4, the government
would launch another multi-million dollar media campaign designed to build public
The first campaign to “keep the oil in the ground” was in Nigeria.
Those who closely followed the management of the Yasuní National Park and Yasuní ITT initiative had
valid reasons to doubt the government’s commitment to leaving the oil in the ground, including
documented extractive activities in neighboring Block 31 by Petroamazonas (the state oil company) and
China’s growing presence in Ecuador as a lender, investor, and purchaser of Ecuadorian oil. See Los
Taladros Petroleros (2013); Martinez (2009); Ross (2014).
3
4

2

consent for its plans to move ahead with oil drilling. This time it would not be an easy
sell, given the popularity of the Yasuní ITT initiative. In fact, the mediated battle between
Yasunidos and the Correa government, and the events that would take place during the
following year, would mark a point of inflection in Ecuadorian politics. It would
influence how people viewed the government, its use of media, and its undemocratic
treatment of social movements and citizens.
Correa’s “Plan B” was consistent with the overall trend of the Latin American
progressive governments5: a combination of intensifying resource extraction and
criminalizing protest. Gudynas (2014), a leading scholar on issues related to resource
extraction and post-extractivist approaches, defines extractivism as activities in which
natural resources (oil, mining, agriculture, and monoculture such as cultivation of shrimp
and soy) are extracted in large volumes, and/or high intensity, and that are mainly
oriented toward exportation as materia prima, or with minimal processing (p. 80).
Svampa (2013) proposes that such extractivist politics are part of a new economic and
political-ideological order, “the Commodities Consensus”, indicating a phase that follows
“the Washington Consensus” (p. 117). This “boom” in state-led resource extraction had
been driven and sustained by the rise in international prices for raw materials.6 Yet, while
these practices fueled economic growth and public investment, they also led to greater
inequality and a new cycle of protests across the Americas, which focused on the defense
of territories targeted for exploitation (Gudynas, 2012). In this “eco-territorial turn”’ new

5

Governments often included in the list of progressive governments are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
6
These prices declined dramatically in the global market in 2014.
3

languages of valoration traverse socio-environmental struggles across the continent”
(Svampa, 2011, p. 185).
Yasunidos is part of the new wave of resistance to these governments’ neoextractivist practices. Gudynas (2012) differentiates between “classic” extractivism
(heavily dependent on foreign investors, who take most of the profits), and “neo”
extractivism, in that it is structured and defended differently, with greater state
protagonism, and profits directed towards social investment (I use both terms
interchangeably). However, Gudynas points out that, despite nationalist rhetoric, states
continue to depend on investment by transnational actors. Also, governments defending
their extractivist practices argue that the social and ecological costs are minimal, and that
profits will be directed toward Amazonian communities, unlike in previous governments.
One if the contributions of this study are that it brings together social movement
scholarship, post-development literature, and media studies, which have not always been
in dialogue.
1.2 Overview of dissertation project
My dissertation is a case study of Yasunidos, an anti-extractivist social movement
that emerged in Ecuador on August 18, 2013. This movement, over the course of nine
intense months, sought to halt the Ecuadorian government’s plan to drill for oil in the
Yasuní, one of the most biodiverse regions in the world. It accomplished this through
creative protest and direct democratic mechanisms. The case study is also about how the
Ecuadorian government responded to this movement in the most undemocratic way
through its statist power and expanded media power. It calls attention to the
contradictions that have arisen, as the government has abandoned a key ecological
4

project, to keep the oil in the soil in the Yasuní. The case study examines the highly
mediated, cultural battle between them, in which the issues of extractivism and the
meaning of development are central. As the study details, Yasunidos is a new,
horizontally-organized, ecological social movement that broadly incorporates students,
feminists, eco-feminists, indigenous, mestizo, urban, rural and Amazonian individuals
and communities. Many of the young people who quickly adhered to the movement did
not have previous experience with social movements or organizing (I examine Yasunidos
identity in more detail in Chapter 2). One of its key successes is that it was able to put
society in movement. At a time when protest was at a low point in Ecuador, this mediated
battle got the entire country thinking and talking about the Yasuní.
I have chosen to examine the Yasunidos case for a number of reasons: 1) It brings
to the foregound one very interesting, particular case about a movement that is part of a
new wave of resistance to extractivism in the progressive states; 2) it calls attention to
how processes of democratization from below can not only challenge state power but can
enact and capture post-development imaginaries that are taking hold in the region; 3) it
examines the repressive, undemocratic practices of the Ecuadorian government as it
pursues resource extraction, with an emphasis on how statist media power is used to
repress and criminalize social movements and protest actions; and 4) it sheds light on
state-social movement conflict from a much-needed communications perspective.
I argue that a communication perspective is essential for several reasons: a) it
highlights how state media practices violate the communication rights framework that
was inscribed in the 2008 Constitution; b) it demonstrates how the government’s
communication practices are intrinsically related to its political practices, given the
5

unprecedented expansion of the government’s material and symbolic media power,; and
c) it underscores the mediated cultural politics of a new movement, which include using
new technologies to circulate images of street protest, political art and embodied
practices that contest the meaning of extractivism and development in Ecuador.
The broader context for this study is the increasing tensions between the so-called
gobiernos progresistas (progressive governments) and the social movements that helped
bring them to power, as they seek to make governments accountable to their pledges to
privilege alternative development models.
This study provides a communications perspective in its analysis of state-social
movement relations. This is particularly relevant in Ecuador, where the government has
used its ever-expanding media power to justify its extractive politics, and question the
legitimacy of citizens, journalists and social movements who oppose such practices. By
media power I follow Couldry’s (2003) conceptualization, which encompasses media’s
symbolic and material dimensions, and emphasizes its definitional power, which
influences and shapes the whole of social space.
Applying a communication lens to this mediated conflict led me to analyze how
Yasunidos has communicated dissent on an uneven playing field in which it has had to
confront not only state power, but also the state’s media power. I conceptualize such
movement practices as mediated cultural politics, by which I mean social movements’
mediated cultural expressions that interrupt hegemonic meanings. The Yasunidos’
mediated cultural politics are centered on counter-hegemonic meanings of development,
or what is also referred to as post-development (Escobar 2014) or post-extractivism
(Gudynas 2012). In the Ecuadorian context, disputes about the nature of development
6

often entail the use of the concept Buen Vivir or Sumak Kawsay in the indigenous Kichwa
language (literally, good living), an indigenous concept integrated into the 2008
Ecuadorian Constitution, which points to sustainable, non-capitalist models of
development in which living beings and the natural environment take precedence over
material wealth (Acosta, 2012). However, the government has deployed the concepts of
development and Buen Vivir in the service of extractivist projects, with promises that
extraction will bring material wealth to the Amazon. Hence, my focus on these dialogical
concepts of media power and mediated cultural politics are lenses with which I analyze
the battle over these contested meanings between the Ecuadorian government and
Yasunidos. I am in dialogue with contemporary, critical left Latin American and Latin
Americanist scholars, especially those who have been documenting, assessing and
theorizing this era of the progressive left governments. These conceptual frameworks are
discussed in Section 1.4 of this introduction.
My dissertation examines three related questions:
1) How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist
politics in Ecuador?
a. How has the mediatization of the conflict becme a constitutive part of the
struggle?
2) How has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador?
a. How has it used its media power to delegitimize and criminalize
Yasunidos and other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní?
3) How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power?
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a. How has Yasunidos deployed a mediated cultural politics of postdevelopment, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and
practices?
Analyzing these questions reveals the cultural battle being waged over the
meaning of extractivism and development in 21st century Latin America, in a context
fraught with contradictions. They illuminate tensions between democratizing processes
led by social movements, and the increasingly undemocratic practices of extractivist
states. In referring to processes of democratization, I follow Latin American scholars that
take distance from the analysis of democracy as a specific kind of regime, but rather view
processes of democratization as “spaces of experience and experimentation that arise
from specific historical, geographical and cultural conditions” (Ramirez, 2012, p. 107).
Nor should democracy be understood as solely emanating from electoral politics or from
political elites, but also from social movements and other sectors of civil society
(Dagnino et al., 2008; Ramirez, 2012).
1.3 Regional contexts
1.3.1 Latin America’s “left turn”
In Latin America, a profound process of capitalist restructuring gained
momentum through the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s
(Svampa, 2011; Ospina, 2013; Grupo Permanente de Trabajo sobre Alternativas al
Desarrollo, 2013). The effects of these policies led to the de-nationalization and
widespread privatization of public and natural resources, including the deregulation,
privatization and concentration of media and telecommunication industries (Hintz, 2011;
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Mastrini and Becerra, 2011).7 In the 1990s and 2000’s, responding to the devastating
effects of neoliberalism, social movements across the Americas organized massive
mobilizations, including the Zapatista uprising in Mexico,8 civil society protests in
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, and indigenous uprisings in Bolivia and Ecuador. These
social movements were responsible, in part, for the subsequent wave of electoral victories
of Left-leaning parties and movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
While there has not been a single route taken by the progressive governments,
there has been a correlation among their rhetoric, legislative actions and foreign relations
policies that reflect nationalist, anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist militancy. Zibechi
(2010) suggests that the regional political reality has been reconfigured in several
interrelated ways: the fight to overcome U.S. domination; the presence of anti-imperial
tendencies and the inclusion of alternative visions of development. A fourth dimension,
which is in tension with alternative visions of development, has been the national-popular
projects that have prioritized industrialization. Notably, Lander (2013) argues that these
projects and tendencies coexist to varying degrees in each state, and that none can be
analyzed as if they were unitary, coherent, or free of tensions and contradictions.
In what is now widely referred to as the retorno al Estado9 (return of the state), a
common goal among the progressive Latin American governments has been to strengthen
the state as a strategic, regulatory body (DeMoraes, 2011). This has led to a measure of
7

By 1983, approximately 85% of the media was under private ownership in Latin America (see Mastrini
and Becerra 2011).
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The Zapatista uprising notably took place on the same day that the Free Trade Agreement between the
U.S. and Mexico went into effect, January 1, 1994
9
The phrase in Spanish is taken from Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1985).
Bringing the state back in. Cambridge University Press.
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growth in social spending in health, education, salaries and public works, and the
implementation of policies that seek to redistribute resources more equitably.10 Yet,
while these governments take on ambitious modernization projects with public funds
derived from natural resource extraction, and mediated rhetoric celebrates popular power,
the question has been raised as to what democratic participation means in these contexts,
especially when social movements and their demands have been routinely delegitimized
(Daza et al., 2013; Lander, 2013; Martínez, 2009; Ospina et al., 2013). For this reason,
many scholars and activists now refer to the progressive governments as the so-called
progressive governments.
In this study, I use this term “so-called” when I wish to draw attention to the gap
between the rhetoric and extractive practice of these governments. However, I continue to
refer to them (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela) as
progressive to acknowledge a rupture with the neoliberal governments of the 1990s and
early 2000s, and the ushering in of a new era in Latin America which began with the
election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. I also seek to distinguish between these
governments and contemporary right-wing, neoliberal governments. At the same time, to
varying degrees, they are all less anti-neoliberal, socialist and democratic than their
rhetoric or practices. With regards to extractivism, they have deepened extractive
practices, and in addition, have criminalized social movements, among other antidemocratic actions. Many scholars agree that the era of progressive governments has
ended or is coming to an end due to increasing contradictions, or their replacement by
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However, as DeSouza Santos (2010) points out, while the main focus has been on lifting the most
vulnerable sectors of society out of poverty, this does not necessarily mean that the interests of the wealthy
and powerful have been negatively affected.
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right-wing governments (At the time of writing, Argentina and Brazil now have rightwing governments).
1.3.2 Restructuring symbolic and material power: media battles and reforms
Another key piece involved in the return of the state has been the progressive
governments’ undertaking of precedent-setting media reforms, and media battles with
private media companies. These processes have been partial, uneven and conflictive, and
have played out differently in each country. Generally speaking, these reforms have
sought to curb the unchecked growth of private media groups that was enabled by
neoliberal (de)regulatory frameworks established during the latter part of the 20th century.
They have also been part of broader strategies to counter the negative campaigns that
private media companies and other political opponents have waged against them. In the
cases of Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, these strategies have also included suing,
taking over, shutting down, managing and controlling private media companies.
Arguably, building a strong presence in the media is one of the principal ways in which a
government can communicate with its citizens; publicize its worldview nationally and
internationally, and contest oppositional factions. And, as private media companies have
been critical of, and have taken oppositional positions to these governments, rolling back
private media has been a key strategy to curtail their power. Private national media and
international organisms such as Reporters Without Borders have framed the structural
reforms as hindering freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However, while
these institutions claim to stand on the value of freedom of expression, scholars and
media reform advocates point out that private media are mostly defending freedom of
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expression for a small group of corporations (Cerbino et al., 2014; DeMoraes, 2011;
Ramos, 2010).
Scholars argue across a continuum both for and against government-led media
reform. For example, Brazilian scholar DeMoraes (2011, p.17) has argued the need for
government regulation of media concentration, given that “… the state is the only
institution that can safeguard cultural diversity as a fundamental element of citizenship.
… [and hence] the importance of legislation that takes into account freedom of
expression as a constitutive part of communication rights.” DeMoraes proposes that state
investment has been central to the development of most key industries, and that
investment in the media industry is equally important. On the other hand, while
Waisbord (2011, 2012) acknowledges that private media are at the forefront of the
opposition to these governments, he argues that unregulated statism is also worrisome,
particularly in a region with a legacy of government discretionalism, weak accountability
and the concentration of presidential power.
Communication scholars have sought to theorize and characterize new
configurations of media power in Latin America by extending the study of populism and
populist practices to the study of media reform. Waisbord (2011) proposes five
characteristics of populist media politics as practiced in “neo-populist” governments: 1) It
divides media into those who support, and those who are against the government, while
effacing the practice of independent journalism; 2) It targets specific media companies
and journalists, but does not seek to completely eliminate private media; 3) It seeks to
revamp rather than overturn private media, using Executive powers to punish and reward
groups according to their stance toward and media treatment of the government; 4) It
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seeks to strengthen and expand state-controlled media under the direction of the
Executive; and 5) It supports legislation that strengthens the regulatory power of the
Executive with respect to media content (often framed as social responsibility).
Moreover, Waisbord (2011) argues that the discrediting of, and retaliation against,
specific media outlets and journalists have had a chilling effect on private media as they
reinforce a climate of self-censorship. While I do not use the framework of populism or
neo-populism in this study, all of the characteristics cited by Waisbord resonate in the
case of Ecuador, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
For Hintz (2011), there are a range of factors that should be considered in
analyzing whether and to what extent media policies are favorable to civil society.
Among them are the extent of media concentration; how national laws are implemented;
transnational influences; support for community media; and whether or not independent
voices and cultural production are promoted (or repressed) by the state. Barriers to civil
society-oriented policies includes a lack of: independence of legislative bodies to the
Executive; transparency by government agencies; and comprehensive and consistent
response to media concentration. These criteria are highly relevant to my analysis of
statist media power in Ecuador. In the same way that the progressive governments
cannot be analyzed as a whole, media practices and reforms have had dramatically
different trajectories in each country. The contribution of this study to this body of
literature is the examinination of not only Ecuador’s media reforms, but actual media
practices, and how they were enacted in conjunction with extractive practicws. I also
analyze how other legislation and state actions, not directly related to communication but
to protest and criminalization of social actors, have enabled or constrained public and
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political expression by media actors, social movements and citizens.
To conclude this section, while early literature about the so-called Latin American
“pink tide” tended to either romanticize or demonize these processes, especially relating
to the more “radical” administrations of Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales
(Garretón et al., 2003, Hershberg and Rosen, 2006; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011;
Weyland, et al., 2010), recent literature has sought to critically take stock of the impacts
of the first decade of state transformation and reform in the region (Stahler-Shock,
Vanden and Becker, 2013). Though rarely discussed in the same study, my dissertation
addresses two arenas of criticism of the “so-called” progressive governments, extractivist
projects and media practices of the Ecuadorian government. These two practices must be
put in conversation, especially in that the government has used its media power to
legitimate its extractivist practices.
1.3.3 Contradictions and conflicts: from progressive constitutions to neo-extractive
practices.
The governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have sought to transform the
state, in part, through the creation of progressive, conceptually innovative constitutions,
which have purported to advance radical democratic agendas under the rubric “Socialism
of the 21st Century (Ellner, 2014).11 Given the constituent assembly processes that
ensued, characterized by democratic debate as well as polarizing political conflict, these
constitutions (Bolivia 2009, Ecuador 2008, Venezuela 1999) incorporated the input of
11

21st Century Socialism differs in several aspects from 20 th century socialism, first and foremost, because
the centralized state and complete control of the market is not a goal of these governments. 21 st Century
Socialism, a term first used by Chavez in Venezuela, is geopolitically specific and refers to a postneoliberal era in which these governments have rejected the dominance of the U.S., Europe and
transnational organisms such as the World Bank. Correa has defined Ecuador as a 21 st century socialist
state.
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social movements and diverse sectors of society. Given the recent founding of these
constitutions, and the participatory nature of their crafting, there has been a high level of
investment in them by diverse social actors. As such, they are sites of permanent
construction, interpretation, debate, and contention (Lander, 2013). This is particularly
true in instances where there are large gaps between what was inscribed in these
constitutions, and actual state practices.
One of the biggest sources of conflict between these states and indigenous,
environmental, ecological and feminist social organizations and movements has been the
expansion of extractivist practices. In fact, many scholars and activists argue that
extractivism is the main threat to the environment, indigenous communities, rural
women’s lives, and to territorial integrity of indigenous populations in Latin America
(Lander, 2013; Seoane, 2013; Svampa, 2013). While extractive activities have increased
in virtually all Latin American countries in the 21st century, the difference between rightwing and progressive government approaches to resource extraction has been that the
latter have applied more state controls, have taken a greater share of the profits, and have
reinvested some of the profits in social spending and public works. However, despite the
investment, many activists argue that extractive activities contradict the spirit and letter
of the new constitutions. The case of Yasunidos offers an example of how democracy has
been eroded in Ecuador due to extractivist policies and practices. An analysis that makes
such connection can contribute to the democratization studies, as it is one that is rarely
made.
Factors that have driven the expansion of extractive frontiers have included the
high prices of materia prima on the international market, which has provided
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governments with funds for social services and infrastructure, which in turn has helped
them to preserve their legitimacy and electoral support. Unfortunately, commitments to
transform the economic and productive model, to honor territorial rights of indigenous
groups and the rights of Nature, have not been fulfilled (Lander, 2013). Instead,
extractivist activities have been framed by “so-called” progressive governments as
essential for “progress,” “development” and “modernization,” and to eradicate poverty
and attain Buen Vivir. The governments of Morales, Correa and Chavez pledged to
deepen democracy, and to push representational democracy towards more participatory,
radical forms. However, extractivist practices have eroded processes of democratization.
They have led to the violation of rights and have generated diverse forms of violence,
including: the forced eviction and militarization of communities; the contamination of
ecosystems leading to severe health issues; the criminalization of protest and jailing of
activists. In Ecuador, Uruguay and Bolivia, governments have ended up eliminating or
compromising referendums, previous consultation, and other participatory mechanisms
when faced with citizen resistance. In Bolivia and Ecuador, new restrictions have been
put on the legal formation of social organizations, and some organizations have been
closed or threatened with closure (Ecuador’s Decree 16, and the subsequent closure of
Pachamama Foundation is discussed in Chapter Three) (Seone et al., 2013). Maristella
Svampa’s assessment sums it up:
It is clear that the expansion of the border of rights (collective, territorial,
environmental) met limits in the growing expansion of the borders of exploitation
of capital, in search of goods (bienes), land and territories, and threw to the ground
emancipatory narratives which had raised strong expectations, especially in
countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. (Svampa, 2015, p. 91).
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To sum up this section, the continuation and deepening of extractive practices have
revealed the contradictions between the rhetoric and practices of Left governments, and
their violation of new constitutional mandates. However, these anti-democratic practices
are being met with new waves of protest and other forms of resistance.
1.3.4 Latin American anti-extractivist protest and social movements
Opposition and resistance to resource extraction is as old as resource extraction
itself. In the past and still today, many struggles are waged at the local level. But with the
intensification of extractive projects across the Americas, and the subsequent growth of
national, regional and international activist networks, recent conflicts have gained greater
visibility.12 Some of the more notable cases have provoked massive citizen marches and
international solidarity campaigns, including Famatima (a town in Northern Argentina
that successfully expulsed four mining companies in a decade)13; Tipnis (construction of
a highway through indigenous lands and national park in Bolivia); Yasuní (planned oil
exploitation in indigenous lands and national park in Ecuador); and Cajamarca and
Tambogrande (mega-mining projects in Peru) (Gudynas, 2014).
Many of the movements involved in these struggles were also active in the antineoliberal protests in the late 1990s and early 2000s. So, what is the relationship between
these different moments, and what are the characteristics of these new waves of protests
and movements? Seone et al. (2013) argue that the current movement activity takes place
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Important anti-extractivist networks include AIDESEP (Peru); CLAES (Latin American region);
CONACAMI (Peru); and Oil Watch (international), among others.
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Origlia, Gabriela. (2015). Famatina: la historia de un pueblo que en nueve años expulsó a cuatro mineras.
La Nación November 8th. Retrieved from: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1843559-famatina-la-historia-de-unpueblo-que-en-nueve-anos-expulso-a-cuatro-mineras
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in a distinct political context in which there is a new configuration of forces in the region.
Conflicts have grown in size and number as progressive governments at the helm not
only break their pledges to dismantle the extractive model, but intensify it. Seone et al.
further argue that in the current phase of a supposed rupture with neoliberal regimes,
governments have repositioned extractivism as necessary. As such, “the myth of progress
is reborn from progresismo.” (Gudynas, 2014a, p. 150).
Post-extractivism is a concept that points toward the development of strategies
and alternatives to extractivist projects. Ecuador’s Yasuní ITT campaign to keep the oil in
the ground was one of the most notable proposals, in that the Ecuadorian government
took on this citizen-led campaign. In fact, Ecuador was one of the first countries to
propose a post-petrol state. The campaign to “keep the oil in the soil” originally emerged
from Amazonian communities that were against oil extraction in their territories, and was
subsequently taken on by the ecologist movement. The idea became a more concrete
proposal in Oil Watch’s position paper in June 2005, and became part of the Plan de
Gobierno 2007-2011. The proposal was eventually proposed officially by the Ministry of
Energy and Mines in 2007 (Acosta, et al., 2013). Such history makes clear that social
movement protest and proposals have led to changes in the laws and constitutions.
Unfortunately, the story also reveals that despite legal and constitutional mandates, the
progressive governments have failed to provide substantive alternatives to development.
Hence, while governments continue to embrace their ¨progressive¨ label, they
cling to older models of development and resource extraction. In response, resistance to
these models are growing, and are gaining more visibility inside and outside of the
region. While there is a great deal of literature about extractivism, few of these studies
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frame the conflicts as cultural battles in which competing imaginaries about the meaning
of development are at stake. Nor has the role of media and mediation on these conflicts
been much studied. This dissertation makes a contribution to the study of this new wave
of protest by analyzing how mediation and counter-hegemonic, post-development
imaginaries have shaped these conflicts. Ecuador’s vibrant ecological movement and the
Yasuní ITT initiative are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.
1.3.5 Ecuador: From a progressive constitution to extractivist practices
In 2007, Rafael Correa, a relatively unknown economics professor who had held
one government position prior to becoming president, ushered in Ecuador’s so-called
“left turn,” branding it the Citizens’ Revolution. At that conjecture, the project
represented the collective construction of the majority of Ecuadorians that had recently
deposed three presidents in less than a decade. (Vega, 2013, p. 103). Once elected, Correa
called for a Constituent Assembly. Social movement actors and many other citizens were
part of the process. While fraught with tensions and contradictions, the end product was a
progressive, truly innovative (though far from perfect) Constitution.
The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution integrated the Indigenous concept of Buen
Vivir or Sumak Kawsay, which points to an alternative, sustainable, non-capitalist model
of development. For many, the inclusion of Buen Vivir means conceptualizing
development as a way of life in which living beings and the natural environment take
precedence over material wealth (Acosta, 2012; Gudynas, 2009; Lander, 2013).
Instrinsically tied to the notion of Buen Vivir is the recognition that indigenous,
afrodescendent and other pueblos’ have collective rights to maintain and develop their
cultural identities and ancestral territories. These rights include the timely and obligatory
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consulta previa (previous consultation) regarding any government or governmentsanctioned plans to prospect, extract or commercialize non-renewable resources on
collectively-owned lands. In Chapter Four, I argue that this constellation of concepts and
rights has impacted the imaginaries of the citizenry, particularly a new generation that
Yasunidos represents.
One of the most celebrated articles in the Ecuadorian 2008 Constitution is that
Nature is a subject of rights. This is the first constitution in Latin America, and the world,
to incorporate this right. Nature is defined in Article 71 of the constitution as “where life
is reproduced and carried out.” 14 Taken together, these concepts and corresponding rights
open the door towards a conception of democracy that transcends tenets of liberal
democracy. However, these were not new concepts in Ecuador. The founding documents
of CONFENAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía
Ecuatoriana), created in 1980, and documents of other indigenous organizations such as
the UNAE (Unión de Nativos de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana, 1976) contained passages that
expressed their rejection of oil drilling and other forms of resource extraction, and
included the care for Nature as essential for life (Berrios & Cuevas, 2014).
Most of the ecological organizations initially supported Correa, especially given
the Yasuní ITT pledge. However, this support would not last. Despite the path-breaking
2008 Constitution, extractivist projects increased in scale and intensity, causing conflicts
between the government and ecological and territorial social movements. The
contradictions between rhetoric and practice were glaringly evident: even as the
government deployed their campaign Yasuní Depende de Ti (the Yasuní depends on You)
14
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in October 2007, it granted an environmental license to Petrobras for Block 31, a territory
inhabited by two indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation. The break between the
government and ecologists was definitive when the Mining Law was approved in 2009,
which opened the way towards mega-mining. This law permits transnational companies
to develop the mining industry with opencast or mountain top mining. When Alberto
Acosta resigned from his role as President of the Constituent Assembly in protest because
of the way in which the government imposed its will in the decision-making processes,
Correa began to attack the ecological sector much more openly. In 2009, on an Enlace
Ciudadano (the president’s television and radio show), he directed three insults against
ecologists that he would continue to use. He accused ecologists of being “infantiles”
(childish); “aniñados” (privileged, spoiled), and of having “barrigas llenas” (full bellies)
(LaTorre Tomás, 2009). These insults were meant to strip ecologists of legitimacy in the
eyes of indigenous actors, Amazonian communities, and public opinion in general. The
underlying message of these attacks is that the privileged, urban sector, who has never
known hunger, could not understand the needs of Amazonian communities. For Correa,
the ecological movement represented all that was contrary to his modernist project of
“progress”.
On March 5, 2012, the government signed the first mega-mining agreement with
Ecuacorrientes S.A. (a Canadian-Chinese enterprise) for 25 years. Three days later, over
20,000 indigenous, campesino and other social actors marched from Zamora to Quito.
The amount of citizen support encountered along the route was substantial, perhaps
surprising given the overwhelming popularity of the administration at that time. In
addition to this being the first large mobilization since Correa came to power, Ospina
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(2013) encountered a few notable items, including the “disproportionate” (p. 28)
government publicity campaign which sought to discredit the marchers, and the
deployment of a government-facilitated counter march. These practices have since
characterized the way in which the government has dealt with protest.
As this brief section details, initial enthusiasm for Correa’s Citizen Revolution by
social movements has increasingly given way to conflict and opposition. As Escobar
(2010) argues, the so-called progressive governments have demonstrated that, despite
pledges to transform the development model, there is still a lack of engagement with a
post-capitalist, alternative forms of modernity that could potentially lead to significant
changes in this model.
1.4 Theoretical Overview
1.4.1 Theoretical frameworks and perspectives
This dissertation seeks to make theoretical, methodological and empirical
contributions to the fields of critical media theory and social movement studies, two
bodies of literature that I bring into conversation in this study. Principally, I utilize two
conceptual frameworks, statist media power and mediated cultural politics, to analyze the
conflict between the Ecuadorian government and Yasunidos, as they engage in broader
cultural struggles over meanings of extractivism, development, and Buen Vivir. In
addition to analyzing the contours of statist media power, I explore its limitations, and
how social movements interrupt it. I am also in dialogue with social movement
scholarship that analyzes the media practices of social movements and the symbolic
dimensions of struggle.

22

1.4.2 Statist media power
Within media studies, I am in conversation with scholarship relating to the
concept of media power. This concept has mainly been used in the study of media
institutions in Western liberal democracies, which tend to focus on the power of media
corporations (Couldry, 2003; Freedman, 2014). On the contrary, my study focuses on the
communicational dynamics at play in state-social movement relations in the context of a
Latin American media system that is markedly different than liberal democratic media
systems. In Ecuador (as in the other Left governments in the region), the typical Latin
American configuration of media power, in which the state and private media are allies,
has been transformed under Correa. By making explicit dimensions of statist media
power, I emphasize both its symbolic and structural aspects, and ways in which they
reinforce each other. I use the concept of statist media power to call attention to the
Ecuadorian government as the main holder of media power. My study differs from
scholars that study the changes underway in Latin American media institutions by
focusing on state-private media relations (including those that use populism as an
analytical framework). It is rare to find studies that analyze the impact that reconfigured
media power has had on social movements in both media and social movement studies.
This study analyzes the reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador since 2007,
when Rafael Correa assumed the presidency. While private media has historically been a
dominant force in Ecuador, as in much of the world, I would argue that, during the time
period under discussion, the government had unprecedented media power given the
collusion of state and media meta-capital (which I refer to as statist media power). I trace
the way in which Correa’s administration has dramatically reshaped media and
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communication practices in Ecuador, and examine the significance that such practices
have had for social movements. I extend Nick Couldry’s (2003) conceptual elaboration of
media power, which emphasizes its symbolic dimensions and its definitional power,
which influences and shapes the whole of social space. Drawing on Bourdieu (1989) but
taking into account mediatization15 processes that were less pronounced at the time when
Bourdieu wrote, Couldry argues that media power is generated in and across fields,
particularly the journalistic and political fields. He extends Bourdieu’s concept of the
meta-capital of the state, which refers to the state’s power over other fields, arguing that
only the media’s meta-capital can compete with that of the state’s meta-capital. I apply
this concept to the Ecuadorian context, in which media meta capital is an integral part of
the state’s meta-capital. In Ecuador, the government’s media power potently traverses the
journalistic and political fields, impacting all fields of power and social space. Hence,
statist media power is a critical site at which I interrogate symbolic as well as materialist
struggles between the government and social movements. I also draw on Des Freedman’s
(2014) work on media power. While he also takes into account the symbolic aspects of
media power, and how it can shape, modify, promote and reinforce particular ideologies,
his analysis remains anchored in media power’s unequally distributed allocation of
resources.
I chart the reconfiguration of statist media power, its symbolic and material
dimensions, in several ways. In Chapter 3, I analyze how the Correa government has
wrought substantive changes through its communication practices, media reforms,
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Without entering into the long-standing theoretical debate about mediatization, I am simply referring to
media’s pervasive influence over social space. Mediatization assumes that media practices are constitutive
of the social construction of reality (Couldry 2014).
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legislative and judicial actions. I track the way the government has used its statist media
power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics, as it simultaneously has sought to
delegitimize dissenting voices. I also examine how the Enlace Ciudadano (Citizen’s Link,
also referred to in this study as EC) has been the main platform for the government to
communicate its agenda and ideological course.
My study also interrogates the limitations and excesses of statist media power.
Des Freedman (2014) offers some useful thoughts about resistance to media power.
Freedman’s theorization of media power is, as he states, mainly relevant to countries with
“pluralist political arrangements and intensively marketized economic systems where the
configuration of media power is formally separate from but intertwined with the state” (p.
3). However, he proposes that media power is not as impermeable as often thought. He
also argues that readers actively interprete media texts (a common argument in cultural
studies literature). As his own empirical studies have shown, including in the cases where
dominant media strongly asserts certain editorial lines.
1.4.3 Mediated cultural politics
If we compare Yasunidos or any other social movement’s media power with that
of the government’s, it is evident that these groups are at a disadvantage. So,
theoretically, how can we account for the ways in which Yasunidos has been able to
interrupt the government´s media power? I propose that the notion of mediated cultural
politics is crucial for understanding how Yasunidos has mobilized counter-hegemonic
meanings, proposed alternatives to the prevailing order, shaped collective imaginaries,
and generated a common ground of struggle on a national level. They have done so in the
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face of the government’s unprecedented power to represent its version of the Yasuní
story.
The idea of mediated cultural politics fuses two distinct conceptualizations. The
first is Alvarez et al.’s (1998) cultural politics framework. Despite important theoretical
contributions about the constitutive role of culture in social movements, scholars who
have studied contemporary Latin American social movements have rarely analyzed or
linked cultural politics or cultural production to political action (Alvarez et. al. 1998;
Escobar, 1992). Recent scholarship on Latin American anti-extractivist social movements
bears witness to the lack of attention given to how movements deploy cultural politics in
social struggles (Acosta et al, 2013; Gudynas 2013; Seone et al. 2013). On the contrary,
Alvarez et al. (1998) have argued for the centrality of culture, pointing out that a focus on
culture does not necessarily mean that historical context and structural inequalities are
neglected. Dissatisfied with the disciplinary borders that framed the analysis of Latin
American social movements, Alvarez et. al. (1998) drew attention to “how social
movements operate at the interface of culture and politics.” (p. xi). By simultaneously
examining “the cultural in the political and the political in the cultural” (p. xi) they
propose that a cultural politics is enacted “when movements deploys alternative
conceptions of ‘woman, nature, race, economy, democracy or citizenship’ that trouble
and resignify dominant discourses and practices (199, p. 6). Methodologically, we can
track such “deployment of alternative conceptions” and their impact on diverse publics
by studying the texts, images, videos, rituals, etc. that movements produce and circulate.
Similarly, Escobar contends that “social movements must be seen equally and
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inseparably as struggles over meanings as well as material conditions, that is, as cultural
struggles” (1992, p. 69). He argues that:
[S]ymbolic creativity in everyday life is vibrant, if somewhat invisible; it involves
language, the body, performance rituals, work, and both individual and collective
identities. It is essential for social movement research to tap into this level of
popular practice….It is out of this reservoir of meanings … that people give shape
to their struggle. (1998, p.71).
Escobar distinguishes this notion of culture from those that understand it as
“something embedded in a set of canonical texts, beliefs and artifacts and characterized
by a certain abstract universality” which in effect, renders invisible the daily lives and
practices of people and movements (1998, p. 70). The cultural politics approach also
departs from notions of culture as unified, fixed, or as either traditional practices, nationbased, or as high art. Following these scholars, this dissertation takes seriously the way in
which Yasunidos mobilized culture to appeal to counter-hegemonic, post-development
imaginaries about the intrinsic value of leaving the oil in the ground in the Yasuní.
Secondly, I draw on Jesus Martín-Barbero´s understanding of mediation as sociocultural manifestations that traverse and give meaning to the process of communication
(Gámez 2007, p. 208). In the past few years, scholars have veered away from
technologist or romantic notions of activist media use. Rather they have theorized the
complex processes that traverse social movements and their media practices. Lievrouw
(2011) has called for a theoretical bridge between interpersonal interaction and media,
proposing that mediation can indicate the use of technology to extend or enhance
communication. It also can refer to “the interpersonal process of participation or
intervention in the creation and sharing of meaning” (p. 4). These two dimensions are
“complementary and mutually determining aspects of the whole phenomenon of
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communication, rather than analytically separate and competing domains.” (p. 4). A
focus on mediation displaces a restrictive focus on the media and rather focuses on social
actors and processes that shape meanings and social imaginaries. A recent edited volume
on social movements and mediation processes (Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy, 2013)
contributes greatly to bringing these two bodies of literature together. In said volume,
McCurdy (2013, p. 6) prefers to view media as an environment that activists “live with,
live in and live through.” Other scholars extend social movement concepts: Mattoni
(2013) shifts Tilly and Tarrow’s conceptualization of repertoires of contention to
repertoires of communication , in order to examine mediated social practices. In another
instance, Constanza-Chock (2013) coined the phrase transmedia mobilization to refer to
the range and layering of media practices and communication platforms used by activists.
Scholars such as John Downing (2000) have been emphasizing diverse forms of
mediation for decades.
Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics have been deployed through an array of
media, including social media, alternative media, and myriad artistic and cultural
manifestations incorporated into protest actions. Beyond thinking about mediation as
mere tools or strategies, I address the potent symbolic effect of mediation in the shaping
of belief systems and social imaginaries. In the case of the meaning of Buen Vivir and
development, the government and Yasunidos have engaged in a symbolic, mediated
confrontation over their meaning. To grasp how power dynamics play out on a symbolic
terrain requires perceptive theoretical tools. A mediated cultural politics framework
allows for the articulation between creative and political expression, without diminishing
one dimension in favor of the other. It allows us to see the practices of art and media28

making (including painting, murals, ritual performance or street theater, producing radio
or video, etc.) as relevant to the everyday work of meaning-making and movementbuilding. And crucial for the study of social movements, it can shed light on processes
that a sole focus on media power might not detect.
My analysis of Yasunidos protests and other actions through a mediated cultural
politics framework has rendered visible the underside of media power. Even while the
Ecuadorian government wields statist media power, and therefore a greater capacity to
represent social reality, Yasunidos has constructed counter-hegemonic representations
from below that resonated widely with diverse publics. Hence, as explored in Chapter 4,
a mediated cultural politics framework theoretically, methodologically and empirically
challenges the idea that statist media power always has the upper hand in shaping
understandings of reality. I examine the multiple ways in which Yasunidos has
confronted the government’s media power, and how it has mobilized alternative notions
of development and Buen Vivir with symbols and images crafted from below and shared
horizontally. Such mediated cultural politics directly confronts the government’s distinct
use of the same concepts to justify opening the Yasuní to further intervention. Finally, by
distinguishing between statist media power and mediated cultural politics I am seeking to
identify and differentiate each actor’s weapons, so to speak. Working in tandem, the two
conceptual lenses, media power and mediated cultural politics help make visible the
contentious communication between the government and Yasunidos without solely
relying on a media-centric notion of power.
My dissertation also draws from research that examines the symbolic practices of
movements. Broadly speaking, the fields of social movement scholarship and media
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studies have not always interacted. Social movement scholarship has not sufficiently
taken into account the communicative practices of movements, or communicative
dynamics between movements and governments (Cammaerts et al., 2013). Likewise,
recent research about Latin American anti-extractivist social movements, where I situate
my study, rarely touches on mediated power dynamics, with some notable exceptions
(Vázquez, 2015). Fortunately, there are growing exceptions to what Downing (2008) has
described as a “divorce” (p. 41) between the fields of media and social movement
scholarship. A recent body of trans-disciplinary research that study what I call ‘new
activist cultures’ has made important strides in analyzing media use by 21st century social
movements (Cammaerts et al., 2013; Costanza-Chock, 2014; Cox et al., 2010; Juris,
2012; Mattoni & Trere, 2014; Nanabhay & Farmanfarmaian, 2011; Postill 2014).
Mattoni and Trere (2014) critique the one-medium bias in social movement literature that
misses the multiple ways in which social actors, and new and old media technologies,
come together.
Social movement scholars, notably those who are part of the current generation of
scholar-activists, are turning their attention to the intersection of new technologies and
creative expression that is generated in movement cultures. Many of these studies focus
on social movement media as embedded in daily practices (Costanza-Chock, 2014;
Fernandes, 2010; Juris, 2008; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; McNee, 2003), as a conduit toward
collective identity formation and “mass self-communication” (Castells, 2007, p. 246).
Cammaerts et al. (2013) employ the concept of mediation to address the shifting
relationship between media practices of social movements, patterns of media power and
counter-power, with attention to symbolic power. While this edited volume is a valuable
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contribution to social movement media studies, they emphasize the media practices and
environment of activists, though few chapters analyze the contentious communication
between movements and other actors, such as governments. One exception is the chapter
by Teune (2013), who analyzes the role that images play in the battle for visibility
between the German government and social movement actors at the 2007 G8 meeting.
However, most studies on movement mediation rarely analyze how such practices
confront state discourse and practices, which is where I hope to make a contribution.
The study of movement-based cultural production entails a multi-layered,
transdisciplinary investigation into the creation and circulation of diverse media and art,
and the use of public space by movement actors. It involves an analysis of the way that
photos, videos, graphics, performances and rituals, integrated into protest actions, can
bear witness to historic injustices and struggles, and provide symbolic currency that is
shared and borrowed among movements and diverse publics. It is attentive to ways in
which cultural production mobilizes counter-hegemonic images, discourses and
perspectives, and the way on-line and off-line interactions shape collective imaginaries.
For example, Mattoni et al. (2014, p. 4) argue that recent trends in social media practices
have facilitated a scenario in which widely shared icons, texts, and images become
“ubiquitous alternative media, linked through different technological sites and
platforms.” McCaughn (2012) turns his attention to the role of artists in movementbuilding, arguing that they help to create visualities and spaces through which citizens
imagine new forms of meaningful citizenship. Tucker (2010) argues that “aesthetic
politics” “…informs the understanding and practice of politics, the latter defined not only
in terms of representatives, but also concerning a ‘broadly politicized’ public life.” (p. 5).
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While such symbolic and performative manifestations have been widely used in protest
movements, arguably since the rise of new social movements in the 1970s and 80s
(Tucker, 2010, p. 43), in Ecuador, movements have typically enacted a more traditional
format of militant-style marches. Feminist and ecological movement actors introduced
more performative elements in the 1990s. Of course, all marches are performance to
some degree, here I refer to the widespread use of images, icons as well as playful, ludic
protest. In that sense, the way in which Yasunidos has deployed mediated cultural politics
has been noted by older social movement actors, political analysts and journalists.
Research presented in Chapter 4 indicates that the powerful images, symbols, and slogans
regularly displayed by Yasunidos in protest actions, zapateadas, press conferences,
plazas, and on their bodies was able to reach those citizens not necessarily tuned in to
political debates or social media conversations. Alvarez et al. (2016, p. 26) remind us that
political art can make visible “the very notion of alternatives.”
1.4.4 Post-Development Imaginaries
In Chapter 4, I examine how the mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos expresses
a post-development imaginary. In this conceptualization, I follow Escobar (2014), who
defines “post-development” as social practices and discourses that displace normative
conceptions of development, in order to identify alternatives to development.16 This
concept rejects the hierarchy of knowledge and power established by development
“experts.” Rather, it valores territorial, indigenous and movement knowledges. He traces
the advent of the term post-development to 1991, though arguably this concept began to
emerge in the 1980s in Ecuador and elsewhere. Within the field of post-development,
16

Escobar distinguishes the concept of post-development from alternative development, a concept that
remains within the development paradigm.
32

Escobar (2014) identifies five key theoretical and methodological tendencies, including
1) modernity/coloniality/decolonialy studies; 2) alternatives to development; 3)
transitions to post-extractivism; 4) discourses on the civilizational model, and 5) concepts
of community, relationality and the pluriverse. I believe that my exploration of postdevelopment imaginaries makes a theoretical contribution to this field of study by
analyzing how new, anti-extractivist movements are creating and circulating art and
embodied practices (in addition to media practices) that signal a generational turn with
regard to how resource extraction is regarded within a petrol state.
1.5 Research Methodologies
1.5.1 Reflexive, engaged, ethnographic, epistemologies of the South frameworks
This section discusses my methodological perspectives, what Saukko (2003)
refers to as the array of “tools, philosophical and political commitments” that accompany
a particular approach to research, and that bring forth a “partial and political perspective
on reality” (p. 8). I situate yy hybrid methodological framework as engaged, decolonial,
feminist, ethnographic research that adopts an epistemology of the South approach. Such
framework indicates that research is never neutral and is always traversed by power
relations, inequality, conflict, capitalist modes of production, colonial legacies and
divergent values and knowledges.
With respect to the question of engaged scholarship, I have been involved in
activism related to media justice, and have participated in both U.S.-based and Latin
American-based social movements. In fact, I have been an activist far longer than I have
been inside the academy, and in this research project I have sought to strike a balance
between the two. While Juris (2013, p. 344) warns that activist-researchers needs to take
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into account such “dual positionality” (p. 344), Maristella Svampa (2008) critiques the
expected fissure or false binary between the academic and the activist. She argues that:
…we believe it is possible to integrate both models that today are seen as
opposites, that of the academic and that of the militant [activist], without denying
the character of either one….we can establish the possibility of combining both into
one paradigm, that of the intellectual researcher as amphibian, a figure capable of
inhabiting and travelling through different worlds, and able to develop a better
comprehension and reflexivity about the different social realities, and about
oneself….with the possibility of generating multiple ties, solidarities and crossings
between different realities. (Svampa, 2008, p. 30).

My interest in anti-extractivist conflicts grew rapidly since arriving in Ecuador in
August 2012. While I had not been involved in ecological activism, several factors came
into play in my new geopolitical location that lent itself to this focus: exposure to
ecologists and indigenous individuals and movements active in resisting extractive
projects; the fact that Nature is a subject of rights in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution;
and my relatively close proximity to the Amazon. Even President Correa’s persuasive
campaign about the value of the Yasuní ITT region, impacted me. They caused me to
turn my attention to the relationship between political ecology, indigenous cosmovisions,
and anti-extractive struggles. In August 2013, when Correa officially abandoned the
Yasuní ITT project, I shared the anguish felt by thousands of Ecuadorian citizens.
Additionally, my sense was that it was an important coyuntura (historical moment) in
contemporary Ecuadorian politics. When Yasunidos came into being, not only was I
present at the marches and witnessed the passion of these young activists, I realized it
was the first highly-visible, nation-wide, anti-extractivist protest since I arrived a year
prior. Though it was not the first wave of protests since Correa was President, it seemed
quite significant, and I decided to track what was happening, though I had no idea how
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Yasunidos might develop, or even if it would last. I continued to pursue my research on
the communication law (my original thesis topic), and perhaps because of these two foci,
I was acutely aware of how the communicational dynamics in Ecuador were affecting the
state-social movement conflict.
Another methodological stance I assume is attention to reflexivity, which involves
being critically aware of the way in which my commitments shape my research practice.
While this is not a new concept in ethnography, Saukko (2003) points out that reflexivity
should be used as a tool to enhance awareness of one’s own situatedness and limited
nature of one’s worldview, which should hopefully aid the researcher in being more open
to other perspectives. Such limitations need to be extended to being realistic about the
impact my research might have, or not have. For example, while Juris (2013) calls
attention to the “subversive and productive potential” of such research, he also
acknowledges the constraints that might reduce the scholar’s role to a “supportive
interlocutor.” (p. 367). In terms of my own process of reflexivity, I have had to face my
own positionality vis á vis my research: being an outsider, a U.S. citizen who was
relatively new to Ecuador and without any ties to the ecologist movement; and age, in
that Yasunidos is largely a youth movement and I am at least a generation older than
most of them; and perhaps the most critical, the political moment in which protest and
protesters were being identified, delegitimized, and criminalized by the government. As
such, at protests I situated myself more so as an observer, rather than an active
participant. During my field work, many individuals, including foreigners, became part of
the government’s campaign of mediated delegitimation and criminalization. Researchers
and activists alike were targeted for their stance as allies to Yasunidos and indigenous
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groups. In fact, one North American that was associated with the Amazon, Pachamama
Foundation and Yasunidos, had his visa revoked and was forced to leave the country.
Taking these events into consideration, I kept a decidedly low profile, representing
myself more as a researcher than an activist, though I was openly an ally of the
movement. However, with regard to gaining access to Yasunidos’ weekly assemblies,
which were private, I was also there as an affiliate of El Churo Comunicación, an
alternative media collective. On a few occasions I wrote short pieces for their website
about Yasunidos. Yasunidos was aware that I was doing research, but at the same time I
was making myself useful in a way that was consistent with my skills, interests and
affiliations. Arturo Escobar (2015, p. 9) raises pertinent questions with regards to
committed research:
With whom, how and from where do we think? With which objectives? What
does it mean to think with others, with the movement activists that produce their
own knowledges, with the subaltern, with social groups in resistance, instead of
only thinking from, and with, the canons of social sciences.

Escobar argues that while we need to recognize that committed research traditions
emerged in the Américas in the 1960s, there are many new formulations which have
emerged from “dialogical methodologies” (p. 9) and their intersectionalities, such as
decoloniality, feminism, indigenous and other epistemologies that reposition the South as
a key space of production of knowledge. For Boaventura de Souza Santos (2010, p. 43)
the global South is not a concept limited to geographical location, but rather is a
“metaphor for human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism on a global scale
and the resistance to overcome or minimize it.” Such epistemology is based on the idea
that research must not be limited to a western comprehension of the world, which is just a
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small part of a vast array of knowledges, values, and ways to conceptually organize
space, time, relationships, and life itself.
These methodological perspectives are pertinent to my own scholarly endeavors,
and are consistent with the movement context within which I have been working.
1.6 Research design: Methods, questions, and summary
This dissertation is a qualitative case study of the mediated conflict between
Yasunidos and the Ecuadorian government. It focuses on a time one-year time period,
from August 15, 2013 (the day that Correa announced the suspension of the Yasuní ITT
campaign to keep the oil in the ground) until August 15, 2014.
1.6.1 Dates of Field Work
I arrived in Ecuador on August 8, 2012, and conducted preliminary research on a
range of topics while studying for my comprehensive exams and writing my prospectus. I
was in Ecuador during the one-year time period of the case study, and have subsequently
remained in Ecuador while writing the dissertation. For two years, I followed a multimethod research design which included ethnographic observation and participation at
marches, public forums, artistic events, and university-based symposia. I attended over a
dozen Yasunidos assemblies (closed strategy meetings which were held weekly) and was
present at the key moments analyzed in this thesis. I also attended the Yasunidos national
assembly in Cuenca in late 2014. At these events, I engaged in unstructured, on-site
conversations with other participants.
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1.6.2 Field site
My main field site was Quito, Ecuador’s capital city. This was both a strength and
limitation of the study. On the one hand, the Quito-based Yasunidos collective was the
most visible, due in part to its location in the capital and seat of government, and
therefore site of national marches and well-known allies of the movement, such as
Acción Ecológica. This also embued Yasunidos-Quito with a strong political character.
However, the Yasunidos collectives that emerged in towns and cities across Ecuador had
distinct characteristics, due to several factors, among them the local political context. For
example, if the local governments did not support Correa’s movement, they were not
harassed as badly as Yasunidos-Quito, where the city government was part of Alianza
Pais (until they lost the mayoral elections in February 2014). While I had several
opportunities to meet with Yasunidos members from other towns and cities, I was not
able to focus on groups outside of Quito.
1.6.3 Methods
The case study is a useful methodological approach for studying social
movements, as it permits the integration of various objects of research or phenomena in a
spatially delimited time period. Case study research invites multi-perspectival reflection
and allows for methodological flexibility (Snow & Trom, 2002). Its defining
characteristics include research and analysis of a “bounded social phenomenon” that can
generate “a richly detailed and ‘thick’ elaboration of the phenomena studied through the
use and triangulation of multiple methods….” (Snow & Trom, 2002, p. 147). My case
study fits neither the category of a “representative” nor “unique” case, but has elements
of each. Following Ragin (1992), Snow & Trom suggest that the best way to proceed is to
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first ask what is the object of the case study. Often times such object is “an instance of an
important theoretical concept or process” (Ragin, 1992, p. 2, as cited in Snow & Trom,
2002, p. 147). In fact, the object of my case study is not limited to Yasunidos as an antiextractivist, ecological youth movement; rather it is a study of a movement that is
inscribed within a particular social, political and communicational context, that enters
into direct conflict with the Ecuadorian government. In addition to empirical analysis, it
seeks to theoretically explore processes of media power and cultural mediation in a
situation of conflict. As such, this case examines a new way of constructing politics that
is derived from movement strategies, as well as the use of direct democratic means that
are inscribed in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution. And, as I will argue later in this study,
while Yasunidos is not the first nor the only group to contest Correa on mediated terrain,
the events that occur within the year under study mark a point of inflection, in which
there is a “before” and “after” Yasunidos.
Within the case study, I draw from various methods including ethnographic
inquiry, semi-structured interviews, institutional analysis and qualitative media analysis.
Ethnography was my foundational methodology and method. One of the most basic
definitions of ethnography, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 4) propose:
In its most characteristic form ethnography involves the researcher participating,
overtly or covertly, in people's lives for an extended period of time, watching
what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions—in fact, collecting
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the
research.
However, I prefer to situate my own “engaged” ethnography (Juris 2013, p. 4) in
conversation with other movement scholars that seek to practice ethnography in a way
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that is at once epistemological, methodological and as method. Transcending the view of
ethnography as just a set of research methods, it involves a specific mode of
“epistemological encounter” … involving an ethic of openness and flexibility and a
willingness to allow oneself to become personally transformed through the research
process.” (Juris, 2013, p. 9). In the best case scenario, it allows the ethnographer to
“generate new concepts and analyses in the process of ethnographic engagement” that
might not emerge from other methodologies (Juris 2013, p. 9). Juris points out, and I
agree, that this is particularly true in the study of new(er) social movements that are
overtly anti-capitalist and that do not take capitalist modernity as a given. These
movements do not neatly fit into conventional social movement methods and categories
such as resource mobilization, framing and political opportunities. I further theorize this
new wave of social movements in Chapter 2.
As part of my ethnography, I attended closed, weekly Yasunidos assemblies; the
early wave of street protests; the zapateadas (festive protest events with music and
dancing); key marches held in Quito; university and movement-led conferences about the
Yasuní; the “infantile ecologist” carnivals; the arrival of the indigenous women’s walk to
Quito; Yasunidos weekend retreat following the first year of protest; and two ethical
tribunes abut the Yasuní that were held in Quito. I was able to travel to different
Amazonian towns, including: Coca, Macas, Puyo, and an indigenous community located
within the Yasuní. I participated in a “Toxic Tour” with movement actors in the northern,
most contaminated region of the Amazon (Lago Agrio and surrounding áreas). During
that weekend we met with and participated in workshops with affected communities, and
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went on an inspection of a processing plant that received complaints by citizens of
contamination.
A complementary method I used was in-depth, semi-structured interviews with
movement leaders, political analysts and journalists. As part of my research design, I
waited until after the one-year period of ethnographic observation and participation to
personally conduct a small, purposive sample of in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with Yasunidos members that I considered to be key leaders. This included a group
interview with 10 members of Yasunidos that were particularly focused on the
communicative dimension of the movement. I also conducted in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with journalists, academics, political analysts, and social movement actors that
were present during that first year. By waiting, the interviewees had, as I did, the benefit
of hindsight and analysis. The interviews allowed me to co-theorize with movement
actors. In total, I conducted 30 in-depth interviews ranging from 1.5 to 2 hours.
My ethnographic approach also involved conducting qualitative media analysis of
a few media sources. I call my media analysis “ethnographic” in that I understand the
flow of media as embedded in people’s daily lives and contexts. Especially in a city like
Quito, many politically-minded people tend to follow the same media sources. I closely
followed, collected, and took “ethnographic” notes on television (morning politicallyoriented talk shows), newspaper coverage of national dailies (mainly El Telegrafo, the socalled “public” newspaper, and El Comercio, a privately owned enterprise) and social
media conversations on Yasunidos’ Facebook page) during that first year, particularly of
the key moments (the emergence of Yasunidos; protest marches; the signature collection
process; and the subsequent tearing down of this direct democratic process by the
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government). I watched and conducted qualitative analysis of 15 of President Correa’s
EC shows during that first year, particularly the key moments previously mentioned (I
also attended one EC). In my study of the Enlaces, I sought to understand the mediated,
discursive patterns related to the delegitimation and criminalization of Yasunidos and
allies, as well as the government’s discources about development, Buen Vivir, and the
Amazon. A limitation of my media analysis is that I did not closely follow radio, which is
still a widespread, highly popular means of receiving and exchanging information.
My theoretical and methodological engagement with media power led me to
undertake an institutional analysis of the journalistic field. In Chapter Three, I map
changes in media ownership since Correa came to power, in order to develop my idea of
statist media power, and the media terrain in which the conflict between Correa and
Yasunidos took place.
1.6.4 Research Questions
Building on my research design, I formulated the following questions:
1) How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist
politics in Ecuador?
a. How was the mediatization of the conflict a constitutive part of the
struggle?
2) How has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador?
a. How has it used its media power to delegitimize and criminalize
Yasunidos and other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní?
3) How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power?
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a. How has Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural politics of postdevelopment, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and
practices?
The following chapters examine these questions in the following manner:
Chapter 1: New Waves of Protest in Ecuador’s Citizen Revolution. The
introductory chapter presents the project summary, relevant background contexts, a
review of relevant literature, my theoretical and methodological frameworks, research
design, methods, my research questions and chapter breakdown.
Chapter 2: The Emergence of Yasunidos. In this chapter, I address Question #1:
How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of struggle against extractivist politics
in the Ecuadorian context? The chapter locates Yasunidos within social movement
theory, as part of a new wave of social movements contesting extractivist practices of
Latin American progressive governments. My methodological focus is that of the case
study ethnography. I analyze the conditions that have given rise to the emergence of this
movement, and provide a panoramic view of the first year of the movement, its practices,
and its conflict with the Ecuadorian government. Methods of analysis used in this chapter
include ethnography, and qualitative analyses of interviews and other documents, such as
newspaper reports, blogs, and television programs.
Chapter 3: The reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador and its impact on
state-social movement conflicts. In Chapter 3, I focus on addressing Question #2: How
has the Correa government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? And, 2a: How has it
used its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics, and to criminalize
social movements that are against such politics? To answer these questions, I use the
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concept of statist media power, which allows me to examine how the Ecuadorian
government has reconfigured media symbolically and materially, through media
ownership and production practices, and legislative-judicial-administrative actions. Once
I have analyzed how media power has changed under Correa’s administration, I analyze
how it has used its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist policies and
practices. My methods include institutional analysis of the growth of government media,
and qualitative analysis of the EC and pro-extractivist government publicity and
propaganda.
Chapter 4: The mediated cultural politics of post-development. Chapter 4 focuses
on my third question: How has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power?
The subquestion is: How has Yasunidos deployed a mediated cultural politics of postdevelopment, thereby challenging the state’s extractivist discourses and practices? Here I
present the conceptual framework of mediated cultural politics, and the notion of postdevelopment imaginaries. To better illustrate the concept, I conduct a qualitative visual
analysis of instances of creative expression, embodied practices and performative protest
of Yasunidos, allied artists and indigenous women (including the zapateadas and the
Indigenous Women’s March on Quito).
Chapter 5: Democracy in Extinction? Challenges to processes of democratization.
Chapter 5 provides some concluding thoughts about the case study. It seeks to account
for the important gains of Yasunidos, while also examining its limitations. It also
provides a final reflection on the power of statist media, as well as its limits. Finally, I
outline the contributions of the study, and suggest directions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EMERGENCE OF YASUNIDOS
2.1 Introduction
Before I arrived in Ecuador, I had read much about the power of social
movements, especially the indigenous movement. I also read and viewed audiovisual
material about the various uprisings that occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s. So, a
few months after moving to Quito, I learned about an upcoming protest called by
CONAIE, with respect to the auctioning of new oil blocks in the Amazon. I looked
forward to witnessing this powerful movement in action. However, when I arrived at the
Marriott Hotel, the site where the protest against the oil auction was to take place, I
received a surprise. Rather than witnessing thousands of people in the streets like in the
videos I had seen, I encountered a group of no more than 100 people. When I asked an
activist friend why there had been so few people, she replied that people did not want to
go to jail. This was my introduction to the criminalization of protest under the Correa
government.
The next time I witnessed a protest was ten months later, when Correa announced
the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative. It seemed that the spirited protests I had heard so
much about had returned. I also witnessed the emergence of a new movement.
A member of Yasunidos theorizes about the new generation that largely conforms
Yasunidos:
Yasunidos came into being, in part, because of the government’s putting
Yasuní ITT in the limelight. [Here is] a new generation with an abstract
sensibility, a new attitude towards Nature, a new ethical pact with
Nature…. This is a generation that no longer comes from the traditional,
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authoritarian family. They have a lot more information, which not only
comes from the radio, television, and the priest….And it also might be that
they come more from the middle class than popular classes…. Those who
participate are not just organic, as those with the most visibility…the
majority that participate represent new configurations of families, new
subjectivities in the nation….that have more empathy with feminism. [They
are] less tolerant of the justification of vertical, aggressive, extractivism that
is violent with Nature. (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015).

This chapter explores the emergence of this new movement, its
characteristics and its differences with older movements. It examines the research
question and subquestion: How has Yasunidos emerged as an important site of
struggle against extractivist politics in Ecuador? And, as part of that question, I
discuss how the mediatization of the Yasunidos-Ecuadorian government conflict
been a constitutive part of such struggle (though I delve further into this question in
the following chapter). This chapter first offers a conceptual focus, in conversation
with scholars that are theorizing the new wave of protests, and the movements that
are confronting the progressive governments. I propose that Yasunidos is part of a
new wave of protests across the Americas. Like other movements in Latin
America, the its emergence makes visible the continuation and intensification of
resource extraction, also referred to as neo-extractivism when specifically
discussing extractivism under the so-called progressive governments (Gudynas
2012). The case study of Yasunidos helps shed light on this new wave of protests,
particularly how social movements and citizens are resisting such practices. I
contend that Yasunidos has done so through mediated cultural politics, which I
define as counterhegemonic cultural expressions enacted by social movements, in
any form, that are then circulated and shared across multiple media platforms.
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This chapter, divided into four sections, seeks to present a panoramic view of the
case. The first section contains a theoretical discussion about the new wave of social
movements and protest in 2lst century Latin America. The second section analyzes the
background context that made possible the emergence of Yasunidos. A key piece of the
story was the Yasuní ITT initiative, how it emerged, and the roles played by social
movements, NGOs, civil society and government. With respect to a communicational
context, I also discuss the government media campaigns that brought the Yasuní ITT
initiative national and international visibility and acclaim. After presenting these
antecedents, Section 3 focuses on the emergence of Yasunidos, keeping in mind the
theoretical arguments made in the first section. In the final section of the chapter, I
describe and analyze key moments of the case, paying particular attention to the social,
political and communicational context Yasunidos confronted in 2013-2014.
2.2 Theorizing new waves of protest and social movement formation in neoextractivist Latin America.
Methodologically speaking, during the year of the study, I carried out
ethnographic research, including first-hand observation and participation in key events.
After that year, I sought to identify social movement theories that resonated with the
Yasunidos case. Not surprisingly, my observations and experiences, and subsequent
theorization, resonated most with theorists snd activist-scholars that are applying
decolonial and post-development lenses to the wave of anti-extractivist protests and
movements that have emerged in the past decade in Latin America. The following
discussion lays out intersecting perspectives among these theorists, with particular
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attention to the question of alternative ontologies and epistemologies that are generated
by anti-extractivist movements.
The work of Arturo Escobar (1995, 2014) has been central to this discussion. In a
recent volume, Escobar (2014) argues that the proposals of Latin American social
movements, particularly indigenous, afrodescendent, environmental, rural and feminist
movements, are at the “vanguard” (p. 14) of imagining and enacting practices towards a
post-development scenario. Further, he proposes a related concept of political ontology,
which “underscores the political dimension of ontology and the ontological dimension of
politics” (p. 13). This concept allows us to examine “what kind of worlds are enacted
through which combination of practices, and with what kind of consequences for which
particular group of humans and non-humans” (p. 13). This concept seeks to valorize the
diverse cosmovisions that are generated by movements and territorial-based
communities, which often provide the philosophical foundation for the enactment of what
I call post-development imaginaries. This set of concepts resonated with my research
findings: here was an urban movement whose foundational principles were based on
indigenous cosmovisions. Their proposals tapped into emerging post-development
imaginaries that were gaining strength in a new generation of Ecuadorians, of which
Yasunidos was a part.
In their consideration of contemporary Latin American social movements, Daza,
Hoetmer & Vargas (2012) suggest that movements fighting extractivism are confronting
a reconfigured political landscape in the 21st century, which includes a new adversary, the
“so-called” progressive governments. Another dimension of this terrain is that these
governments have incorporated many aspects of the agendas of social movements, if only
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at the discursive level, yet have not sufficiently changed structural relations of power as
they had originally pledged to do. Instead, progressive governments have passed new
laws that seek to repress, control and criminalize acts of dissent. Boaventura de Souza
Santos (2010), Edgardo Lander (2013), Seone et al. (2013) and others have argued that
these contradictions have been responsible, in part, for the diminished support these
governments have faced. These arguments resonate with my case study of Yasunidos.
They had to engage in a battle with a still-popular government (this would shift over the
next few years) that had built its platform on social movement proposals, but whose
practices sought to fragment, delegitimize and criminalize these same organizations.
Another feature that Daza et al. (2012) emphasize is that these governments, and
the movements that confront them, have increasingly used the media as platforms of
dispute. The mediatization of conflicts between the government and social movements
has been a key feature in Ecuador. This chapter contributes to the discussion by providing
evidence of this new scenario of mediated conflict in Ecuador, and how such terrain was
essential to their activities.
Juliana Flores (2010), who situates her work within the Modernity/Coloniality
Latin American research project, proposes that contemporary Latin American social
movements expose the limits of capitalist modernity, despite scores of theorists that have
ignored their contributions, due to a “eurocentric vision of modernity” (Flores, citing
Escobar, 2003). Flores critiques theorists (among them, Laclau and Mouffe, Giddens,
Mainwarning and Viola, Melucci, Touraine) for the distinction they make between
movements in the global North and the “exceptional character of collective action” (p.
74) in the global South, a framework that reduces collective action to “subjugated
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alterities” (p. 74). Flores also calls attention to these theorists’ “modern binaristic logic:
autonomy-dependence, advanced-backward, development-underdevelopment, centerperiphery, etc.” (p. 83):
…these theories conclude that in the regions where modernity has not completely
been attained, these movements can do very little to question it. Their actions, if
anything, are to reach it [modernity]. Therefore, we are faced with peripheral
struggles, anchored in illustration; struggles that are limited to cover basic
necessities, gain autonomy from the State, reach economic development,
consolidate weak democracies, etc. (p. 72).

And while she values the important contributions of diverse theories born in the
global North (including resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and
collective identity, etc.) she calls on social movement theorists to “develop a perspective
of globalization much more multi-form and paradoxical” (p. 78) than has been proposed
until now.
Following Flores’ argumentation, I propose that movements such as Yasunidos
are privileged sites at which to analyze differing notions of modernity that are at play in
the region. Daza et al. (2012, p. 47) propose that new social movement formations
“dispute dominant models of living from specific subjectivities” (2012, p. 50), and rather
look toward otros saberes (other knowing subjects and forms of knowledge), often
subaltern and invisibilized. These movements “have generated new cognitive
maps…[and are] confronting power from other spaces of enunciation, from
epistemologies that position other forms of relations between humans and the rest of
life.” (2012, p. 50). As Escobar (2014) has pointed out, Latin American social
movements are often way ahead of academic theorizing. This is relevant to the Yasunidos
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case, particularly the ways in which distinct visions of development have been deployed
by Yasunidos.
But how have alternative ontologies taken shape, how have they shaped social
movements, affected the national imaginary, and contributed to the emergence of
Yasunidos in August 2013? I propose that alternative ontologies have emerged from
various sources, events and geographic locations, generating a multilayered, cumulative
effect on citizens and movements. They have manifested in a widespread ecological
consciousness, particularly among young people. Such consciousness has confronted the
dominant paradigm, hegemonic since the 1970s, that oil extraction is necessary for
Ecuador’s well-being and prosperity, and is the mechanism to “develop” and
“modernize” Ecuador. On the contrary, the alternative ontologies have been shaped by
various factors listed here and described in the following paragraphs: 1) the centuries-old
indigenous resistance to colonization; 2) the experience of contamination from oildrilling, which began in the northern Amazon in the 1970s; 3) diverse movements in
Ecuador (indigenous, ecologist, feminist, peasant, student), and the flows and exchanges
between peoples and movements due to the Amazon’s proximity; 4) the influence of
global social movements against climate change; and 5) the 2008 Ecuadorian
Constitution; and the government’s rhetoric and media campaigns about Buen Vivir and
the rights of Nature.
A major contributor to contemporary alternative ontologies has been the ongoing
indigenous resistance, and in contemporary times, the CONAIE-led uprisings in the
1990s and early 2000s (Becker, 2012). They have left an indelible imprint on the
imaginaries of feminist, ecological, eco-feminist, student and peasant struggles and
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movements (Martinez, 2009). The indigenous cosmovision that understands Nature as an
instrinsic part of life has been adopted by ecological social movements, which together
with the CONAIE, influenced the direction of the Constituent Assembly and the
subsequent insertion of the rights of Nature into the 2008 Constitution. A related concept,
also inscribed in the Constitution is that of Buen Vivir. Ecuadorians have taken pride in
their new Constitution, and these groundbreaking articles, which have also been
celebrated internationally.
Secondly, another important source of ecological consciousness has come from
first-hand experience with the unprecedented contamination in the Ecuador’s northern
Amazon, and the high visibility of the Chevron-Texaco case, which sought damages for
the massive environmental destruction in that region (Joseph, 2012). Government
discourse and publicity heavily circulated the message that this would not happen again
on Ecuadorian soil.
A third factor, well worth mentioning, is the geographic proximity to the Amazon
from different cities and towns. Ecuador is a relatively small country, with constant flows
and exchanges between people from different regions. From Quito, one can reach the
towns bordering the Amazon by bus in four to eight hours. While many Ecuadorians have
not visited the Amazon, its territories and peoples are present in the national imaginary
(even if that imaginary has not always been positive or accurate; as the Amazon region
has also been the most misunderstood, exploited and forgotten of Ecuador’s regions).
Geographical proximity has also meant that diverse movements have walked shoulder to
shoulder in marches, and have shared roundtables in public forums and universities.
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Fourth, globalized environmental and indigenous movements have called
attention to issue of climate change, to indigenous peoples’ role as guardian of the most
biodiverse places on earth, and their territorial struggles. One of the World Social Forums
took place in Quito in 2005, which brought global actors to a local stage.
The fifth factor has been the 2008 Constitution, particularly paradigm-shifting
articles about the rights of Nature, Buen Vivir and the promise to transform the
development model. The government’s ecological discourses and media campaigns that
widely circulated them, have also played an important role in shifting imaginaries. To
conclude, I propose that the reasons cited here have helped lead to the emergence of
alternative ontologies that shape conceptions of development and that have engendered
post-development imaginaries.
In order to understand how Yasunidos emerged as a key site in the most recent
conflict, a fundamental antecedent is the Yasuní ITT initiative. This has been the most
recent and perhaps singularly most important precedent leading up to contemporary
events, presented in the following section.
2.3 The Yasuní ITT Initiative
2.3.1. A groundbreaking proposal
This section provides important background details, necessary for understanding
how the Yasuní ITT initiative became so important to the Ecuadorian people and the
international community. The story of the Yasuní ITT initiative spans over two decades,
and has had a multifaceted, sinuous path, from indigenous and ecological movementbased beginnings in the late 1980s, to becoming a capstone government initiative in
2007, and finally, to its termination on August 15, 2013 by the same government that
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initially supported it. As such, this project had many complex, contradictory facets, and
although innovative and groundbreaking in many ways, its management has also been
widely criticized (Martínez, 2009; Martin, 2011; Acosta, 2016). This section presents a
brief introduction that paints a picture of its importance to Ecuadorian citizens, social
movements and the international community.
The story of the Yasuní ITT initiative is a pivotal element to understanding the
emergence of Yasunidos. Alberto Acosta (2016), one of its main proponents, has laid out
the key reasons why it was a groundbreaking proposal. In the first place, it represented a
rupture with Ecuador’s history of policies and practices around resource extraction. Since
the first barrel of oil was exported from the Amazon region, in August 17th 1972, all
governments and many Ecuadorians have considered the primary export model as
essential to the functioning of the nation. Indeed, even with the promise to keep the oil in
the ground in the Yasuní ITT initiative, oil extraction and revenue from extractive
activities have continued, and even increased during Correa’s government (Acosta 2016).
The Yasuní ITT initiative was a bold step towards changing Ecuador’s
dependence on oil extraction, and pointed the way toward a model in which Ecuadorian
citizens and the biodiversity of its territories would be privileged over capitalist
accumulation. Secondly, with respect to indigenous rights, the Yasuní ITT initiative
represented a significant measure designed to protect Amazonian groups made vulnerable
by the rapidly expanding oil frontier. Thirdly, it was a move toward global redistributive
justice with the global North providing 50% of the estimated 700 million dollars of oil
revenue to “keep the oil in the soil” (Martin, 2011, p. 2). The vision of Acción Ecológica,
an ecological social organization founded in 1986 as a women’s collective, and still a key
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social movement actor nationally and internationally, was key to the Initiative. The idea
was not just about compensation, rather it focused on receiving contributions from
countries that have played a greater role in ecological destruction. Martin (2011) argued
that the Initiative “represents the struggles of all peoples around the globe who seek
better, cleaner environments not just for themselves, but for their grandchildren” and that
it represented “the largest global environmental trust fund of its kind.” (p. 3).
2.3.2. The Yasuní, indigenous territories in need of protection
The Yasuní is the ancestral home of the Waorani indigenous nationality, and of
the Taromenare and Tagaeri clans, two nomadic groups related to the Waorani that live in
voluntary isolation. Other indigenous groups living there include the Kichwa. There are
also colonos (mestizo settlers) who live there. Given the diverse peoples and cultures, the
region should be considered first and foremost a territory, not only a park, or a group of
oil blocks, as it is often framed. As Esperanza Martinez (2009, p. 66) points out, the
designation of national park, like the creation of Yosemite Park in the 19th century in the
United States, often serves to erase the histories of these sites as ancestral indigenous
territories. It also obscures the fact that the Yasuní, unlike the vision of a pristine “park”
has been an area profoundly marked by rubber barons, illegal wood traffickers, oil
companies, missionaries, the military, and settlers that came to work in these industries.
Oil prospection began in the 1930s in territories that were inhabited by nomadic
indigenous groups. Shell perforated Tiputini 1, part of the Yasuní, in 1948. Two access
roads were subsequently opened up, and several state and private oil corporations have
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wanted to exploit the region, even though the estimated reserves of 950,000 barrels is
heavy crude, which is much more difficult and resource-intensive to extract.17

Figure 2a. Map of the Yasuní National Park by Susana Crespo and Pablo Cabrera.
Retrieved from http://www.terraecuador.net/revista_83/83_acoso_mapa.html

2.3.3. National and international designations
The Yasuní has several kinds of designations, and national and international
protections:
-

In 1979, Ecuador´s Ministry of the Environment (MAE) declared 1,022,736 hectares
(one hectare is approximately 2.5 miles).as the Yasuní National Park (YNP) (MAE,
Agreement No. 332).

-

The YNP, the Intangible Zone, and the adjacent Waorani territory span 2.7 million
hectares. In 1989, the entirety of the 2.7 million hectares were designated by

17

The history of the Yasuní ITT is well covered in Martinez (2009).
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UNESCO a World Biosphere Reserve, due to its status as the region with the greatest
biodiversity on the planet.
-

The “ITT’s” (the Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini oil fields located in oil block
43, named after rivers that traverse the region) 189,889 hectares are located within
the Intangible Zone (758,051 hectares), considered as such because of the nomadic
groups that inhabit this territory.

-

In 2006, 982,000 hectares of the YNP were delimited by the Ecuadorian
government.18 Moreover, the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), asked for protective measures in order to safeguard indigenous rights,
particularly those populations that have been made vulnerable because of their
exposure to oil activities, illegal wood trafficking, population expansion, and other
activities related to resource extraction (Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
2014).
The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution underscores the importance of the Initiative, in that

it forbids oil extraction in areas where uncontacted indigenous groups live (Ecuador
Const. art. 57). Though the government does not admit it, certainly one of the major
incentives to exploit the oil in the Yasuní, is to pay toward the massive debt Ecuador has
amassed to China (Villavicencio, 2013).

18

Executive Decree No. 552, published on February 2, 1999, declared the Intangible Zone should be free of
all extractive activity. Ecuador, along with Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru, ratified the ILO’s
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, No. 169. See www.ilo.org.
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Figure 2b. Map of Yasuní National Park, Huaroni territories and Intangible Zone.
2.3.4 Keep the oil in the soil: indigenous and ecological movement histories in
Ecuador
This brief section sets the groundwork for understanding the current context for
current anti-extractivist social movements. In 1990, the Indigenous Uprising on Inti
Raymi, and subsequent mobilizations throughout the 90s, marked a turning point in
Ecuador’s political history, as the indigenous movement, led by the CONAIE, became a
central social and political actor (Becker, 2012; Ortiz Lemos, 2013). This powerful
movement came of age during neoliberal times, and it fought against structural
adjustments with a multiplicity of organizations and movements, including student,
feminist, environmental and worker movements. While the CONAIE’s broad agenda
incorporates many kinds of demands, socio-environmental and territorial conflicts have
been priorities. During the historical Uprising in 1990, OPIP (Organización de Pueblos
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Indígenas de Pastaza) proposed legalizing and delimiting ethnic Amazonian territories
(this claim was rejected by the Borja government) (Varea et al., 1996). In 1998, in one of
the first resistance struggles, the Cofanes (indigenous group in the northern part of the
Amazon) were successful in closing an oil well, and in keeping Texaco off their
territory.19 Further south, the Kichwa People of Sarayaku waged an unprecedented fight
against unauthorized incursion and oil prospection in their territories. In 1996, part of
their territory was concessioned to an oil company, and in 2002, Sarayaku declared a
state of emergency for six months, and engaged in protests, in order to stop the
prospection and dynamiting of their lands. They took their claim to the IACHR in 2003,
and won an historic victory which included monetary reparations. For Alberto Acosta
(personal communication, April 10, 2015), the Kichwa Sarayaku struggle concretely
showed how to resist government and corporate incursion into their territory.
The success of the indigenous movement´s mobilizations led to the incorporation
of several of their demands in the 1998 Constitution, which stated that indigenous groups
must be consulted on matters concerning their territories. The political arm of the
movement, Pachakutik, was created in 1995. The cooptation that ensued in both
Pachakutik and the CONAIE resulted in a dramatic dccrease in their legitimacy (Becker,
2012). By the time Correa became president in 2007, the indigenous movement had
already lost a great deal of political power.
While Ecuador’s Indigenous movement has gained recognition internationally,
what is less known is the history and impact that ecological social organizations and
movements have had on the political history of Ecuador. In fact, socio-environmental
19

Accion Ecológica’s website details resistance against extractivism. See http://www.acciónecológica.org
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movements have been structured around the protagonistic role of the CONAIE, Acción
Ecológica and the Amazonia Por la Vida (Amazon for Life) campaign, along with
hundreds of local and regional movements. Writing in 1992, Varea & Ortiz claimed that
there were over 200 organizations in Ecuador that worked for the protection of the
environment. A broad, but useful categorization is proposed by Latorre (2009), who
distinguishes between “technocratic” and “radical” organizations (p. 11). Organizations
that are technocratic tend to seek solutions to environmental problems through
technological innovation, and through the market. “Radical” organizations are those that
seek to change the development model. I would also add that the radical organizations are
those that have actively confronted the government’s extractivist policies and actions.
One of the key organizations of the past decades has been Accion Ecológica (AE).
AE was founded in 1986 as women´s collective, and has consistently supported popular
ecological movements, the defense of territories, and communities affected by extractive
activities. Members of Acción Ecológica have also widely published on these matters,
and are founders of the international network, Oil Watch. In 1996, at an Oil Watch
meeting held in Quito, 15 international organizations initiated the Keep the Oil in the Soil
campaign. Acción Ecológica, and other ecological and indigenous organizations and the
Amazonia Por la Vida campaign, founded in 1989, have been important predecessors,
and indeed, incubators, of Yasunidos and the ideas they brought forward in their
movement. In 2005, Oil Watch presented a position paper that proposed that the Yasuní
should not be exploited (Martinez, 2009).
The story of the Yasuní ITT also helps to tell the story of Ecuador’s ecological
movement, which I would argue has been an organized, innovative force from its very
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beginnings in the 1980s. In fact, Ecuador and Nigeria were the first nations to propose a
transition from the extractive model by leaving oil underground. The first explicit, written
references to a post-petrol transition can be found in Larrea (2000). However,
environmental and anti-extractivist activism, and a search for alternatives, began much
earlier. The campaign Amazonia Por la Vida, which grew out of Oil Watch, was
established in 1989 as a national network that connected human rights organizations,
indigenous organizations, ecologist initiatives, social movements, affected citizens and
allies across Ecuador, in their common goal to defend the Ecuadorian Amazon from
further oil exploitation (Vasquez 2015; Oilwatch, 2005; Fontaine, 2009). Its motto, “El
Yasuní depende de ti” (the Yasuní depends on you) later used by Yasunidos.20 Amazonia
Por la Vida went on to become a key movement actor in one of the most visible,
prolonged and difficult battles, the Chevron-Texaco case.
In the late 1980s, women, campesinos, and workers in the northern region of the
Ecuadorian Amazon formed dozens of organizations that began to organize around a
multitude of issues, including the massive contamination caused by Texaco’s
(subsequently bought by Chevron) extractive activities. The movement histories of thia
region have been elocuently documented in Yanza (2014). Luis Angel Saavedra of
INREDH argues that the Chevron-Texaco story has been told by different actors. The
Ecuadorian government has told the story through government campaigns that have
appropriated the discourses of the affected but have not successfully communicated the
experiences of the affected. The aggressor, Chevron-Texaco, has tried to displace the
blame and erase the story. Finally, movements and individuals have sought to tell the real

20

Significantly, several members of Yasunidos were active members of this campaign.
61

stories that contain “the magic, the hope, the cruelty, the pain…” as well as the
contradictions lived in this region (Yanza, 2014, p. 9).
On November, 3, 1993, more than 30,000 affected citizens filed a lawsuit against
Texaco (later Chevron-Texaco) in the Federal Court of New York State demanding that
they pay compensation for the huge costs of reparations for environmental damages
(Joseph, 2012; Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos, n.d.). Six months
later, on May 15, 1994, approximately 25 organizations and rural communities,
indigenous nationalities, and representatives of some public and non-governmental
entitiies, ratified the constitution of Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia (Defense Front of
the Amazon) in order to integrate the organized and non-organized social actors. This
organization went on to facilitate a process that would continue for almost two decades.
Finally, on February 14, 2011, after 17 years of fighting, the Court ordered Chevron to
pay more than 18 billion dollars in reparations. This first important victory (the struggle
to get Chevron to comply with the sentence continues) “was the result not only of the
strength, unity and resistance of the affected, but also because the fight was taken on as a
collective struggle with collective goals” by movement actors (Yanza, 2014).
In a separate but related action, On June 5, 2003, the Pachamama Foundation21,
Acción Ecológica and CDES presented a proposal to the MAE for a moratorium on the
expansion of the oil and mining frontier for three years. At that meeting, they presented a
technical, economic and ecological report that provided evidence that it was not worth
continuing to extract natural resources at the expense of the destruction those activities
21

The Pachamama Foundation was the first social organization closed by the Ecuadorian government on
December 5th, 2013. It was able to do this through Decree 16, which gives the state the power to dissolve
any social organization that it considers dangerous to the internal or external interests of the nation, or that
affects “public peace.”
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caused, and harm to those people that inhabited these territories.22 From 2005-2007, there
were numerous conflicts in the Yasuní between the oil companies and indigenous groups
(Fontaine, 2009). On January 3, 2007, before leaving office, President Alfredo Palacio
responded to mounting pressure from civil society, and signed the decree to establish the
Intangible Zone within the World Biosphere Reserve.
2.3.5 Government appropriation of the Yasuní ITT initiative.
On June 5, 2007, the Yasuní ITT initiative was launched. President Correa
presented a petition signed by over 1,000 persons (crafted by Alberto Acosta, who at the
time was Minister of Energy), to the international community. The petition demanded a
moratorium on the exploitation of the ITT. The 2008 Constitution further built
expectations that it was a viable plan. It was in line with the concept of Buen Vivir, the
Rights of Nature (Ecuador Const. art. 14, 71, 414), of respecting Indigenous territories
(Ecuador Const. art. 2, 57, 60, 171, 257), and of working to change the matriz productiva
(productive model) (Ecuador Const. art. 276). Ecologists decided to support the
government-led initiative, even though there were well-founded suspicions about the
government’s commitment to it. There was also criticism that the initiative was limited to
Blocks 31 and 43, and that it presented an idealized image of the Yasuní. Regarding the
government’s appropriation of the Initiative from a citizen-led effort, Eduardo
Pichilingue reflected that “civil society’s error was that it did not totally appropriate the
initiative. It came about as a result of civil society, but we left it to the government to
administer.” (Eduardo Pichilingue, personal communication, Abril 30, 2015).
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La Hora (2003), see http://lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1000165802/1/home/goRegional/Loja#.V2NaN6ODGkp.
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The Yasuní ITT initiative went on to become the poster child of the Citizen
Revolution. Ecuador’s government was presented as a leader that was seeking
alternatives to resource extraction. Suddenly, Ecuadorian social movement actors and
government ministers became international actors because of this innoviate project. They
were frequently invited to speak at international symposiums, UN forums and meetings
of the European Union. Indigenous activists, particularly those from Sarayaku, whose
territory is located within the Amazon, actively promoted their philosophical concept of
Sacha Kawsay, or the “living forest”. Ecuador’s efforts were celebrated, as it seemed to
truly take seriously the rights of Nature inscribed in the 2008 Constitution. Within
Ecuador, young people, including many who later identified as or supported Yasunidos,
learned about the Initiative in their schools and through government-led publicity
campaigns.
2.3.6 Continuation of extractive activity
Though the initiative received broad support nationally and internationally, it was
apparent that the so-called “Plan B,” oil extraction in this mega-diverse territory, was
never entirely taken off the table. In fact, it became increasingly clear that resource
extraction was still a priority.23 The government continued to concession oil blocks that
were within Amazonian indigenous territories. For example, in November 2010, the
Ecuadorian government renegotiated its contract with AGIP Oil, which included a
portion of Block 23, even though the Kichwa Sarayaku and other groups living there
were firmly against oil extraction on their lands. Another clear example is the case of
23

In 2007, when Correa assumed the Presidency, oil concessions in the Amazon region totaled 5 million
hectares, with 4.3 million of these concessioned to foreign companies. In 2011, 22 additional oil blocks in
the Central-South region of the Amazon were made available to bidders in the XI Oil Auction (Acosta
2016, p. ).
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licensing Armadillo Block, even though there was clear evidence of the presence of
indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation. After a fatal spear attack by a
Taromenare of wood merchant Luis Castellanos inside Armadillo Block, there were an
additional 34 reported events that evidenced the presence of uncontacted indigenous
groups in that zone (Informe Ejecutivo sobre la situación de los Pueblos Indígenas
Aislados (PIA) 2009). While such evidence was able to momentarily halt oil exploration,
the government gave a license to Montex-Gosanti the following year, in June 2011 (El
Universo, 2013).24
Just a few months before the Yasuní ITT Initiative was terminated, on March 25,
2013, the Ecuadorian government finalized its Ronda Sur Oriente del Ecuador (auction
of oil blocks in the southeast of Ecuador) in Beijing, Bogotá, Houston, Paris, and
Singapore. This auction potentially affected 2,600,000 hectares, divided into 13 oil
blocks. Oil exploration and extraction here would impact seven indigenous nations (the
Kichwa, Waorani, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Andoas and Sápara). In their report, Acción
Ecológica states that “the intention to exploit the Southern Amazon should be seen as the
necesity to take control of territories, where there are also mining concessions and
various hydroelectric projects.” According to this report, the indigenous communities
have not been consulted (Acción Ecológica, 2013).
The above-mentioned examples are just a few instances of the continuation of
extractive activities. Additionally, there were also threats to disband the Yasuní ITT
initiative if enough funds weren’t received. Roque Sevilla, who headed the initiative until
January 2010, told BBC World that, in addition to the economic crisis, potential
24

The Via Maxus oil road, which runs 180km through the Yasuní National Park, was built in 1993.
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European donors were influenced by the contradictions shown by the government,
especially having Plan B “up their sleeves.” Correa also insulted governments with whom
Ecuador was in negotiation. In one infamous, frequently cited instance, Correa told
German donors that they could “stick their money in their ears” when he was unhappy
with the terms of an agreement that outlined how international funds would be channeled
(El Universo, 2010).
2.3.7 The unraveling of the Yasuní ITT initiative
Given the messages communicated by the Correa government, funders saw the
writing on the wall, and international monetary support dwindled. Germany, under
Angela Merkel, was originally one of the largest contributors to the initiative, but in her
second administration, Germany decided not to continue to provide financing (La
República, 2011). This affected the willingness of other countries to contribute. Correa
did not take a clear enough stand that would have helped donors feel confident that he
was serious about keeping the oil in the soil. For example, he could have promised that
while he is President, the Yasuní ITT would not be exploited. Also, clear policies were
never set. In fact, “the concepts, measures and instruments to make it concrete were not
sufficiently clarified nor agreed upon.” (Acosta, 2016, p. 11). Of course, there were
external factors that worked against its success: it is likely that it was just too dangerous a
precedent for governments of the global North to pay a form of reparations to keep the oil
in the ground. German Minister Niebel, responsible for denying funds during the second
Merkel administration, stated “I don’t pay for something that won’t happen. If we take
part in [the initiative], we will create a precedent of unpredictable consequences.” (La
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República, 2011). Another important factor to take into account was the financial crisis
that shifted the global scenario in 2008 and over the next several years.
On August 15, 2013, when Correa announced that the Yasuní ITT initiative failed
because of lack of international financial backing, many supporters found this reason
unacceptable. Many people believed that Ecuador should carry out its pledge even
without international support. Subsequently, the abandonment of the Yasuní ITT
initiative became, for many citizens, a point of rupture with the government. With the
demise of this innovative initiative, the idea of transforming from a primary export model
to a post-petrol one, seemed that much more out of reach.
2.3.8 The mediatization of the Yasuní ITT initiative
To comprehend the reaction to Ecuadorian President Correa’s announcement on
August 15, 2013 that the government would terminate the Yasuní ITT initiative, it is
crucial to understand that this flagship initiative was heavily promoted by the government
and NGOs for six years, both nationally and internationally, though a sophisticated
advertising campaign. In a search for Yasuní ITT videos uploaded to Youtube in June
2015, we encountered 45 spots that are or appear to have been created by SECOM. These
spots mainly target an Ecuadorian audience, and were uploaded between August 2008
and March 2013, a mere five months before the initiative was abandoned. The videos
include short animations directed toward young children, spots that feature famous
Ecuadorian actors and singers, and even a promotional video for a reality TV show in
which 12 Ecuadorians seek the “Spirit of the Yasuní”.25

25

See Espiritu Yasuní.mov. accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GkEZ-6rvys&t=2s
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One of the many commercials produced by the Ecuadorian government’s SECOM
(Secretary of Communication) for the Yasuní ITT initiative (for national television
audiences) opens in a dense forest setting. A 3D black bubble emerges from the soil and
floats during the length of the commercial. Amidst lush foliage, a young indigenous man
dressed in a tee shirt and jeans rises to speak directly to the camera in Spanish: “Yasuní
ITT is a huge commitment to the planet. Ecuador will contribute 50% of the value that it
could have obtained by extracting petroleum. The camera cuts to an indigenous woman
of Kichwa descent (apparent by her clothing) in a similar setting and says to the camera,
“the world should contribute the other 50%. We will be the example. There is still time.”
The camera now cuts to a young indigenous girl who tell us “because a country is also
big by the grandeur of its actions.” Two German tourists emerge from a jungle path and
say “Support Yasuní ITT because the Yasuní is not only for Ecuador,” and their sentence
is completed by an indigenous woman of Shuar nationality paddling a canoe in a small
river, “it is for the whole world”. An Indigenous young man emphatically states in his
native language, “leave the petroleum underground.” An Indigenous elder, also in native
dress, and in his language, says, “It is in our hands, you decide.” The black bubble falls
back into the soil, and the announcer emphasizes, “Get informed, be a part of the
initiative, and create a new world.” The spot ends with two logos: Yasuní-ITT: Create a
New World, and Ecuador loves life.26 This spot is just an example of dozens of ads that
were created and circulated on television, radio, social media, in plazas, and even at
massive music concerts.
26

Yasuní ITT Spot TV, uploaded to You Tube on August 21, 2011. Accessed at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mljCjLQcak
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As several of my interviewees pointed out, many youth that went on to identify as
Yasunidos were adolescents at the time that these spots came out. So it was not surprising
that the government, in its attempt to convince people of Plan B, had a difficult time
because of its own successful publicity campaign. A generation of Ecuadorians watched
the commercials, heard the government discourse, and sat through many presentations of
the initiative in their schools. I would argue that this is an important antecedent to the
emergence of a movement to protect the Yasuni from oil exploitation in 2013-2014.
Next section grounds earlier theorizations about a new wave of Latin American
social movements that seek to hold progressive governments accountable to their
promises. I propose that Yasunidos is part of the vanguard that Escobar (2014) refers to
when discussing a new wave of Latin American movements that call for a postdevelopment scenario. I mainly relied on ethnographic and interview-based methods to
describe and analyze the emergence of Yasunidos. I discuss the early protests, and
demonstrate how Yasunidos, while standing on the shoulders of other contemporary
ecological movements, presents new identities and practices that locate them in such
vanguard.
2.4 Candlelight vigils, protests and mediated maneuvers
Even before President Correa declared, on August 15, 2013 that his government
would terminate the Yasuní ITT initiative, opting instead for “Plan B,” there had been
rumors that the announcement was imminent. Ecuadorian citizens, many of them young
people, began gathering in plazas across Ecuador to hold vigils for the Yasuní. While
many of them were not associated with any social or political organizations, there were
also many ecologist, feminist, animal rights and human rights collectives present.
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Amazonia Por la Vida (affiliated with Acción Ecológica and the international group Oil
Watch) and the La Red de Guardianes del Yasuní (Network of Yasuní Guardians, a
national network of diverse collectives that defended the proposal to keep the oil in the
soil) were among the groups that organized the vigils in various cities across Ecuador.
One of the members of the collective Amazonia Por la Vida described early protests:
I remember that days before [the announcement] were were already
anticipating the moment, and we decided to hold zapateadas27 and
candlelight vigils in front of the Government Palace…we began to
organize people and chanted slogans in defense of the Yasuní, letting the
government know that we were vigilant.” (RG, personal communication,
March 12, 2015).

The zapateadas became a hallmark of Yasunidos protests and other Yasunírelated events, which almost always included artistic and performative expressions,
including singing, dancing, chanting, artistic displays, and performance. The enactment
of what I call mediated cultural politics became common movement practices. They were
key vehicles that interrupted hegemonic meanings of development, and communicated
post-development imaginaries to diverse publics. These mediated cultural politics were at
once contestatory and propositive acts against the developmentalist paradigm deployed
through statist media power.
2.4.1 The televised announcement
Correa’s government has reshaped media and communication practices in
Ecuador. I conceptualize the government’s increasing appropriation of media (both in
material and symbolic terms) as statist media power, and argue that it is a potent site to
27

A zapateada is an Indigenous collective dance, accompanied by musicians. It is done in a circle , and is
associated with important days for indigenous peoples, including Inti Raymi. Yasunidos’ zapateadas mixed
both traditional and more contemporary rhythms.
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interrogate symbolic conflicts between the government and social movements. The
Yasunidos case provides an important example of how the government has sought to
wield its media power to try to convince Ecuadorians that the Yasuni must be opened up
to exploration and extraction of oil.
Correa’s live national broadcast, held before an audience of carefully selected
ministers and political allies, including a teary-eyed Ivonne Baki, who had led the
Initiative since 2010 (many say to its downfall) lasted 22 minutes. With Decree No. 74,
Correa brought an end to the initiative. Surely anticipating the collective indignation by
the generation that grew up with the Yasuní ITT initiative and the Rights of Nature,
Correa invoked young people 14 times. Seeking to appeal to this demographic, Correa
said “beloved young people, you have the security of knowing that no one defends the
Yasuní, and no-one feels the pain of this decision, more than your own compañero
President.” He made a special pledge: “My work will always be at the service of young
people and the Ecuadorian people.” He added: “The worst crime against human rights is
misery. The greatest error is to subordinate these human rights against the supposed
rights of Nature.” He appealed to the pockets of the provincial governments by pledging
$1, 568 million dollars to each, which would be profits derived from oil exploitation. (El
Comercio, 2013). Correa framed the decision in a way that would become commonplace
over the next few months: justifying resource extraction as necessary to lift the Amazon
out of poverty, and promising that the profits would be directed toward Amazonian local
governments.
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2.4.2 The Great Vigil for the Yasuní
That same evening, hundreds of people gathered on the Plaza Grande, just outside
of Carondelet (the government palace). There were two main factions: on one side of the
plaza, protesters denounced the end of the initiative. They called the gathering the Gran
Velada por el Yasuní (the Great Vigil for the Yasuní). On the other end, those for
exploitation held a counter-demonstration. Pro-government events like this one have been
a common response to protest in Correa’s administration. The demonstration included
members of Alianza Pais (Correa’s movement), employees of the government (often
ordered to attend), supporters, and a large contingent of the national police that protected
them. While government supporters were permitted to occupy the plaza, the protesters’
access to the same space was blocked by the police.
The pro-Yasuní protesters held handwritten signs and banners about the Yasuní,
depicting the animals that lived there. They played music, danced and chanted. These
became emblematic practices of the movement. That evening, there were a few
squirmishes between the two groups, with the police trying to separate them, but there
were no violent confrontations.
One of the young people on the Plaza Grande that day would go on to become a
member of Yasunidos, and a dynamic spokesperson on a national and international level:
When Correa declared the exploitation, for me it was a very emotional moment
because of the indignation I felt, but also because of my feminist reflections, like
who has the right to decide… And this is a president who comes forward with a
very paternalistic discourse, saying “beloved young people, I have
decided…”.…But I was also excited about the response, that there was protest,
because it had been a long time since there was a strong mobilization in this
country. (RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015).
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The indignation felt by this young person was shared by thousands of people
across Ecuador, many who had never visited the Amazon. This was due, in part, to the
deep identification that they felt with the Yasuní ITT Initiative, the knowledge that the
Yasuní is the most bio-diverse region in the world, and because the government made a
commitment to safeguard it. The indignation expressed by so many evidenced that the
Rights of Nature and territorial rights for indigenous not only had widespread acceptance,
it was actually part of the identity of a whole generation of Ecuadorians.
In a letter written to the President and members of Alianza Pais on May 1, 2014, a
member of Yasunidos reflected back to that day:
A few years ago I heard a President speak of equity, of a change of era, of
progress for the poorest, and that capital is not above human beings, of the right
of Nature, of this small piece of land called the Yasuní (until that moment I had
no idea what it was). Hearing him speak, I fell in love: to maintain the most
biodiverse place on the planet, territory of other human civilizations from which
we have so much to learn; showing voracious capitalism and the world that
human beings could live more lovingly with nature….On August 15, 2013, while
you, Mr. President gave your discourse about cancelling the Yasuní ITT initiative
… I had the hope that you would say that although the funds had not been raised,
there would be no exploitation. Without a doubt this was one of the most difficult
moments of my life. I did not understand how my president could turn his back on
this dream.28

These emotions and subsequent rupture with the government was shared by many
young people and others who had believed that it would fulfill its promise to care for the
Yasuní. Even though there was suspicion all along, especially by those that followed the
ongoing auction of oil blocks, the final death knell of the initiative brought forth an
explosion of sadness, frustration and anger.

28

Letter written by Pedro Bermeo, and published on the Yasunidos website. Retrieved from
http://sitio.Yasunidos.org/images/cartas/Carta-Pedro_Bermeo.jpg
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2.4.3 Indignation spreads across plazas and multiple media platforms
Public outcry erupted across the nation. Radio and TV programs could speak of
nothing else. Indignation, disillusionment, and also acquiescence, support and
justification for the decision, were shared and debated across social media, often
accompanied by photos, videos, and memes. The majority of texts and images against
exploitation referenced the rights of Nature, the biodiversity of the region and displayed
photos of animals that live in the Yasuní. Some referred to the indigenous communities
that would surely be affected by the contamination that would ensue. On August 16,
independent filmmaker and journalist Carlos Andrés Vera published an entry in his blog,
Polificción, entitled “Reasons to not exploit the ITT.”29 This blog entry generated heated
debate, in that within 24 hours there were hundreds of responses.
Reading the responses, I noticed few comments about the indigenous groups
living in voluntary isolation, as this was still not an issue on many people’s radar.30 In
fact, one of the comments on the blog encapsulates the pro-“development” rationale
heard on radio and television programs in the following days and weeks:
My question is the following: for four nomadic tribes that live in the
Neolithic era, and that, according to you, need 1 million [hectares] to live
(when in the city of Guayaquil, where 2.5 million persons live … we
occupy 3.45% of what 4 tribes need), the country should suffer?
(Commentary by YogaGYE, Polificcion Blog, August 16, 2013).

The person went on to quoting Rafael Correa’s sentiments enunciated many times
on the EC, (and before him, the 19th century explorer Humbolt), ¨we cannot continue

29

https://polificcion.wordpress.com/2013/08/16/motivos-para-no-explotar-el-itt/
Opinion polls showed that the general public responded more to photos or drawings of animals than to
indigenous peoples.
30
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being the fools of the world, sitting on top of gold but poor…¨ On the other hand, CDES,
a small nonprofit founded in 1997, sought to raise awareness about the indigenous groups
living in voluntary isolation. On August 17, two days after Correa´s announcement,
CDES sent out a mass e-mail denouncing the government’s sudden denial that these
nomadic groups lived in the Yasuní. They pointed out that “paradoxically, this is the
same government that promoted their existence internationally. Now that the plan is to
exploit oil reserves, conveniently they no longer exist.” (CDES, 2013). CDES also
pointed out that the Minister of Justice, mandated to protect the lives of isolated
indigenous groups, now claimed that these groups were 70 kilometers away (see Map 1
and Map 2 below). This new narrative did not make sense because semi-nomadic hunters
and gatherers regularly move about wide swaths of territory.31 Finally, in the e-mail,
CDES reminded readers that oil exploitation in the area was not only against the
constitutionally-declared rights of Nature, but that it would affect the lives of human
beings whose ways of life were already in danger. For many, the indigenous cosmovision
that has penetrated some of society understands human rights and the rights of Nature as
inextricably intertwined.

31

On August 23, the Ministry of Justice published a new map in which the uncontacted groups were
indicated as living and roaming completely outside of the perimeter of Block 31 and the Yasuní ITT. The
new map contradicted the previous map that was sent to the IACHR in April 2013. See
http://www.claveverde.org/index.php/noticias/343-ecuador-ministerio-de-justicia-cambia-mapa-depoblacion-en-aislamien
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Figure 2c. Created in 2010 by the Ministry of Environment as part of the negotiations
with the Equipo de Medidas Cautelares (Team of Preventive Measures). It is consistent
with the one sent to the IACHR in April 2013.

Figure 2d. Map showing presence of clans of isolated groups in the ancestral territory
Tagaeri-Taromenare. This map was sent as part of the report from the Minister of to the
IAHCR in April 2013.
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Figure 2e. Map of distribution of indigenous groups living in isolation. This map was
sent by the Minister of Justice to the National Assembly on August 23, 2013.
2.5 Yasunidos emerges in the midst of a national mobilization
Collectives began organizing toward a national mobilization set for August 17,
2013. News of the upcoming event, less than 48 hours after the announcement, circulated
by word-of-mouth, radio, television, print media and social media. Similar to Occupy
Wall Street, 15M, and uprisings of the “Arab Spring”, the call to participate, and the
logistics of the events, spread rapidly across cities and towns through social media.
During the mobilization, the confrontation was much more intense than it had
been during previous protests.32 The national police sought to limit the use of public
space by the protesters, and prevented them from occupying the Plaza Grande. The
reason given was that a cultural event was in process. The event they were referring to
32

The mobilizations on August 17, 2013 took place in many cities and towns across Ecuador. .
77

was that of the counter-demonstration, mostly members of Alianza Pais. This group
insulted the protesters, using Correa’s own phrases such as “tirapiedras” (stone throwers)
often invokedwhen referring to students that were associated with the Movimiento
Popular Democrático (MPD).33 The government had also set up huge speakers that
drowned out the protesters music and chants (see Vázquez, 2015; La Hora, 2013).34 A
member of Yasunidos later recalled what we were all conscious of at the time:
It was the first major mobilization against the regime. (SD, personal
communication, May 9, 2015).
While citizen and social movement protests continued, there is general agreement
among scholars, activists and political analysts that the repression and criminalization of
movement leaders had a chilling effect since Correa came to power in 2007.35
Another member provided more analysis about that particular historical moment
in Ecuador:
Yasunidos is somewhat exceptional; it is something that transcends all that
has transpired in environmental matters. Amazonia por la Vida was a small
group that served as a base for Yasunidos. There is a moment in which the
Ecuadorian society rises up against certain forms of governance. There is
political effervescense with the fall of the presidents, and that is when civil
society organizations are strengthened. There is a breaking point with
Gutierrez, who realizes that the indigenous movement had much to do with
the fall of his predecessors. So he set out to weaken the indigenous
movement to the point where it almost disappears…Correa is then able to
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The MPD was a communist party founded in 1978 that had played a key role in some elections.
However, in the general elections of 2013 the CNE rescinded its legal status as it did not receive popular
support (another way in which the government has eliminated minority parties). In 2015, the party
reinvented itself as the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP).
34
See http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101550611/1/Po...e_la_Marcha_por_el_Yasun%C3%AD_hacia_Carondelet.html#.UhE-L-AukZY)
35
Ospina (2013) has pointed out that the number of conflicts increased from 2010-2012. Some related to
environmental conflicts, such as the march that CONAIE and the Frente Popular initiated between March
8-22, 2012, against mining, and against a pro-privatization water law.
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bring together the Forajidos,36 he seeks to bring in the ecologists,
indigenous, LGBT…all of these movements supported his candidacy which
sought great changes. In 2007, this works, but things begin to change with
the years, to the point where counter-marches began. And just at that
moment the Yasuní ITT initiative is terminated. Important figures in social
movements return, and they are consolidated at the societal level. (PE,
personal communication, Abril 30, 2015).
The pro-Yasuní wave of protests across the nation marked a turning point in
social movement mobilization, as the issue resonated with a wide range of Ecuadorians.
The Yasuní conflict would remain in the public eye for over a year; and it would have
long-lasting political effects beyond that year.
2.5.1 Yasunidos is founded
The following day, August 18, 2013, the Yasunidos collective was founded. This
section introduces elements of their movement identity, in particular how Yasunidos
differs from previous Ecuadorian social movements. I include interviews I conducted
approximately one year after ethnographic field work. I did this so, like me, they would
have the benefit of reflection. For this reason, I consider the process to be one of cotheorization with movement activists.
According to a core member that was present the evening that Yasunidos was
founded:
The collective was born of two primordial energies. The first is
indignation, and the second is the opposite of that, the desire to create and
to propose. In other words, indignation because many people, Ecuadorians
and foreigners, really believed in the sincerity of such a revolutionary
proposal. Then, to see that hope fall precipitously and be crushed… (BB,
personal communication, May 7, 2015).
36

The Rebelión de los Forajidos (the Rebellion of the Forajidos) was the mostly urban movement that
brought down the government of President Gutierrez through democratic protest during April 13-20, 2005.
The name forajido was the way Gutierrez referred to those who protested against him, and citizens proudly
reappropriated the name.
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A dynamic tension between indignation and propositive action, connected to a postdevelopment imaginary, was one of the characteristics of this new generation of activists.
Although there has been ecological activism in Ecuador for decades by the
indigenous movement and other social organizations, the emergence of Yasunidos as a
new social actor representing distinct subjectivities differs from other movements in that
it is heterogenous, youth-led, horizontally structured, and maintains its independence
from political parties. Omar Bonilla, a member of the collective, suggests that the
majority of Yasunidos are young people who simply do not want to accept the world that
is being offered to them. “What detonates in them is what sociologists call a ‘moral
economy’¨ (Yasunidos: el nuevo activismo urbano, 2014). Bonilla adds that many
members were neither for nor against the government, as they had not been previously
involved in politics. On their website, Yasunidos self-describes as:
Non-partisan, autonomous and self-organized … we are vegans, cyclists,
Buddhists, feminists, ecologists, indigenous, housewives, those who fight
for gender equality and sexual liberation, farmers, workers, artists,
intellectuals … who have found it necessary to defend life over money…
We reject extractivism as the only way to produce wealth. We practice
resistance but are not violent. We are pacifists but not passive. We want a
different world, but are not naïve. We base our ideals on the reality of
climate change, the water crisis, the irreversible extinction of biodiversity
and ethnocide of Indigenous peoples.37
Another member of Yasunidos theorizes its place in movement history.
I feel part of an historic moment. Obviously, there is a legacy, I would not
deny all that has been achieved by those whom we have inherited these
struggles: the compañeras of Acción Ecológica, the indigenous movement,
and other organizations and movements. But this moment of youth
mobilization about the Yasuní has a different political tone in its forms of
37

Retrieved from http://sitio.Yasunidos.org.
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protest, its discourses, and even its ways of expressing itself. (RG, personal
communication, March 12, 2015).
As demonstrated here, the ecological consciousness in a new generation of Ecuadorians
has been gestating in for decades, but has its own identity. Its “political tone” prefers
festive, performative protest actions over more militant forms. Not only is anti-capitalist
it re-imagines development as a future free of extractivisms.
To conclude, I return to the earlier theoretical section of this chapter to affirm that
indeed, Yasunidos fits into the new wave of social movements in Latin America. As Daza
et al. (2012) argue, these movements face a reconfigured landscape in that they are
confronting the broken promises of the progressive governments. In the Ecuadorian case,
Yasunidos emerged at a moment when many Ecuadorians, after five years of the Correa
administration, had grown weary of failed promises to transition from resource
extraction. Some members ceased supporting the policies and actions of the government
long before the Yasuní ITT announcement; others were still somewhat hopeful but on the
verge of disillusionment. The abandonment of the Yasuní ITT initiative became a flash
point for many citizens due to its innovative, progressive mandate that was a source of
national pride. This was particularly true for a younger generation that had feminist and
ecologist sensibilities. Like many progressive movements in the 21st century, Yasunidos
rejects political party affiliation, and rather cultivates democratic assemblies that seek
consensus. Daza et al. also argue that the new movements are disputing dominant models
of living from specific subjectivities. In the case of Yasunidos, adherents have grown up
with the concept of Buen Vivir, and deeply question the paradigm that extractivism brings
prosperity. The post-development imaginary, emerging from alternative ontologies, is
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part of the identity of Yasunidos. In the Ecuadorian case, Yasunidos has been shaped by
groundbreaking initiatives and constitutional mandates (and their promotion across media
platforms): the Yasuní ITT initative, the constitutionally-sanctioned rights of Nature and
recognition of cultural and territorial rights of indigenous peoples. As I analyze in the
next few chapters, the mediatization of the Yasuní ITT initiative by the government
began with praise and ended with justifying its exploitation. The conflict that ensued
makes visible the government´s extractivist plans, and major push-back from citizens.
2.6 Yasunidos coming into play
The Yasunidos case also tells the story of tensions involving, on the one
hand, processes of democratization from below, and on the other, the lack of democractic
processes in political institutions. This final section focuses on this theme. As discussed
in Chapter One, I understand democratization not as a path towards a specific type of
democracy or processes limited to electoral politics, but rather as “spaces of experience
and experimentation that arise from specific historical, geographical and cultural
conditions” (Ramirez, 2012, p. 115). The analysis of the distinct forms of power at play,
whether government media power or mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos, can shed
light on cultural battles being waged in Ecuador. An examinination of the six month-long
signature-gathering process brings into focus contradictions at play in governmental
discourses and practices. Following Ranciere (2011), substantive democracy cannot be
reduced to a form of government; rather it is an expression of popular power, “the power
of those who have no special entitlement to exercise power.” (p. 79). The very act of
calling for a referendum facilitated a process in which Ecuadorian citizens, led by
Yasunidos, sought to reclaim popular power that had been taken away during the Citizens
82

Revolution. As discussed in Chapter One, during the Correa administration, citizen
participation has been conceived as a consultative process at best, in which citizens have
been largely called on to agree with the government.
Ramiro Avila Santamaria, a scholar and one of Yasunidos’ attorneys, emphasizes
three kinds of democracy inscribed in the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution: representative
democracy, direct democracy and communitarian democracy. He proposes that since
representative democracy had failed Ecuadorians in the case of Yasuní ITT, Yasunidos
had no other choice but to turn to the other two forms of democracy, communitarian
democracy, which took place in the streets, and direct democracy, which was waged
through the referendum process.38
To analyze Yasunidos´ bid for a referendum on the Yasuní, I have identified three
key phases around which the story of Yasunidos and processes of democratization can be
told: 1) the emergence of the movement and first wave of protests, which Avila has
referred to as communitarian democracy; 2) the signature-gathering process that
Yasunidos waged during six months, which was the legally-sanctioned period of time
they had to collect 583,324 signatures of Ecuadorian citizens in order to have the
constitutional right to call for a popular referendum, a direct democratic process. Part of
the second phase, I include the joyous victory march in which Yasunidos and key allies
delivered 55 boxes containing 757,623 signatures to the CNE (an elevated moment in
which popular power was reclaimed). and 3) the series of events that followed the

Avila’s intervention took place on January 12, 2015, during the launching of the Yasunidos report by
Vázquez (2015). Direct democratic mechanisms are constitutionally sanctioned in the 2008 Constitution,
articles 103-107. Article 104 stated that Ecuadorian citizens may call for a popular referendum on an issue.
After this conflict, the government amended the article.
38
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delivery of signatures, in which the CNE invalidated 230,000 signatures. Yasunidos has
coined this moment “democracy in extinction.”
The referendum process is a privileged site at which to understand the state-social
movement conflict in a dispute over development and extractivism. It illuminates how
each side sought to convince Ecuadorian citizens of their perspective. On the one hand,
the government deployed its media power in order to shape public opinion, mainly
through the delegitimization and criminalization of the movement; on the other hand,
Yasunidos, visibilizing new subjectivities and forms of protest in Ecuador, enacted a
mediated cultural politics that garnered approval and visibility both nationally and
internationally.
2.6.1 Consulta Popular! Yasunidos calls for a national referendum
The decision to call for a national referendum was made by Yasunidos on August
22, 2013, just days after the collective was formed. To do so, they needed to gather
signatures totaling 5% of the electorate, which was 583,324 signatures at that time. The
question they posed, later legally approved, was: Do you agree that the Ecuadorian
government should indefinitely leave the crude oil in the ground in the ITT, known as
block 43?
Although there were those who disagreed, a member of Yasunidos justified the
decision to go this route:
This decision was another big moment. Even though I am very critical of
the state and of power I do believe that it is necessary to be strategic, to
have a vision beyond the moment. For me this was an important action, to
have proposed the national referendum, because it helped to sustain the
mobilization for the Yasuní. We all know that street protests can die out
quickly, they last for a time and then they end. And that is what occurred,
although they did last a good amount of time. I remember that we went out
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to protest almost every day, and we had sit-ins in the streets near Carondelet
(Presidential palace) … but the call for a consulta sustained mobilization,
and more people joined. It was an activity that people could feel part of,
after the protests. It was also very difficult, it required a lot of work….the
signature-gathering process was super important….What it allowed us was
to fight for participation. And precisely what we did was to construct ways
to do things wherein the greatest amount of people could participate. (RG,
personal communication, March 12, 2015).
Indeed, the signature-gathering process, a direct-democracy mechanism, would
captivate the nation over the next six months.
2.6.2 The signature-gathering process as mediated cultural politics
The right to gather signatures towards a national referendum was eventually
granted to Yasunidos by the CNE on October 1, 2013. The six-month process of
signature-gathering, from October 14, 2013 to April 12, 2014, became a potent
movement building mechanism.
In a study about the Egyptian protests of 2011, Nanabhay et al. (2011) argue that
an “amplified public sphere” is created at the intersection of three interrelated spaces:
physical, analog and digital. They propose that each space informs the other, leading to a
context in which real world protests function in tandem with social media and
mainstream media. However, they clearly assert that change does not occur without the
occupation of public space. This was indeed the case with the signature-gathering
process.
The signature-gathering process was an act of mediated cultural politics. As
Alvarez et al. (1996) remind us, culture is not static, rather it is “a process that produces
meanings that shape and configure social relations (p. 3). By extension, cultural politics
should be analyzed by “its effects on political culture (what counts as “political” in a
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given society), how they challenge and unsettle it. A similar meaning is given by Juris
(2015) who proposes that it is through cultural performance that “alternative meanings,
values and identities are produced, embodied, and publicly communicated by social
movements.” (p. 82). He also argues that these performances bridge the mind-body
divide. In other words, when a movement enacts cultural politics in these ways, their
appeal can be broader. Hence, in a similar vein, Yasunidos enacted a mediated cultural
politics that resignified what direct democratic participation and development could look
like.
The act of occupying public space, not just with a table and signature forms, but
with large posters depicting healthy people, forests, and animals (a post-development
environment free of extractive activities that contaminate and kill), as well as music and
dance, dynamized and visibilized dissent as perhaps no other action could. In the first
place, it was not as easy for the government to delegitimize or criminalize this process,
given it was constitutionally sanctioned and legally approved by CNE. In the second
place, its effect was amplified in other mediated platforms. Everyone I interviewed
believed that the signature gathering process was one of the most successful components
of Yasunidos’ campaign. It mobilized members of Yasunidos and volunteers across the
country, including citizens who had not yet been involved. As real, substantive citizen
participation dwindled during the Citizens Revolution, here was a constitutionally
consecrated way to take action on an issue that was important to so many:
I believe that the moment in which we were on the offensive was the best
moment for Yasunidos. Networks grew on a national level. When we
visited the various provinces where there were Yasunidos, about 18 to 20
provinces, and we missed a few, it was extraordinary because groups grew
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even where we hadn’t facilitated them. (SD, personal communication, May
9, 2015).

This member of Yasunidos further describes the scenarios that took place across
Ecuador, and proposes why this phenomenon attracted attention:
I witnessed young people of 23 years of age work 16, 17 hours a day in the
collection of signatures. They were absolutely obsessed with the task. A
whole generation of young people went out to the streets with an impressive
amount of joy…The fact that young people, unaligned, dove into the task
with passion and heart…with other groups it might have been impossible to
achieve. It was at once the great virtue and great limitation of Yasunidos.
(SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015).
At the same time, the process of occupying public spaces such as plazas, outside
schools, churches, shopping malls and other places crowds gather, was an excellent way
to meet and dialogue with people across race, class, gender, age, and neighborhoods.
Unlike Correa’s unilateral decision, this process fostered a citizen-led, national debate on
the Yasuní, extractivism, and democracy (regarding who has the right to make a decision
about the Yasuní). During this process, the public had a first-hand opportunity to get to
know Yasunidos and debate the issues with them (rather than a soley mediated
experience).
As one member of Yasunidos described, she sometimes felt that she was winning
people over one person at a time. She even ran after a few people when they simply
walked away to ask “why?” These personal encounters led to some of the richest
exchanges. Yasunidos was committed not just to gathering signatures, but to engaging in
dialogue and debate with fellow citizens. The process allowed Yasunidos to reach broad
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sectors of society, and further, to appeal to their imaginaries about the kind of Ecuador
they want, and to take action towards that future:
We made a tremendous effort to reach all sectors of society, above all
perhaps those that had never been connected to social struggles. We
appealed to people’s artistic sensibilities as well. And Yasunidos was able
to amplify its discourse in light of a theme that was super concrete: You
disagree with what is happening? Well, here is a concrete tool, sign
here…(SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015).
The process also brought Yasunidos into direct contact with the obstacles, such as
people’s fears of signing the petition. Signature collectors, who would share their stories
at the Yasunidos weekly assemblies, recounted that many individuals confessed that they
were afraid to sign the form because they didn’t want to lose their government job. They
would often bring family members or friends to sign on their behalf, admitting those
feelings, but proudly having their children or parents provide a signature.
Other difficulties and tensions with other social movements and with political
figures arose during the process of signature collection. These frictions were due, in part,
to Yasunidos’ rejection of the help (or protagonism, one might say) of parties. They were
also due, in part, to reactions to urban youth taking a lead in themes that had been the
domain of others. For example, CONAIE, led during this process by Humberto
Cholango, did not participate, although ECUARUNARI, the highlands chapter of
CONAIE, led by Carlos Perez Guambartel, played a key role. Alberto Acosta commented
on this:
First, no flags; second, no old figures that lead political movements, which
is very interesting, and many of them understand this and put themselves on
the margin (like myself). Other political figures feel marginalized and did
not commit as they should have. CONAIE did not commit, ECUARUNARI
did as they have other leaders. There was also a kind of jealousy, not just
from the indigenous movement, but also from others. There was uneasiness
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on the part of certain political figures who wanted to help but felt mistreated
by the youth. Yasunidos rejected all of them without distinction. (Alberto
Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015).
A member of Yasunidos shared his perspective on this issue:
I think what occurred was about protagonisms and personalisms….it is very
difficult to accept that a young woman that is 19 or 20 years old relegates a
political leader like Humberto Cholango (then president of the CONAIE) to
the sidelines. I think that these were the kinds of agendas that
predominated. At some moment some of them came to see Yasunidos as
their enemy, which is absolutely unreal. For example, there was a moment
when some leaders asked who financed Yasunidos, adding “is it true you
received money from Chevron? (an allegation of the government). Pretexts
as absurd as these… they had their own interests, their own resentments and
their own agendas. (BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015).
As these interview segments reveal, one could say that there was a cost to the way
that Yasunidos did politics. Yet, I propose that the benefits outweighed the downside, as
their position brought them a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes of many Ecuadorians. It
also made it harder for the government to accuse them (as it tried to do) of being a
movement made up of “los mismos tirapiedras de siempre,” a common lema of Rafael
Correa when talking about political or social movement actors.
The possibility of a popular referendum brought international attention, including
several globally-organized petition drives. International allies also posted on social media
their photos with signs indicating their support of Yasunidos and the preservation of the
Yasuní. This must have been very hard for the government to stomach, as it had mostly
enjoyed being known as an ecologically-friendly nation. With the international spotlight
on Yasunidos, this image began to be replaced by another, that of a government who
would abandon the project of keeping the oil in the soil in the Yasuní.
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2.6.3 Signature-gathering process as a site of conflict: government strategies
The signature-gathering process was marked by multiple efforts on the part of the
government and its allies to confuse people and dissuade them from signing (Vazquez,
2015). The use of media platforms amplified that effort. The first irregularity was that,
according to law, the Constitutional Court needed to approve the question. It never
responded as to the validity of the question. This fostered mistrust, because at any point
in the process the Court could simply decide the question was invalid. Extensive
interviews with Yasunidos (Vázquez, 2015) revealed that Yasunidos members were
regularly followed and harassed, their phones tapped, and their bank accounts
investigated. Signature-gathering efforts were also impeded by the police and private
guards. In one case in Quito, private guards destroyed and removed a tent that protected
signature gatherers from the rain. There were also cases of infiltration, in which suspect
individuals showed up at Yasunidos headquarters to allegedly volunteer to collect
signatures. Another intimidating tactic used frequently was that police and other
individuals (civil servants or allies of the government) took photos of the signaturegatherers and signers. Adding to the atmosphere of harassment and intimidation, on
November 5th, 2013, a police intelligence report was leaked and circulated on social
networks. It provided a detailed map with photographs of the members and allies of
Yasunidos. A member of Yasunidos discusses some of the ways in which they dealt with
these tactics:
One of the reasons that I am not afraid, or rather the way in which I have
worked with my fear, is my belief in the collective process, and I think that
working collectively one is more protected. We have also learned that it is
better not to hide, rather, when they attack you, you need to become even
more visible. That way you have more people that recognize you, that
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identify you, and that will defend you…We Yasunidos have also learned
that if they attack someone, it should be that person who is a spokesperson,
who shows their face….For example, when the police put out the pólice
report, framing us as if we were drug dealers, those people profiled became
the spokespeople …. (RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015).
Mediated strategies used by the government in the Enlaces during the early wave
of protests and the signature gathering process included misframing of the protests and
specific protesters as violent; insults and threats to sympathetic political and social actors,
academics, members of political parties, and journalists; verbal attacks on social media,
likely coming from government-hired “trolls” (people paid to intervene in social media).
The mediated response to Yasunidos is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Three. Here I
provide a few key examples as part of the overall context (the mediated response cannot
be excised from the context given its constant presence and weight).
On EC No. 336 on August 23, 2013, Correa characterized Yasunidos as
manipulated by politicians, “childish ecologists,” “the same stone-throwers as always,” or
as middle-class urbanites with ¨full bellies¨ that had never been to the Amazon, nor knew
what it meant to live without basic services. He sought to depict Yasunidos as out of
touch with people in the Amazon. In a move that was highly intimidating, in this EC, and
what became a common occurrence over the next few months, he showed photographs of
the marches, often pointing out and discussing specific individuals at length.
On EC No. 331, on August 31, 2013, after the request to initiate a national
referendum process, Correa stepped up the attacks. He dared Yasunidos “not to be lazy”
(“no sean vagos”), and to collect signatures to prove they had support. Scenes from the
protests were also shown. This segment sought to, on the one hand, minimize the
numbers of protesters, and on the other, accuse them of acts of violence. Showing a video
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of people writing on a wall, accompanied by ominous-sounding background music, he
accused protesters of trying to “destabilize the government and create chaos.” This
particular EC framed the riot police as victims of aggression. Correa also made it clear
that his supporters were following Yasunidos’ social media communications. In addition
to intimidation, accusations and criminalization of Yasunidos, Correa made fun of
proposed alternatives to oil extraction, even displaying a chart with a table divided in
two-halves, the “government’s” proposals and “irresponsible” proposals. In these ways,
the government sought to interrupt the image of Yasunidos as nonviolent and also
delegitimized their post-extractivist proposals.
2.6.4 Sowing confusion during signature-gathering
The incidents that created the most confusion were when two different groups also
began referendum processes on the same theme. One of the groups, Amazonia Vive
(Amazon Lives), initiated by the 30 mayors that were aligned with Alianza Pais,
supported extractive activities in the Amazon. They used the slogan Yasuní Sí. Their
leading question was:
Do you support the President’s proposal to exploit petroleum in an area no more
than 1 per 1,000 in the Yasuní National Park, and that the oil that is extracted from
blocks 43, in the ITT camp, is directed toward the fight against poverty, the
financing of life plans of ancestral communities, and the provision of basic
services?
There were several reports from citizens that some of the signature gatherers of
these competing referendum processes sought to convince people that they were
members of Yasunidos. In one of the most shocking acts that transpired during the sixmonth process, the forms designed by Yasunidos and disseminated in the daily
newspaper, El Comercio, were plagiarized by the other two groups leading referendum
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processes and disseminated the following week in El Comercio and other newspapers, the
only notable difference being the questions (Vázquez, 2015). Many people became so
confused by all the different forms and questions, they simply did not sign anything.
There were also government actions that targeted other environmental groups. One
of the most disturbing was the sudden government-closure of the Pachamama
Foundation. Pachamama was an ally of Yasunidos, and provided funds to Ecuadorian
groups, such as Acción Ecológica, to underscore how the ECs were intertwined with
government actions. Just days before the closure, on November 30, 2014, on EC No. 350,
Correa presented a video that attacked Yasunidos, Acción Ecológica, Pachamama
Foundation, and indigenous leaders. Following the closure of Pachamama, on EC No.
351, Correa framed NGOs as being against the progressive governments, and bankrolled
by “foreign interests.” While this has occurred historically in certain cases, this particular
claim, denied by Yasunidos and without evidence, was likely meant to damage their
reputation. These and many other incidents, detailed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, led to
a climate of fear, paranoia, distress about the way the government was using its statist
power and statist media power to attack critical actors.
2.6.5 Yasunidos victory march to deliver the signatures
Despite the mediated, physical, and psychological obstacles placed in their path,
Yasunidos exceed their own and everyone’s expectations, and gathered 757,623
signatures, which was 173,300 more than the 584,323 signatures required. On April 12,
2014, 55 boxes containing 107,088 signature pages were delivered to the CNE at the
culmination of the most joyous march most people could recall. Indigenous youth and
women travelled from the Amazon, Yasunidos collectives arrived from across the
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country, Afro-Ecuadorians from the coast, Indigenous groups from the highlands, and
thousands who had a stake in the process of the past few months took part in the march.
A member of Yasunidos describes the emotional tone of the March:
The night before the delivery of the signatures…we camped out in El
Arbolito (The Little Tree, a park in which many protest activities have take
place), and the next day that great march moved me so much. It was so
beautiful, diverse, and showed much of the expressions that had meant the
defense of the Yasuní, and it was a momento of poder del pueblo (power of
the people), saying, here are our signatures, they represent us, here they are,
we deliver them, and then that collective joy when we reach the CNE….
(RG, personal communication, March 12, 2015).
As the boxes were delivered one by one, to the sound of unending applause, the
march acted as a collective voice of citizens, making visible dissent, and breaking
through silence and fear. The march was perhaps the most important and vibrant
manifestation of Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics of post-development.
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Figure 2f. Yasunidos delivers the signatures to CNE. Photos: Diana Coryat
2.6.6 Democracy in Extinction
Once the boxes were delivered by Yasunidos to CNE, another series of
irregularities took place. Three days after the signatures were delivered, on April 15,
2014, CNE released a video, aired nationally, that described reasons that could lead to the
elimination of signatures. Sensing a fraud foretold, members of Yasunidos made a
surprise visit to the CNE. When they demanded to see their boxes, they observed that the
security belts were broken on several of them. Upon revision, they found that many of the
copies of identification cards of signature gatherers were missing, which would lead to
the disqualification of thousands of signatures. Two days later, the CNE accused
Yasunidos of trying to deceive them, and the boxes were hauled away by the military to
one of their installments. The signature verification process ultimately took place without
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the consent or supervision of Yasunidos, as was originally stipulated. Moreover, these
events occurred during Easter week, when many people leave Quito to spend time with
their families. So there were far less protesters than there might have been during another
time period.
Vázquez et al. (2015) carefully documented the process, noting fraudulent and
suspicious activites that included: the breaking of the protective seals of the boxes; public
media campaigns against Yasunidos, including false allegations against the signature
gatherers; CNE press releases citing the reasons for the elimination of signatures; and the
very serious accusation that Yasunidos had falsified signatures. In short, there were
multiple irregularies leading up to CNE’s announcement that it had eliminated over 60%
of the signatures. On April 29, 2014, President Correa declared that there would be no
referendum, even before the signature verification process took place. It was very clear
that the government was adamant about not allowing a referendum to go forward.
This was indeed the most difficult moment the movement had faced. Yasunidos
initiated a campaign urging citizens to demand that their signatures be validated.
However, this campaign, “Democracy in Extinction” did not gain traction. A member of
Yasunidos discusses the impact that this series of events had on the movement:
We did not have a strategy prepared for the moment of fraud. I think we
were somewhat naive in believing that with that number of signatures, the
referendum would go forward. Psychologically we were more prepared to
win, than for a mediated situation of fraud. I don’t think there was planning
in the event of fraud…we decided on the theme of “democracy in
extinction” as a way to attract more sectors. But I feel that the message
wasn’t so clear, nor was it as emotionally appealing as in the previous
phase….It caught us completely off guard politically as well as
mediatically….Also, the type of activists and bodies that were very efficient
for the phase of signature collection, and to convince the people that they
had to sign, and vote in favor of the Yasuní, were not the same kinds of
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activists needed for that next moment…like those with more political
experience, in order to confront that situation. Precisely because we are
young, we had not had experience with autoritarian regimes. We didn’t
have experience in civil disobedience, or in actions of resistance nor direct
action… (BM, personal communication, April 28, 2015).
On May 6, 2014, the CNE announced that they would only validate 359,761
signatures, which fell short of the amount they needed to call for a national referendum.
Reasons given ranged from valid ones such as repeat signatures, to those that were
unreasonable, including small stains or wrinkles on a form or undecipherable letters. No
matter where Ecuadorians stood on the issue of drilling for oil in the Yasuní, the
government’s frontal attack on the signature-gathering process, its effort to depict
Yasunidos as dishonest, and the manner in which the CNE dealt with the process, was an
affront to many people’s sense of democracy and justice. It appeared that every effort
was made so that the referendum would fail.
A team of academics from several universities carried out an independent
statistical analysis of the signatures presented by Yasunidos to the CNE to try to estimate
the number of valid signatures (Vázquez, 2015). According to their report, Yasunidos
delivered between 667,334 and 680,339 valid signatures. They concluded that the chance
that the number of valid signatures presented by CNE was accurate was statistically less
than “one millionth.” They also concluded that chances that the number of valid
signatures were less than the minimum required by law was almost equal to zero. This
report called into question the objectivity of the CNE, and recommended a formal,
independent audit and access to CNE’s database. The report stated that an audit “is
indispensable, as conditions for democratic institutionality, transparency, independence
and credibility of the resolutions of electoral power.” (Tegantai, 2014, p. 2)
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I would argue that the elimination of signatures and other irregularities provoked
a sense of frustration and despair in many citizens, which lead to paralysis rather than
mobilization. It was also an emotionally difficult moment for many members of
Yasunidos, especially those who did not have political experience. Several were so
frustrated and angry they simply stopped their protest activities. Others persevered, but
without the forward momentum provided by the concrete goal of gathering signatures.
Yasunidos has since struggled to gain that kind of massive public support. It seemed that
the moment of hope and people-powered direct democracy was over, at least at this
juncture.
Although a devastating moment in the life of the movement, and one that had far
reaching implications for democracy in Ecuador, Yasunidos does not assume what
occurred as a total loss. As one member argues:
The Yasunidos collective became a new poltiical actor in the public sphere,
and it was a fresh voice whose intervention was needed. When Yasunidos
breaks into this sphere, I think the other political actors did not have an
adequate response to what we were proposing, from the most traditional of
the Right, to the center Left… and perhaps even social movements. And
after the signature collection process, I don’t believe the state will permit
another exercise of signature collection as Yasunidos did. (BB, personal
communication, May 7, 2015).
A political actor I interviewed also discussed the outcome:
They (Yasunidos) aren’t necessarily a threat to the government. The
possibility that people organize is a threat to the government, and that they
claim the rights established in the Constitution, and that is why they wanted
to eliminate them. And since then, there are many international meetings,
not just academic meetings but political ones, and this case is always
present. Members of Yasunidos have also travelled and presented at these
and other meetings. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10,
2015).
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Many analysts agree that the government’s decision to drill for oil in the Yasuní,
and its treatment of Yasunidos, hurt Correa politically. For instance, when Correa’s
movement, Alianza Pais, lost Ecuador’s three major cities (Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca)
and most of the Amazon in the mayoral races of February 2014, many considered it a
vote against all that had happened in 2013 (Ospina, 2014). In Chapter 5, I discuss the
longer-term political implications of this mediated battle, in particular for processes of
democracy in Ecuador.
On October 28, 2014, Yasunidos presented a demand to the IACHR against the
Ecuadorian government for violation of political rights of the citizens who signed the
petitions for a popular referendum. Julio César Trujillo, one of Yasunidos’ lawyers,
stated that they had little hope that the referendum would be approved, as governmental
organizations “obeyed one will, that of the President of the Republic…and because of
this we needed to appeal to international organisms.” (Cazorla, 2014, p. 4).
Ironically, on May 22, 2014, the International Day of Biodiversity, the Ministry of
the Environment granted Petroamazonas (the state oil company), the license to exploit the
Yasuní blocks 31 and 43. The complete coordination of supposed independent branches
and institutions of government, and alignment of public media, was further proof that
democratization processes had been eroded.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter, divided into four sections, has sought to present a largely interview
and ethnographically-based, panoramic view of the case study of Yasunidos. The first
section grounded the chapter in a theoretical discussion about the new wave of social
movements in Latin America. Here I analyzed how Yasunidos fits patterns associated
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with a new generation of movement actors that are contesting power in the progressive
governments. The second section focused on the story of the Yasuní ITT, including its
mediated treatment by the government, thereby contextualizing the emergence of
Yasunidos. Section Three focused on Yasunidos identity and movement practices. In the
final section of the chapter, I analyzed four key moments of the case, paying particular
attention to the social, political and communicational context they confronted in that first
year. I sought to tell the story of the year in a succint manner. In what was a very
complicated year on many levels in Ecuador, I emphasized the tension between
movement-based processes of democratization, and government attempts to abort those
processes. I analyzed how the direct democratic process of collecting signatures across
the country was able to partially interrupt the government’s media power. As I discussed
in Chapter 1, media power has been theorized by several scholars, but the limits and
excesses of media power has rarely been analyzed. This chapter, particularly Section 4,
provides insight into howYasunidos confronted the government’s media power with
direct democratic actions. These actions formed part of their practices of mediated
cultural politics. And, as I have proposed, a focus on mediated cultural politics sheds
light on processes that a sole focus on media power can overlook.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RECONFIGURATION OF MEDIA POWER IN ECUADOR AND ITS
IMPACT ON STATE-SOCIAL MOVEMENT CONFLICTS
3.1 Introduction
When I first travelled to Ecuador in August 2012, Julian Assange, the founder of
Wikileaks, had recently been given safe harbor in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.39
Internationally, President Correa was celebrated as a champion of freedom of expression
given his support of this whistleblower. So, when I read Ecuadorian newspapers in the
days following my arrival, I was puzzled to read numerous editorials and opinion
columns that questioned the “intolerant government that seeks to wash its image using
Assange” and pointed to the “contradictions” this act displayed with domestic
communication, such as forbidding government functionaries to give interviews to the
press and other such actions.40 I would later find that this disjuncture between
international and national opinion about the Ecuadorian government was just one of
many examples of communicative criticism. Others would be related to the
government’s attitudes towards the media, social movements and the indigenous
communities seeking to protect their territories from extractivism.
In this chapter, I address one of my main research questions: how has the Correa
government reconfigured media power in Ecuador? A related sub-questions that I analyze
39

Julian Assange applied for political asylum in Ecuador due to continuous legal battles in Sweden over
allegedly unresolved rape charges. Assange and many others believe that his extradition would lead to
persecution by the U.S. due to his whistleblowing Wikileads project. See Julian Assange seeking asylum in
Ecuadorean embassy in London, June 19, 2012, The Guardian. Accessed at
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/19/julian-assange-wikileaks-asylum-ecuador
40

See Assange, Ecuador on Stage, August 20, 2012, El Comercio, and La Agenda Del Poder, June 29,
2012, El Comercio, for two examples of then-current opinion about the action.
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in Part II of this chapter is: how has the Correa government used its media power,
particularly the EC television program, to delegitimize and criminalize Yasunidos and
other social actors that oppose oil drilling in the Yasuní.
In the following section, I return to the theorization of media power that I
introduced in Chapter One. I then discuss Ecuador’s media field prior to, and after 2007,
when Correa assumed office. I analyze different components of media power, including
the symbolic, legislative, and production practices of the government, particularly in
relation to journalists and private media companies. While most of the dissertation
focuses on mediated government-social movement relations, in analyzing the
reconfiguration of media power it is necessary to focus on the journalistic field, where
such configurations have mostly played out. Part II of this chapter focuses on how the
government has deployed its media power in its dealing with Yasunidos and other social
movements, particular through the EC. I also analyze Yasunidos’ media practices: how
they strategically used the governmental attacks to their advantage; how they leveraged
private media; and how they characterized their own social media practices. An analytic
thread that runs through the whole chapter is the limitations of statist media power, a
theme that is underdeveloped in most accounts of media power.
The methodologies used in this chapter are diverse, and have included
ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with members of Yasunidos, journalists,
political analysts, and social movement actors who have expertise in communication
practices. I use institutional analysis to examine laws and decrees that were passed during
the year covered in this case study. In Part II, I use a critical discourse analysis
framework to analyze presidential discourses in the EC, related to Yasunidos and other
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anti-extractivist resistance. One of the aspirations of this chapter, both theoretically and
empirically, is to widen our understanding about the reconfiguration of statist media
power by examining the symbolic actions, legislative-judicial framework, and media
ownership and production practices of the government. In this way, we can better grasp
its implications for journalists, media organizations and social movements, as well as
appreciate its limitations, and the ways social movements resist and fight back.
3.2 Theorizing statist media power in Ecuador
A conceptual framework of statist media power has evaded most theories of
media power that focus on liberal democratic regimes, in which power and protagonism
are assumed to be the domain of private media (albeit in alignment with government).
This is not the case in Ecuador, nor in other states where governments have attained some
measure of direct control over media’s symbolic and material resources. Therefore, I seek
to further develop a concept of statist media power, theoretically, methodologically and
empirically.
In Chapter One, I argued that it is essential to apply a communicational lens to the
Yasunidos case, as it can illuminate contemporary state-social movement conflicts about
extractivism in ways that are often overlooked (either media is left out of the analysis or
there is a focus on government-media relations). I introduced a framework of statist
media power that expands on Couldry’s (2003) notion of media power as symbolic and
material resources that, taken together, have definitional power to shape the whole of
social space. Couldry extends Bourdieu’s notion of the meta-capital of the state, which
refers to the state’s power over other fields, and he applies it to the meta-capital that the
media potently generate over other fields. In doing so, Couldry proposes that only media
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meta-capital can compete with statist meta-capital, as each has the cross-cutting power to
deeply impact other fields of power. In the context in which Couldry is theorizing media
power, these two meta-capitals (of the state and of the media) are generated by distinct
actors. Whereas I propose that in the Ecuadorian context, the meta-capital of the media
(media power) has become, under Correa, a constituent, even dominant aspect of the
state’s meta-capital.
Therefore, when I refer to statist media power, I understand it as the power to
construct a version of reality using symbolic and material resources at the state’s
disposal. Given the scope of resources available to the state, such power also affects the
capacity of the state to circulate other kinds of state capital (political, economic,
legislative, judicial, and communicational). As such, it is a multilevel, multi-modal,
dynamic process that involves the mediation of symbols, images, rituals, and discursive
constructions of state and non-state actors. Paired with material resources, such statist
media power has enormous potential to benefit government agendas. Because statist
media power is part of a “package” of various kinds of statist capital, and also able to
leverage those other forms of capital, it can have strong implications, not just for media
democratization, but for overall processes of democratization (in this case, the erosion of
democratization).
One of the key arguments in this chapter, arrived at though careful analysis of the
Ecuadorian government’s media practices and media holdings, is that it has amassed an
unprecedented amount of media power, although that power is always partial, and
permanently subject to contestation and resistance. I categorize the various forms of
media power in three conceptually discrete but overlapping categories (in that all have
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symbolic and material dimensions and implications): symbolic actions, legal-judicialadministrative factors, and state media ownership and production practices. The first,
symbolic actions, include threats, delegitimization and criminalization of government
adversaries. The second, legal-judicial-administrative factors, include the passing of laws
and decrees that provide the government with legal means to penalize social movements
and the media. These factors have restricted freedom of expression and self-censorship. It
also includes taking over and closing private media; and establishing a new
communication infrastructure that oversees and sanctions media. The third factor is state
media ownership and production practices, which are the main vehicles for transmitting
the symbolic dimensions of the state. This includes the production of content that is
circulated widely across media platforms.
By making explicit the various dimensions of statist media power, it is my intent
to emphasize both its symbolic and structural, materialist aspects, and ways in which they
relate and overlap. The Enlace Ciudadano, for example, integrates all three categories, in
that it is a television and radio program produced by the government; it is aired on many
channels owned by and/or that have been taken over by the government, it is archived
online in government websites, and the content - its discourses, visuals and rituals - have
symbolic power.
There is another aspect to media power that has been underexplored in scholarly
literature: the limitations of media power. Couldry (2003) argues that some
concentrations of symbolic power are so great that they “dominate the whole landscape”
and amount to the power of constructing reality (p. 4). While I agree with Couldry that
such concentration, given the uneven distribution of symbolic power, can dominate and
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therefore distort representations of reality, such media hegemony always encounters
counter-hegemonic challenges that seek to interrupt its discourses and representations.
Des Freedman (2014) has explored the limitations of media power through empirical
cases (both Couldry and Freedman conceptualize mainstream media as the holder of
media power, a key difference with my study). While Freedman concurs with Couldry as
to the troubling effects of the unequal allocation of symbolic and material media
resources, his research findings have lead him to conclude that “[m]edia institutions do
not exert an exorable power over society…They are open to challenge, particularly when
their frames don’t match experiences or aspirations, especially in times of social
struggles…when existing narratives are under stress (2014, p. 119-120)41. As such, media
power is not as “predictable, solid, or immoveable” as advocates of the propaganda
model argue (p. 117). However, when it comes to interrogating how media power can be
challenged, his proposals lack specificity; for example, he proposes that it is important to
take advantage of the contradictions inherent in capitalism, without providing further
detail.
Freedman’s assertions are key to understanding the limitations of media power in
the Yasunidos case, particularly his argument that challenges to media power can arise
when frames (in this case, the government’s) don’t match “the experiences or
aspirations” (2014, p. 119) of citizens. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, such
mismatch between Correa’s assertions that oil-drilling brings wealth to the Amazon
region did not match Ecuador’s decades-long experience as a petrol state, in which the
financial resources did not benefit the Amazon region. Even more dissonant, the
One of Freedman’s (2014) studies focused on how readers question editorial frames of the Iraq pro-war
media.
41
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government’s vision of development did not match its own stated vision, just months
before it abandoned the project to keep the oil in the soil. Additionally, young people’s
post-development imaginaries did not match the traditional, petrol state logic, in which
extractivism is believed to bring development, modernity and much-needed cash for the
economy. Post-develoment imaginaries are further examined in Chapter 4.
I propose, too, that challenges to media power also arise when social movements
powerfully deploy alternative conceptualizations that resonate with citizens. Yasunidos
was able to trouble the government’s depiction of their movement as violent, as
manipulated youth backed by “los mismos de siempre” (a common Correa statement,
referring to the same political actors as always,). They were also able to interpellate
statist media power by strategically leveraging it for their own benefit, as analyzed in Part
II of this chapter.
3.3 The journalistic field in Ecuador prior to 2007
In Ecuador, as in most of the world, the journalistic field has been characterized
by the dominance and concentration of private media, which has grown
disproportionately compared to other kinds of media, historically holding approximately
95% of radio and television licenses. In 2006, four national business groups (that are also
families) owned more than 70% of national dailies (Ramos, 2010). The Commision for
the Audit of the Concession of Frequencies of Radio and Television (hereafter referred to
as the Audit) found that at least four concessionaries controlled VHF stations in
practically the whole of Ecuador. (Ramos, 2010, p. 27). A social movement actor
involved in the drafting of the communication rights agenda in the 2008 Constituent
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Assembly discussed the Audit that was conducted about the situation of media
ownership:
We presented the Audit to Rafael Correa on May 18, 2009. In this audit,
we discovered all of the dealings of frequencies that we suspected. The
study covered from 1995 to 2008. But beforehand, the Controlaria also
conducted an audit. We came to the same conclusion that frequencies
had been purchased. (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication,
January 22, 2016).

Even though episodic ruptures in government-media relations have arisen from
time to time, historically these media actors have enjoyed a close alliance with dominant
political and economic actors (the state, elites and business sectors). The private media in
Ecuador, owned to this day mainly by families rather than by transnational corporations,
have benefitted from these ties. Their close relationship with the state has meant that
laws, regulations and state practices have enabled private media to occupy a privileged
position in relation to other kinds of media. Cerbino et al. (2014) have spelled out the
multiple ways in which a succession of Ecuadorian governments have subsidized private
media. For example, until recently, the state did not set limits on the number of
frequencies that could be associated with one owner. It also permitted, with little or no
oversight, the rent, sale, and transference of radio and television channels. Regarding the
provision of news and information of public interest, tt was merely left up to the
discretion of private media to do so. Since the 1960s, private media companies received
tax exemptions, and other economic incentives. Taxes were waived on the importation of
equipment, and they did not have to pay taxes on investments. Additionally, the military
regime that was in power from 1963-1966 passed two decrees that waived private radio
and television companies from taxation on their sales and earned profits. In the 1970s,
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they were granted steep reductions in postage rates. However, none of these kinds of
incentives were available to community media. In fact, community media were forbidden
from selling advertising during the dictatorship (Cerbino et al., 2014). By 2007, 19
families controlled 287 of the 348 television licenses. In radio, 45 families controlled
60% of the concessions. Until 2008, the Ecuadorian state only had one official media:
The National Radio of Ecuador, an AM station that transmitted from Quito for four
decades. The growth of public media began in 2008, under Correa.
On the other hand, in interviews that I conducted with journalists42 that work for
the two leading dailies, El Comercio and El Universo, they have argued that within this
schema, there was more pluralism and debate in these media, and generally in society,
than since Correa came to power in 2007, given the threats and suits against journalists
and media companies. These actions, spearheaded by Correa himself, ushered in an era of
self-censorship in the journalistic field, unlike in any other era in Ecuador. However,
while it might be true that there was more diversity of opinion in Ecuador’s dailies and
journals in terms of reporting and opinion, I would argue that the scenario was far from
one of media democracy, as very few social actors had access to the media, and generally
speaking, private ownership by families meant that elite actors, mainly aligned with the
state, held media power.
There is another important context that needs to be considered, which was the
record-low popularity of Ecuadorian media at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the
21st century. Prior to Correa taking the political stage in 2007, the journalistic field had
reached a crisis of credibility with Ecuadorian citizens. Such crisis coincided with
42

These journalists are left-leaning; I mention this to break with the idea that all those that work in private
media are necessarily aligned with commercial or right-wing interests.
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citizens’ rejection of party politics, politicians and neoliberal practices in general. This
was due, in part, to the complicity between the journalistic and political fields. Just prior
to Correa’s election, three presidents had been overthrown by popular protest (rather than
military coups) in a period of eight years, evidence of the growing discontent with
neoliberal politics and the politicians that promoted them. An analysis of the events
surrounding the fall of president Lucio Gutierrez, on April 20, 2005, help bring into focus
the interconnected political and journalistic crisis of credibility. Abad (2011) recounts a
dramatic example of such collusion: citizen uprisings in April 2005, which would soon
push Gutierrez out of power, were “timidly” (p. 17) covered by Ecuador’s mass media,
even as protests increased dramatically. While there were over 100,000 people protesting
in the streets of Quito on April 19, 2005, (a day in which a Chilean journalist died due to
asphyxiation by tear gas that was used by the police to repress protesters), El Universo’s
cover page on the following day featured a half-page photo of Pope Benedict XVI, and
only provided a few lines about the protests in official discourse (p. 18-19). This brought
on not just a political rebellion but also an “audience rebellion” by outraged citizens.
Aligned with a discourse of stability and social order promoted by
power, the impossibility of understanding other forms of political
expression outside of proselytism and the rhetoric of political parties,
these media turned their back on the protesters, and, not seeing
themselves represented, [citizens] stopped believing them.…. (Abad,
2011, p. 17)
In the face of the media’s refusal to cover what was happening, news of protests
circulated by word-of-mouth, cell phones, e-mail and Radio La Luna, a small private
radio station that provided citizens with live tribunas ciudadanas (citizen tribunals) in
order to share information, events and opinion (Navas, 2012, p. 233). There were many
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dissonant moments in the tumultuous neoliberal era, this being merely a “point of
reference” (p. 19), which involved the delegitimation of both political power and media
power. In fact, this particular context was instrumental to Correa winning the presidency
on an anti-neoliberal platform, and to his ability to wage a guerra mediatica against
journalists and media companies.
3.4 Changes in Ecuador’s journalistic field since 2007
3.4.1 Overview of changes
The government is a recent, powerful entrant in the journalistic field, and
therefore, a defining actor in both the political and journalistic fields. As the most
powerful actor in the political field, the state has the power to redefine other fields
through legislation and other means (Bourdieu, 1999). In Ecuador, the typical Latin
American configuration of media power, in which the state and private media are allies,
has been transformed under Correa. As I previously pointed out, much has been written
about the reconfiguration of media power with a focus on government-media relations.
However, this chapter, while taking into account the effect such changes have had on
journalists and private media, privileges an analysis of how social movements have been
affected.
Waisbord (2011) has characterized media practices of the progressive Latin
American governments as populist media. Although I do not use, nor enter into the long,
complex debate about populism, I concur with Waisbord’s analysis of media practices in
that they represent trends that are distinct from liberal democratic media systems.43 They
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Although many scholars use the concept of populism or neo-populism in their discussions of the 21st
century wave of Latin American leftist governments, it is not useful in my study, given that it focuses on
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include the mediated polarization of those who are “for” or “against” the government; the
strengthening of state control over the media; and the disciplining of media outlets and
journalists by the Executive through rewards for acquiescence and punishment for
criticism. All of these characteristics fit government actions since 2007.
I propose a broad categorization that characterizes distinct but overlapping ways
in which the reconfiguration of media power has been utilized by the government against
journalists, private media and social movements:
1) Symbolic actions: These include threats, campaigns of delegitimization and
criminalization of government adversaries (journalists, social movements,
academics, and anyone who publicly confronts the government). Strategies of
delegitimation also include questioning the veracity of opponents’ claims and
invalidation of demands, suggesting that they have other interests.
2) These symbolic actions are enacted and widely circulated through a variety of
media; the media platform par excellence is the Enlace Ciudadano (EC).
3) Legal-judicial-administrative actions: The passage of laws and decrees that
provide the government with legal means to sanction journalists, media
companies and social movements, which curtail freedom of expression and
encourage self-censorship (and therefore the erosion of media democracy). This
category includes the confiscation and closing of private media. It also includes
the new communication law which stipulated the construction of a new

the imbricated relationship between the leader and el pueblo. Rather, this study focuses on the conflictive
relationship between the government and social movements.
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administrative communication infrastructure that oversees and sanctions
journalists and media outlets.
4) Statist media ownership and media production practices: This category
encompasses several factors: how the government has increased its role as a
media owner; how it manages the media under its control; the production of radio,
television and internet-based content; and the creation and circulation of
government publicity in public and private media. Such content production and
circulation on a multiplicity of platforms is one of the main vehicles for
transmitting the symbolic dimensions of the state.
The following sections briefly introduce each category.
3.4.2 Symbolic actions
Soon after he was elected President in 2007, fully taking advantage of the
credibility crisis of the media, Correa began to disrupt the historic state-private media
alliance (Cerbino et al., 2014; Ramos, 2010). While the private media was originally
supportive of Correa, in a matter of a few months, relations quickly turned sour when the
media began to criticize the government. The private media anticipated the guerra
mediatica even during Correa’s presidential campaign, when on November 11, 2006,
Correa announced that the media would have the freedom to exercise its profession, but
that he would promote laws and sanctions in case of deliberate disinformation. But even
before the government could exercise sanctions through the new Communication Law
that was passed in 2013, Correa applied symbolic tactics, often through threats,
delegitimation, name calling and making fun of journalists and media outlets.
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Correa also increasingly demonstrated intolerance for journalists that asked him
questions he did not want to answer. For example, on January 11, 2007, he ordered the
removal of several journalists during a press conference. (El Universo, 2007, March 12).
One of the events that has remained engraved in the memories of Ecuadorians, is when,
on June 27, 2007, during a press conference, Sandra Ochoa, a journalist with El Universo
asked Correa about his petrol politics, even though he had warned he did not want to talk
about this issue until he had made concrete decisions. When she insisted, he became
exasperated and exclaimed, “Esta gordita horrorosa!” (“This horrible fatso.”). Over the
next few days, journalists and citizens publicly expressed their disapproval of this action.
This kind of insult came to be representative of the way that Correa would treat
journalists, and also women (especially feminists, who have been called malcriadas,
badly-raised or misbehaved), and social movements. These actions would continue and
increase over the next several years.
This and other egregious actions spearheaded by Correa sent shockwaves through
media institutions, and continue to affect what they publish or say till the present time.
Journalists and media outlets have had good reason to fear reprisals for publishing
investigative journalism that targets government officials. Since 2007, the Correa
government and the private media have had a highly conflictive relationship. In fact,
Correa has portrayed private media as a political opponent in its own right, with more
power than fragmented political parties (Cerbino et al., 2014). Correa has systematically
and publicly criticized journalists and private media as corrupt and dishonest, especially
when they have been critical of the government’s actions. Some of the names he uses to
insult them include: la prensa corrupta (the corrupt media); asesinos de tinta (ink assasins,
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etc.). In fact, he dedicates up to half-hour of his Saturday show to insult the media and
journalists. There are special segments of the EC, such as La Libertad de Expresión es
para Todos (Freedom of Expression is for Everyone,) and the Caretuca de la Semana
(Mugshot of the Week). These regular segments are dedicated to refuting news articles
by journalists (and politicians), insulting them for their biases and errors in reporting, and
mocking them. Initially, such criticism was embraced by many citizens, or at the very
least seemed funny, given their direct experiences with the media’s alignment with power
during citizen uprisings against several presidents. But eventually, the public’s
heightened awareness of media half-truths and lies (pointed out by Correa in special
segments of the EC) were applied to government media. Hence, the years-long avalanche
of criticism of the media has also greatly affected how government communication is
viewed. By making the public more aware of how the media distorts facts, has only
called more attention to government media does the same. Again, this brings to the fore
the limitations of media power, in that the public has become as untrusting, if not more
so, of government media.
The table below provides a small sample of symbolic actions enacted by the
government against journalists and media companies. While many of these actions can
also can be situated within the legal-administrative category, they are indeed symbolic
acts in terms of the disruption of the government-media alliance, and because of the longlasting impacts they had on the journalistic field, in terms of the self-censorship and fear
it provoked.
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Table 3a. A representative sample of symbolic actions.
Date

Category

Event

Attacks

Emilio Palacios is thrown out of President’s Palace for
asking a question that Correa did not like (May 20th).
During a press conference, Sandra Ochoa, insisted about
Correa’s petrol politics, he became exasperated and
exclaimed, “Esta gordita horrorosa!” (“This horrible fatso.”)
(June 27).

2007

2009

Punishment

Governmental organizations are ordered by Correa to either
reduce or eliminate media buying in the most important
private dailies (El Universo and El Comercio). This practice
continues until 2012.

Punishment

Government prohibits its ministries from giving interviews
to private media. These sources were the most utilized
sources prior to the prohibition. This prohibition was in
effect until 2013.

Resignations and
closures

Carlos Vera’s TV program, which criticized and questioned
the government, was closed due to the government’s
complaints about its breach of law (Vera refused to give
airtime to one of the government’s bureaucrats).

Resignations

On March 30, 26 columnists quit ‘El Telegrafo’ (state
newspaper) because it was censoring their opinion columns
about the internal situation of the newspaper.

Resignations and
attacks

Jorge Ortiz, who strongly criticized the government, had to
resign fromTeleamazonas stating that he was leaving
because of the constant and insistent attacks from the
government to the channel and himself.

Resignations and
attacks

Janet Hinostroza left her interview and opinion television
program. She stated that she had suffered "threats to her
integrity", so she chose to withdraw temporarily from the
program.

2010

2012

Threats, attacks,
dismissals

Gonzalo Rosero, director of Radio Democracia, complaint
about threats and attacks: Rosero: " Please stop bothering
and chasing me". He implored President Correa to guarantee
his free exercise of journalism.
Martin Pallares, an investigative journalist who worked at El
Comercio for 13 years, was fired for critical comments he
made about the government on his personal twitter account.

2013

Rejection of
international
norms

The Ecuadorian government rejects the report of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights on Freedom of
Expression and calls for change in the Special Rapporteur.

Punishment and
closures

Closing of the opposition magazine “Vanguardia” (July
17th). The government explains that the closing of the
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business was due to economic mismanagement.
2014

Punishment and
closures

On August 26, the Superintendence of Communications
liquidated the critical Diario Hoy (newspaper) arguing that it
had losses of 50% or more of the capital for two continuous
years.

Another way in which media corporations are encouraged not to criticize the
government is by the implicit or explicit threat to withhold advertising (and the funds
they bring in). Since approximately 70% of advertising are still derived from the
government, this age-old practice remains a powerful mechanism of silencing criticism.
The symbolic actions mentioned in this section and in the above table are only
some of the most representative. The scale of journalist and media delegitimization is
immense, as many of these actions take place on a weekly, if not daily basis.
3.4.3 Legal-judicial-administrative factors.
Conaghan (2015) argues that policies directed toward civil society organizations
and the media have expanded the scope of societal regulation, and with it, the powers of
the Executive, referred to as “politicized legalism”44. She further argues that “new
government bureaucracies have been endowed with substantial powers” and “constitute a
sweeping new regimen of executive-directed social control….” (p. 9). She also argues
that “no enemy loomed as large in the dark societal landscape envisioned by Correa than
the mainstream media” (Conaghan, 2015, p. 11). This section discusses the institutions
charged with regulating media and society under the Correa government, and some of
more contentious new regulations. The objective here is to provide an overall picture of

44

Conaghan’s assessment is derived from Daniel Brinks’ (2012) notion of analyzing the ‘state-as-law’.
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ways in which the government is reconfiguring media power in its favor through legaladministrative means.
Correa’s refoundational discourse and anti-neoliberal platform included, at least
initially, a communication rights framework that was conceived during the Constituent
Assembly with strong participation of community media advocates. As such, the 2008
Constitution advances a broad and progressive vision of communication rights,
guaranteeing citizens not only access to information and communication technologies,
but also to the broadcast spectrum.45 This constitutional mandate potentially creates an
opening for the democratization of the media, understood as “the necessity to maximize
democracy with citizen participation in decision making, and … to maximize diversity
and pluralism in the mediated world.” (Leon, 2013). It also implies confronting the
concentration of media and privileging the interests of elite economic groups. Returning
to the concept of media power, Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of expression:
the right of all peoples to “seek out, receive, exchange, produce and circulate
information.” Hence, it has potential implications for the power of representation of
minority voices and the exclusions of “voice” (Couldry, 2010). Initially, there was
excitement among progressive communication activists about possible impacts of this
framework for the democratization of the media. However, the symbolic actions of the
government sent powerful messages that a rights-based approach would not be the focus
of this administration. Rather, the application would be punitive and would privilege the
government’s right to communication above others.

45

Several of the progressive Latin American governments including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and
Uruguay. have enacted media reforms that seek to democratize the broadcast spectrum, as discussed in
Chapter One. Each case is different in terms of the actual reforms, and execution of them.
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On multiple occasions, Correa’s response to the media’s critique of, or opposition
to his policies, has been to take legal actions against journalists and media outlets. One of
the most renowned cases involving the judicialization of the media, among many, is
simply referred to as Caso El Universo. Emilio Palacio, a journalist who was already
under fire for his heated exchanges with Correa, published an opinion column (“No to
lies”, 201146) with respect to the events surrounding the national drama that was
unleashed with a police revolt on September 30, 2011 (referred to as “30-S”). Palacios
stated that the government opened fire inside a hospital full of innocent citizens. In
response, President Correa sued Palacio and his newspaper, El Universo, for US$ 80
million and also sought prison sentences for the journalist and directors of the national
daily. The sentence was ratified by the Ecuadorian courts (which have been subordinated
to the Executive). One of the judges in the case, Monica Encalada, went into exile in
Colombia after revealing alleged corruption in the case, as she feared for her life. After
receiving the most severe international criticism from the international community,
Correa issued an official pardon to the journalist and newspaper. Such pardon led to the
CPJ’s (Committee for the Protection of Journalists) staff member, Carlos Lauria, to
comment that “to listen to the president, it as if I were listening to someone who acts as a
King rather than an elected President.” (Human Rights Ecuador, 2011). He also pointed
out that the use of criminal procedures to punish comments about public officials is a
violation of Article 13 of the Human Rights convention that guarantees freedom of
expression. But the damage had already been done; media outlets and journalists would
now think twice before publishing a critical piece. Self-censorship became widespread, as
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Retrieved from http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/02/06/1/1363/mentiras.html February 6th, 2011
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reported by Reporters without Borders and other media watchdog organizations. For
example, Martin Pallares, an investigative journalist who worked at El Comercio for 13
years, was fired for critical comments he made about the government on his personal
twitter account. In this interview, he addresses the context for media outlets and
journalists:
I believe there is an awful atmosphere of self-censorship, I believe that neither
journalists nor the media escape that terror, my dismissal occurred within that
context.
Before going into the details of my departure, I believe it is necessary to
understand that it happened in the context of a terribly hostile environment for the
press, with a Communications Law that forces the media and journalists to live in
a state of permanent distress. The fear of being prosecuted either by the
Communications Superintendency on the side of law or by any judge in this
country. I believe there is an awful atmosphere of self-censorship, I believe that
neither journalists nor the media escape that terror; my dismissal occurred within
that context.47
Given the situation described above, on March 12, 2013, a group of journalists
and media organizations of different political orientations testified before members of the
Comisión Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos (CIDH, The Interamerican
Commission of Human Rights) and the Relatoria Especial para la Libertad de Expresión
(Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) about the frequent
violation of rights. They cited: the judicialization of opinion; the closing of media; the
increase in stigmatizing discourses against the media; and the use of national cadenas
(government broadcasts that all stations are required to air) to attack journalists. They
even cited a suspicious assassination of a journalist. In 2012 alone, there were 172
reported threats and aggressions against journalists and media. Journalist Christian Zurita
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Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorreview.com/in-depth-ecuador/interviews/martin-pallares-i-believethere-is-an-awful-atmosphere-of-self-censorship/ August 31, 2015.
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reported that three different media had to retract their comments on several occasions
because of official pressures. Moreover, he mentioned that 1,365 obligatory cadenas,
totaling 11,793 minutes, had been ordered by the government between 2007-2012 (El
Universo, March 13, 2013). By 2011, four prominent journalists that had television
interview programs had resigned. Janeth Hinostroza of Teleamazonas, the fourth to
resign, stated that she did so because she had suffered repeated threats.
3.4.3.1 Creation of a communication law and institutions that sanction and regulate
The communication rights platform inscribed in the Constitution was to be
implemented through the passage of the Ley Organica de Comunicacion (LOC), which
was signed into law on June 14, 2013. Like the 2008 Constitution, the LOC is a
progressive document that includes provisions for communication rights, intercultural
communication by pueblos and nacionalidades (Indigenous and Afro communities),
workers’ rights, affirmative action, freedom of expression, and articles that foment
national and regional production and diffusion. Yet, I agree with the communication
rights scholars, activists and watchdog organizations that I have interviewed, spoken
with, and read, that the LOC has not promoted the democratization of the media. In fact,
contrary to the rhetoric, it has actually contributed to the erosion of media democracy and
processes of democratization in Ecuador.
One of the more significant aspects of this legislation has been its pledge to
redistribute the broadcast spectrum in thirds: 33% to private media; 33% to public media;
and 34% to community media.48 To date, however, while public media has grown to
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The proposal to divide the spectrum in thirds originally came from AMARC, according to José Ignacio
López Vigil, a long-time communication rights advocate and key actor in Ecuador’s Constituent Assembly.
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occupy over 17% of the airwaves, community media has barely grown (Acosta, 2016).
Aside from the 14 radio frequencies that were temporarily granted to indigenous and afro
communities, there have been few changes with regard to license reversions (that would
free up airwaves for community media), and not one community radio or television
frequency has been granted.
With respect to private media, the same eight families continue to hold most of
the frequencies. Even though an audit was conducted about media ownership, none of
those media have been reverted. And while Ecuador was the first Latin American nation
to establish that shareholders of financial institutions cannot hold stocks in media outlets
(Article 312 in the 2008 Constitution), the Eljuri family (Banco de Austro), an ally of the
Correa government, owns the television station Telerama. In the case of the Ecuadorian
media holdings of Angel González, the Mexican media mogul and friend of the Correa
government, owns 16 media companies in Ecuador, 10 of which are national: three
television stations, 11 radio stations and two newspapers, including El Comercio, a
national daily).49 Such holdings are prohibited through two articles. Firstly, Article 6,
stipulates that national media cannot be owned by foreign interests, and secondly, Article
113, prohibits a person or organization from owning more than 2 radio or television
channels. González controls 10 of 61 national media, a figure that is only superseded by
the government, which owns 12 national media. According to one communication rights
activist:
We are living in a time in which it does not depend on the strength of a law or the
impact of a law, or of the organizations that have demanded it, but simply the
discretional application by the Executive….I do not believe that this government
governs with the law in hand. (JLV)
49

A US Magnate controls 10 national media. (El Universo, 22 febrero 2015).
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While private media has taken a blow, more so do to judicial threats and
sanctions, and community media is stagnant, public media has become a powerful
communication apparatus of the government. But rather than adopting a pluralistic
model, it is directly under state control and ownership.
In 2009, SECOM (the National Secretary of Communication) was created by
presidential decree. This organization institutionalizes government discourse and the
production of information, establishing the scripts, editorial lines, rules, and procedures.
A long-time media activist spoke of the kind of power held by SECOM:
It holds symbolic power but it is also very material. There are the public media
stations that broadcast the sabatinas, the cadenas, {Correa’s Enlace Ciudadano)
etc. But there are also private media that, if they don’t broadcast the sabatina,
SECOM calls them. They call them and say “remember that the frequencies are
owned by the state.” For example, Radio Latacunga, a community radio station
that is technically private, receives these calls. Private and community radio
stations are bribed through publicity funds, or a call from SECOM. Correa has
generated an espionage aparatus, including SENAIN 50 and SECOM, which even
controls social media. (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication,
January 22, 2016).
Another media activist argues:
SECOM has played a fundamental role in the government – the government
would be nothing without SECOM. The communication strategy of the
government has been a strategy of publicists of propaganda. It isn’t a secretary of
communication; rather it is a secretary of propaganda. In other words, there are
official media that have a direct connection to propaganda.
The Superintendencia de la Información y Comunicación (SUPERCOM,
Superintendent of Information and Communication) is an institution that was created
through the LOC. It is charged with ensuring compliance with the LOC. It has the ability
50

La Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia (SENAIN, the National Secretary of Intelligence) was created by
presidential decree No. 1768 on June 8, 2009.
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to demand steep fines of media institutions that have transgressed the LOC. Its decisions
are binding and do not include an appeal process. It is a very polemic institution,
especially given that its director is selected from a short list of three candidates handpicked by the President of the Republic. SUPERCOM has broad powers to interpret the
LOC, which in many parts have vague language and are therefore open to broad. In the
first year of its operation, it reviewed and processed 93 cases.
SUPERCOM has pursued journalists, politicians and media organizations through
one of the more controversial articles of the LOC, Article 26, linchiamiento mediático
(media lynching). Media lynching is broadly defined in this article as the diffusion of
information, reproduced publicly and repeatedly, which seeks to diminish the public
credibility or prestige of a natural or juridical person. Offenses are punishable by fines, as
well as an order to provide a public apology. This article has yielded multiple sanctions
or threats of sanctions in cases where the Correa government has been criticized.
However, when citizens and organizations have sought to use the media lynching article
when Correa has defamed them, they have been denied a hearing. In one case, a pollster
requested the right to reply to insults directed at him by Correa. SUPERCOM replied that
Correa is not subject to such provision because his broadcasts are part of his presidential
duties. Cite.
Additionally, as part of a package of constitutional amendments passed on
December 3, 2015, the media in Ecuador legally became a public service, which signifies
that it is owned by the state, not the people.51 One of the consequences of this is that if a
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Fundamedios 2015, retrieved from http://www.fundamedios.org/alertas/asamblea-aprueba-cambio-laconstitucion-para-que-la-comunicacion-sea-considerada-como-servicio-publico/
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media fails to inform the public about themes and events of public interest, such media
can be fined by SUPERCOM. According to one communication activist I interviewed:
That communication is considered a public good is terrible, because it means that
the state retains the ownership. I have a right to be informed and to inform, and I
have the right to own media. It is my right, not because the state allows it. So, if it
is considered a public service that is dangerous because for me to be able to
access this right, I need state authorization. Moreover, the Constitution states that
public services need to be uniform – imagine if communication were uniform –
one line of thought only! (Jose Ignacio López Vigil, personal communication,
January 22, 2016).

Another institution created through the LOC is Consejo de Regulación y
Desarrollo de la Información y Comunicación (CORDICOM, the Board of Regulation
and Development of Information and Communication). Among many responsibilities,
one of its roles is to regulate media content and time slots. On the one hand, the agency is
vigilant about cases of racial and gender discrimination in the media. On the other hand,
It is important to note here that many of these articles and institutions were not part of
what was fought for by media activists. Rather, several of these articles were inserted the
night before the LOC was passed in the Assembly, before anyone, even most members of
the Assembly, had time to review or comment on them.
Hence, as potentially transformative as the LOC might have been, it has been
widely criticized as a measure of control, especially by sectors that are already at odds
with the government, namely social movements and journalists. Private media was
always against the LOC and waged coordinated campaigns against its passing (Ramos,
2012). But social movements (except for communication rights advocates who fought for
the law, though have since been disappointed) never got behind the LOC. Their lack of
enthusiasm was clearly due to the government’s campaigns of delegitimization and
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criminalization of social movements, which began early on in Correa’s presidency. As
such, there was little hope that the LOC would benefit social movements that were at
odds with the government’s policies.
Table 3b. Legislative-Judicial-Administrative Actions
Date

Category

Event

2008

Confiscation

Confiscation of more than 15 mass media: TC Televisión,
GamaTV, CN3 y Cablevisión, Compañía y Televisión del
Pacifico, Editorial Uminasa, Radiodifusora del Pacífico,
Radio Bolívar, Radio Súper K, Radio Carrusel, Organización
Radial, América Visión, Radio La Prensa, Editores e
Impresores Edimpres y Movidad C.A. que imprime las
revistas La Otra, La Onda, La Onda Infantil, Más, El Agro
and Samborondón

2009

Creation of
regulatory
institution

SECOM (the National Secretary of Communication) was
created by presidential decree in December 2009.

2011

2012

Judicial

Judicial

Legislative

2013

Regulatory
institutions
created by the
LOC

2015
Regulatory
institutions

President Rafael Correa sued for US $ 10 million to
journalists Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita for
moral damage to publish the book “El Gran Hermano” (The
Big Brother).
“El Universo” case: The National Court of Justice confirmed
the sentence for a fine of 40 million dollars and three years in
prison for each of the damned: Emilio Palacio and Carlos,
Cesar and Nicolas Perez brothers.
Ley Organica de Comunicacion (LOC) was signed into law
on June 14, 2013.
CORDICOM (The Consejo de Regulación de la
Comunicación y Desarrollo de la Información) was created
in November. It regulates media content, time slots, and
charges of discrimination.
SUPERCOM, the Superintendency of Information and
Communication, was created through the LOC. It has the
ability to fine journalists and media institutions that have
transgressed the LOC
The Agencia de Regulación y Control de las
Telecomunicaciones (ARCOTEL, Agency of Regulation and
Control of Telecommunications), was created and charged
with the administration, regulation and control of
telecommunications and the broadcast spectrum
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3.4.3.3 Confiscation of media outlets
Another way in which the Correa government has increased its media holdings
has been through the confiscation of private media. According to Kitzberger (2015) these
actions have been “part of a broader transformation of the social power matrix in a
process of realignment of institutional, political, and communication resources that
allowed for the wholesale reconfiguration of power relationships” (p. 10). In 2007, the
government embargoed El Telegrafo, a national daily. In 2008, it was refounded as public
media. In 2008, 12 media (radio, television and newspapers) were confiscated (see table
below for details). One of the television stations, Gama TV, was then utilized as the main
broadcast station to transmit the EC. In 2011, the number of confiscated holdings
abruptly grew to over 20 media properties. In 2012, another 16 private media were shut
down. According to Supertel (the Superintendent of Telecomm unications) these media
transgressed the Radio and Television Law. It was also true that most of these media held
critical stances toward the government. In 2014, Diario Hoy, a national newspaper
critical of the government, was shut down.
3.4.3.4 Non-communication legislation that impacts social movements.
It is important to take into account legislation that is not directly related to
communication, when it affects the free expression and practices of citizens and social
movements. One law and one decree, created in 2013, have been viewed by critical
scholars, social movements, social organizations and journalists as negatively affecting
public expression of civil society organizations. These include Decreto 16 and the Penal
Code. Together with the LOC, the three new pieces of legislation that passed in 2013 and
early 2014 have been referred to as a trilogy of state control mechanisms.
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Published in the Official Register on June 16, 2013, Decreto 16 gives the state the
power to dissolve any social organization that it considers dangerous to the internal or
external interests of the nation, or that affects “public peace.” Moreover, social
organizations (which include several kinds of organizations, including collectives, social
movements, and NGOs) have been forbidden from engaging in political activities, which
are supposed to be reserved for parties and political movements that are registered with
the CNE. This Decree has been a cause of concern for many organizations that are
autonomous, especially those that are critical of the government, and has precipitated
self-censorship on the part of social organizations.
According to Decreto 16’s wide parameters, indigenous social movement
organizations such as the CONAIE could be shut down by the government. In fact, the
Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (ECUARUNARI),
along with several other organizations, has challenged its constitutionality, on the
grounds that prohibition of political activity could limit their freedom of expression.
ECUARUNARI also claims that Decreto 16 contradicts Article 57 of the 2008
Constitution, which endows indigenous peoples and their organizations with legal status.
Social organizations need to be share their information with a government registry that
details the name of their members, funding sources and activities. Such registry has
caused consternation among many social organizations.52 The first casualty of Decree 16
was the Pachamama Foundation, an Ecuadorian non-governmental organization founded
in 1997. The Pachamama Foundation had historically played an active role in ecological
matters, and had an anti-extractivist posture. It had provided some support for Yasunidos.
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Yasunidos decided to remain a non-legalized collective due to many reasons, with Decreto 16 being one
of the considerations.
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The Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP, Organic Integral Penal Code), which
became law on August 10, 2014, has without doubt, legally expanded the punitive power
of the state. It contains 29 articles that refer to crimes against “public security” (an
increase from 13 articles that characterized certain conduct as sabatoge and terrorism.
One of the new crimes is called “rebellion”. Some legal experts have noted that many of
these articles are vaguely worded, which is worrisome, as the government has already
widely interpreted articles from the previous penal code in order to process social
movement actors, including 200+ indigenous leaders that had been arrested while
protesting (Pásara, 2014). Legal expert Pásara has been especially worried about Articles
345 and 346, as they can be used to repress social protest. For example, Article 345
deems many activities historically related to social protest as “sabotage.” Article 346
prescribes 1 to 3 years of prison for those that “paralyze a public service”. In sum, the
new penal code and Decreto 16 have contributed to the creation of a context in which
protest is discouraged, questioned, and criminalized.
These sections, and the table above, underscore some of the ways in which the
communication rights framework has been given short shrift, while the government
pursues critical media outlets and journalists through a combination of symbolic actions
and legislative-judicial-administrative means. The following section examines how the
government’s media ownership and production practices add yet another layer to the
reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador.
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3.4.4 State media ownership and production practices
3.4.4.1 Media ownership
As part of the reconfiguration of media power, in 2008, the government
established the country’s first public media (radio, television, print media and internet),
mainly through the creation of public media, and confiscation of private media channels
owned by economic groups that owed taxes. Though referred to as public media, it does
not adhere to international norms of public media, which are characterized by
independence from the government, pluralism, and mechanisms for participation and
autonomously created content. Whereas “state media” would refer to those media under
the control of the Executive, “which act as communicational appendages” of the state
(Waisbord, 2014, p. 86). In Ecuador, there is no real editorial or administrative
independence of these media, rather they are directly under SECOM (Secretary of
Communication), and largely represent government perspectives, rarely criticizing its
officials or policies.
Prior to 2007, the government only had one official media, Radio Nacional de
Ecuador (Ecuador National Radio), an AM radio station. By 2012, the public media
system consisted of 22 different media. Newly created government media have included
Ecuador TV (2007), and Radio Pública on FM Radio, administered by SECOM. In 2009,
the internet-based ANDES (Agencia Publica de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramerica) was
created by SECOM, and has been administered by Ecuador TV. In 2010, the government
launched the newspaper PP: El Verdadero. In 2011, a multimedia platform consisting of
television, radio, printed press, and a website, El Ciudadano, is created. In 2012, Habla
Ecuador (Ecuador Speaks) was launched as part of El Ciudadano. With 231 radio
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stations, it became the most important radio network, with the greatest national coverage
in Ecuador. Synopses of many of its programs are translated into several indigenous
languages.
Public media has grown to occupy 17% of radio and television diffusion from
under 1%. (Acosta, 2016). And even though public media is still dwarfed by private
media in terms of percentage owned, it has come to occupy a dominant position in the
journalistic field, given the collusion of the meta capital of the state, and meta capital of
media, as discussed previously. Additionally, the Correa government has utilized its
statist power like no prior government, to produce media content for its obligatory
cadenas (that all media must air). Journalist Christian Zurita reported that 1,365
obligatory cadenas, totaling 11,793 minutes, had been ordered by the government
between 2007-2012 (El Universo, March 13, 2013). Most recently, in 2016, by way of
Executive Decree 1158, the government has created a new organization that brings all of
its various media (TV, radio, print media and internet) under one umbrella company,
Empresa Pública Medios Públicos de Comunicación del Ecuador (Medios Públicos EP).
Table 3c. State media ownership and production practices.
Date
2007

2008

Category

Event

Producer

“The President talks with the people” (January): first steps
towards the creation of “El Enlace Cuidadano”. Radio program
broadcasted by more than 150 radio stations around the country
and aired every Saturday morning for two hours

Creator

EDITOGRAN, a private company, passed into public domain
because the government equipped the printing press in March.

Creator

In March 17th El Telegrafo is reborn as a state newspaper.

Creator

Ecuador TV: new TV channel created in November for the
transmission of the Constituent Assembly.

Confiscation

GamaTV, a private TV channel, was confiscated in July and
used as headquarters for the transmission of the “Sabatina”.
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Confiscation

TC Televisión, a private TV channel, was confiscated in July.

Confiscation

Confiscation of other media: CN3 y Cablevisión, Compañía y
Televisión del Pacifico, Editorial Uminasa, Radiodifusora del
Pacífico, Radio Bolívar, Radio Súper K, Radio Carrusel,
Organización Radial, América Visión, Radio La Prensa,
Editores e Impresores Edimpres y Movidad C.A. que imprime
las revistas La Otra, La Onda, La Onda Infantil, Más, El Agro y
Samborondón

Creator

Radio Pública (Public Radio) in august was made part of the
Estado a cargo de la Secretaría Nacional de Comunicación.

2009

Creator

Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramérica
(ANDES) is born in December and circulates online.

2010

Producer

In September, the newspaper ‘PP El Verdadero’ (Pepe the
truthful) began circulating with El Telegrafo.

2011

Creator

Ciudadano Multimedia (multimedia citizen) is the official
channel for the government of the Revolución Ciudadana. It
includes TV, radio, written press and webpage.

2012

Producer

Habla Ecuador (Speak Ecuador) is a network of 231 radio
stations that covers the whole national territory.

2013

Creator

National Assembly TV was created in March to transmit the
meetings live.

2014

Producer

Correa informed that the 92% of the media were still private and
that the citizens are receiving untruthful information.

3.4.4.2 State media production practices
As a media producer of print, TV, radio, and Internet; as well as through the
production of non-broadcast content that publicizes public works and government
initiatives (not just commercials, but media created for the various government
ministries, television series, documentaries, etc.), the government has appropriated a
public good, the media, and has used it to construct social reality according to its
perspective. Correa has used public media as a platform upon which to wage a
“permanent campaign” (Conaghan and De La Torre, 2008) about the successful
administration of the government.
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The government increasingly receives criticism for the amount of public funds
spent on media production. Visión 360, an investigative reporting television program,
aired an episode entitled Luces, cameras, derroche? (Lights, Cameras, Waste?53.). This
episode questions the exorbitant use of funds spent, by many different government
ministries, on high-cost productions, many of which have never been broadcast or
distributed. While no total budget figure has been made available, one can piece together
public works contracts to arrive at general estimates. Additionally, there are indicators of
the scale of national production activity it produces. For example, a media production
company executive interviewed for Vision 360 estimated that in the past five years
approximately 80% of all production company jobs have originated from the government.
Much of the production costs go to the filming of public works (for dissemination on the
EC, and in institutional videos uploaded to YouTube), by dozens of government
ministries and agencies. These include promotion of the extractive industries. For
example, a single search on YouTube for Refineria del Pacífico (the Pacific Refinery,
which is a refinery under construction since 2008 with a projected capacity of processing
300,000 barrels of oil a day) yields dozens of videos created by diverse government
agencies. The Refinería del Pacífico channel displays 49 different videos. Additionally,
hundreds of videos about public works have been uploaded to other government agencies
channels on YouTube, including Archivo Ciudadano, El Ciudadano, Agencia Andes,
Ecuador Estratégico, Presidencia de la República de Ecuador, TeleCiudadana, and Vice
Ecuador, among them. Ecuador Estratégico, a government agency that “constructs
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Luces, cameras, derroche? (Program 16, Bloque 1, Season 3) Parts I and II were retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykAzFrjmIDE and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMsaEk-cqk.
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happiness” and “generates Buen Vivir and integral development in communities that are
close to strategic projects” (oil drilling, mining, etc.) has 195 videos uploaded to its
channel. They include pedagogical animations54 and videos in indigenous languages.
Yet, interestingly, the question of media power is brought to the foreground, as
part of the main argument of the Visión 360 program. It maintains that, despite the
exorbitant expenditures of public funds on media production, many governmentproduced programs never make it to broadcast, and those that are aired do not have large
audiences, many out of the radar of most citizens, despite placement in multiple media
platforms. For example, in 2011, the government produced a 12-episode Reality TV
series called Espiritú del Yasuní (Spirit of the Yasuní). SECOM said it never aired
because of policy changes (referring to Correa’s Plan B). However, the show was
produced in 2011, and Correa did not announce the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative until
2013. Yet, it never aired. Another mini-series, Ciudad Quinde (City of Hummingbirds)
cost $700,000 but had a small number of viewers. Tierra de Serpientes (Land of
Serpents) a fictionalized mini-series produced by the Ministry of Interior, and that
emphasizes the work of the national police, made full use of public goods such as
helicopters, police facilities, etc. The cost of production was $678,000. Martin Pallares, a
renowned Ecuadorian independent journalist (fired by El Comercio because of his
resolute, critical stance of the government) argues in this show that this use of public
funds is unjustified. Visión 360 focused mainly on the promotion of public works,
government initiatives and tourism projects. It didn’t even mention the enormous amount
of the time government uses to criticize its opponents and detractors. In the following
54

See Ecuador Estratégico: Que hacemos? Recursos que construyen felicidad (Strategic Ecuador: What do
we do? Resources that build happiness.” (accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smyrKdpFmsI).)
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section, we can see how the government used publicity dollars to mount a campaign to
justify the termination of the Yasuní ITT initiative.
3.4.4.3. Other media campaigns justifying the termination of the Yasuní ITT
initiative.
The delegitimation and criminalization of Yasunidos was intertwined with other
kinds of media campaigns. This brief section presents how the government used publicity
to “sell” Plan B. Once Correa announced the end of the Yasuní ITT initiative, the
governmental communication strategy included a large-scale, mediated justification. It
produced and circulated a multiple-platform campaign that would seek to convince
citizens of the need to extract the oil in the Yasuní. The publicity was shown on the EC
but also aired as commercials during other television programs. The campaign also went
beyond the media to physical spaces in cities and towns.
The basic arguments advanced by the media campaign were that 1) the money is
needed to eradicate poverty; 2) A large percentage of the funds would be directed to the
Amazon, and 3) oil drilling would only affect 1% of the Yasuní given use of ‘cuttingedge’ technology (these themes were also some of the main topics in the EC).
Investigative reporters and scholars have disputed such claims, based on recent extractive
activities in the Yasuní (Finer et al., 2014; Los Taladros Petroleros, 2013). This campaign
included physical as well as mediated interventions. Large banners that were placed in
the Plaza Grande announced that “99% of the Yasuní is intact.” In fact, the Plaza Grande,
historically an important stage upon which protests and counterprotests are held was a
key site for the government’s pro-drilling campaign. In addition to the presence of
banners, and government-supported pro-drilling protester presence, one particular EC,
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held on the Plaza Grande, featured Amazonian mayors and indigenous groups that
support drilling. In this way, the government symbolically and physically reappropriated
the Plaza Grande.
With regard to televised campaigns, the Corporación Participación Ciudadana
(Corporation for Citizen Participation) reported that from August 15, 2013 through the
end of September, there were 126 government announcements on 9 national television
stations. Media monitoring in September resulted in documenting the airing of prodrilling commercials 555 times, 530 minutes of air time (Project Yasuní). Another series
of spots entitled “Speaking about the Yasuní,” bearing the Secretary of Communication
logo, were aired 140 times, for a total of 140 minutes. The “Yasuní Lives” campaign was
aired 80 times, for a total of 104 minutes. “The President Said” campaign was aired 38
times for a total of 37 minutes of airtime (Vasquéz, 2015).55
Along with the pro-drilling Yasuní spots, the government also launched another
high-profile campaign, “The Dirty Hands of Chevron”, which denounced the damage that
Texaco-Chevron had caused in Ecuador (although the state oil company Petroamazonas
also harms the environment). The public relations firm, McSquared, located in Brooklyn,
NY, purportedly paid Hollywood actors large sums of money (Mia Farrow, $188,000 and
Danny Glover, $330,000) to visit Ecuador and put a gloved hand into contaminated oil
pools. The amount of public funds used for these campaigns has not been disclosed.
However, McSquared received $6.4 million dollars from the Ecuadorean government for
international public relations. Owned by Ecuadorians, it reported expenses of
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Some of these spots can be seen on the blog Otra Educación Retrieved from http://otraeducacion.blogspot.com/2014/03/el-cuento-del-99-del-Yasuní-o-el-Yasuní.html.
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$1,943,140.42 to the U.S. Department of Justice, per a legal mandate to report funds
received from foreign governments (Los Pagos de McSquared, 2014).
This brief section has served to illustrate that the Enlace is not the only media strategy of
the government; rather, it is part of a concerted effort that takes many forms, both
material and symbolic.
In sum, the amount of media production activity, as well as the number of media
outlets that serve as government platforms, has increased the ability of the Ecuadorian
government to promote and justify its extractivist agenda. As evidenced in this section,
the government has directed hundreds of thousands of dollars to a diverse array of media
content to serve this purpose. Yet, as Visión 360 investigative reporting has revealed, the
number of programs produced does not necessarily translate into a critical mass of
viewers. While my study does not specifically focus on circulation and audience
reception, this is an important area of future research on government media power. The
picture painted here is one of a government who has allocated huge budgets for
producing media content that promotes its works, in order to maintain legitimacy and
diminish questions about its extractivist policies. Many agree with journalist Martin
Pallares, who has commented that the government is “administered by publicists” (in an
interview with Visión 360).
To conclude Part I of this chapter, I have argued that the Ecuadorian government
was able to reconfigure the journalistic field, and build a media empire within five years
(2007-2012). This has translated into statist media power, both symbolically and
materially. In order to understand the media context in 2013, when Correa announced the
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end of the Yasuní ITT initiative, I set out to reconstruct just how statist media power has
grown to dominate the landscape.
The following section provides a detailed analysis of how media ownership,
media production practices, and legislation have come together in the Yasunidos case
study. I analyze how the Enlace Ciudadano became the cornerstone of the government
campaign to promote a pro-extractivist agenda, extole the virtues of development in the
Amazon, and attack Yasunidos.
3.5. The Enlace Ciudadano: the mediated delegitimization and criminalization of
Yasunidos
This second part of this chapter focuses on the Enlace Ciudadano (EC), and how
the Ecuadorian government has used it as a premier media platform upon which to attack,
delegitimize and criminalize anti-extractivist, social movement protest. In particular, I
analyze how Correa has sought to use the EC to turn public opinion against Yasunidos.
This section corresponds to my research question: How has the Correa government used
its media power to seek consensus for its extractivist politics and to criminalize social
movements that are against such politics?
3.5.1. An overview of the Enlace Ciudadano: statist meta-capital meets media metacapital.
The Enlace is the most important mediated platform for the government and for
President Correa, who hosts the show, to disseminate its position on all themes. It is an
exceptional space in which we can appreciate the concept of media power as symbolic
and material resources that have definitional power to shape social space. As Couldry
(2003) proposes, both media meta-capital and statist meta-capital can generate impact in
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and across all fields of power. In my own conception of media power, I understand statist
media power in Ecuador as a constituent, dominant aspect of the state’s meta-capital.
Without a doubt, the EC is a privileged site where these two forms of capital potently
merge. Running approximately 3.5 to 4 hours, the EC is a weekly program that has aired
nearly every Saturday since 2007. Broadcast from a different town or city in Ecuador
each week, it is aired nationally on national and regional television stations, and on over
400 radio stations. Even when President Correa is traveling, the EC is led by the Vice
President of the Republic. There have also been ECs broadcast from New York City and
Genoa, Italy, as part of Correa’s visits to those cities.
Since its inception, the EC has been widely viewed, heard, and commented on
weekly by supporters and detractors alike (Cerbino et al., 2014; Conaghan and de la
Torre, 2008; de la Torre, 2013). It is the mediated space in which the political and
journalistic fields converge, in which the government not only disseminates its
perspectives with compelling arguments, images and testimonials in the presence of a
supportive audience, but also where it carries out a mediated battle against its perceived
enemies. Prior to 2007, the private media had the power to shape the national agenda and
public opinion. But with the introduction of the EC, Correa has appropriated the
technologies, production values, and aesthetics of private media, in order to confront
them on their own terms in a “hegemonic dispute.” (Cerbino et al., 2016, p. 9). Cerbino et
al. (2016) argue that “Correa transcends and at the same time transgresses some aspects
of the media logics” (Cerbino et al., 2016, p. 6). The EC, they argue, is the “most
effective communicational tool utilized by President Correa to sustain his political
discourse” (2016, p. 11). This is due to various factors, including: the wide ranging
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themes of national interest that it tackles; and the timely announcements made by the
President himself, which endows the program with an immediacy that makes journalists,
ministers and social actors ever attentive. Its ritualized nature; its celebration of national
popular culture, the diverse regions it features each week, its entertainment value, and the
accompanying itinerant ministries, offers Ecuadorian citizens direct contact with
government officials, with a chance to appear on television, in regions where most
governments had never gone before.56 Much more critical of the EC, De la Torre (2013,
p. 32) offers an analysis of the ritualistic, pedagogical performance that has taken place
nearly 365 weeks a year since 2007:
The president sits in a high podium from which the professor of the nation gives a
class to all Ecuadorians. He utilizes Powerpoint presentations to illustrate, with
sources and technical data, his government’s policies. The master classes are
interrupted by applause of the audience, or by Correa’s questions directed toward
the audience, which are answered with either yes or no.” In this way, power is
revealed: the president-professor of the nation is above a public that affirms him,
but that has no possibility to enter into a critical dialogue with him…. These
interventions demonstrate that he is the State and serves the nation with real faith
and dedication.

Another aspect of the EC, certainly much less inspirational than the popular
national music, poetic images of the nation, and shots of adoring constituents waving
lime green flags (the color of Alianza Pais), is Correa’s lengthy attacks on his political
opponents. Conaghan and de la Torre (2008, p. 278) propose that for Correa:
political opponents are not simply wrong-headed, misguided, or misinformed;
they are corrupt and immoral representatives of the privileged, the oligarchy….In
stark contrast to those on the dark side stand the forces allied with el pueblo (the
people), the morally superior common folk.
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These itinerant cabinets consist of government officials that travel with the show to meet with local
authorities, deepening the political impact of the visits to towns and cities.
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Private media is always presented in the Enlaces as the enemy not only of Correa,
but of el pueblo ecuatoriano (the Ecuadorian people). The ‘us vs. them,’ and ‘friend or
enemy’ construction is ever-present in the EC. There are several segments of the program
that are reserved especially for this purpose. Whether scolding them, uncovering their
half-truths, insulting them or making fun, private media has received the most virulent
attacks in Ecuadorian history. Correa has referred to the media as “ink assassins,”, “the
corrupt press”, “liars,” “criminals,” etc. In this way, the private media has received a kind
of scrutiny it has never faced before.
On the other hand, this kind of “media literacy” provided by Correa during the
EC, along with the years-long debates about communication rights, freedom of
expression and the communication law, have also facilitated a heightened awareness
among the public about the media and its effects. As such, Ecuadorians can easily
identify news sources, media actors and the political agendas they represent. The
consequences of this is not insignificant; it means that government media is also critically
read by the public. In other words, just because the EC commands attention, it by no
means translates into acceptation by the public. In fact, as the years pass, what was once
seen by some citizens as an unprecedented act of government transparency, is now
viewed as a despised program whose grandiosity and accompanying high budgets, have
been questioned by citizens, journalists and social movements (In Chapter 4, I analyze
how Yasunidos has been able to leverage such negative sentiments to their advantage).
3.5.2 The mediated construction of political legitimacy and illegitimacy
Private media is not the only oppositional force according to the government:
others include political parties, critical scholars, and social movements. As pointed out in
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Cerbino et al. (2014), Correa discursively constructs democratic legitimacy as solely
emanating from the electoral process. Hence, given that Correa had won a majority of
votes during three presidential elections (2006, 2008, 2013), he proposes frequently that
his government is the most legitimate actor. In the following quote, we see how he
equates approval for the exploitation of the Yasuní with his approval rating:
The clamor of the people to leave the oil in the ground? As they (Diario Hoy)
want that, they come up with impressive numbers. What is the reality? 56% of the
country support, more than just exploiting the Yasuní, they support the decision of
their President. (President Correa, Enlace 336, August 24, 2013).
When social movements or other social actors speak out against government
polices, Correa often says (and has repeated frequently in the EC) that such actors should
have no say, given that they were not duly elected. He further proposes that if they want
to have a voice, they should run for office and win, as he did. Such argument disregards
the idea that minority parties or those outside of party politics, like social movements,
should be able to express dissent. Applying such logic, if winning at the polls is the
democratic measure of who has the right to speak and who should remain silent, social
movement actors lose to politicians. Correa also frames social movements (and other
organized groups such as labor unions) as organizations that represent special interest
groups, instead of the pueblo ecuatoriano as he does. Hence, discursively he is pitting
movements and citizens against each other. He has reserved a special disdain for
CONAIE’s indigenous leaders, and has sought to divide the social movement throughout
the years (see Becker, 2012 and de la Torre, 2014 for discussions about processes of
fragmentation and cooptation of movements).
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The crucial point here, in terms of statist media power, is that President Correa,
the political actor who hosts the EC, is constructed in that space as the most legitimate
actor in Ecuadorian politics. Moreover, the EC is broadcast in a context of hyperpresidentialism, in which the legislative, judicial and statist media rarely if ever exhibit
independence from the Executive. Consistent with Couldry’s (2003) and my theorization
of statist media power, van Dijk (2001, p. 174) proposes that:
Mediated discourse, and especially, journalistic, whether by print media, radio,
television or internet, has a relevant influence in the way in which we represent
the world around us. While it is true that perhaps we don’t believe all that we read
in the newspaper, nor do we necessarily feel influenced by the transmission of a
discourse of our President, but, in spite of that, news will influence what we think
(although critically), regarding what we think is important or irrelevant, in which
people we consider important or irrelevant, and in which people are considered
prominent or marginal, and which events are or are not interesting.57

This argument by van Dijk is important to keep in mind in the following pages,
that describe and analyze not just how but also by whom Yasunidos has been depicted. It
is not just the depiction; rather the enunciation emanated from the Ecuadorian President,
frequently, over an extended period of time (approximately 7 months). In fact, in the
LOC, this activity is referred to as media lynching. However, when individuals have
sought to accuse Correa of such, Cordicom has rebuffed such charges on the grounds that
Correa is not “media.” One could argue otherwise, by taking into account the
implications of possessing statist media power.
This situation was a double-edged sword for Yasunidos. The highly mediated
nature of the case provided excellent opportunities for national visibility, at the same time
that it presented formidable challenges. This new movement of young people, most of
57

I have translated this from a Spanish text.
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whom had little to no political or media experience, had to quickly learn how to respond
to the ever-expanding level of delegitimization and criminalization they faced. This
treatment of Yasunidos is explored in the next section.
3.5.3 The Construction of Yasunidos in the Enlace Ciudadano
In addition to a theoretical framework of media power that is transversal
throughout this study, in this section I am also guided by a critical discourse studies
(CDS) framework (van Dijk 2001, 2015). Critical discourse studies is neither a theory nor
method, rather it is a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding how specific
discourses are deployed in the reproduction of power and domination; the social and
political representations of social actors, and the consequences of such discourses (van
Dijk, 2015, p. 474). CDS categories useful for my analysis include: the communicative
event (the EC), the themes (interpretation of social movement actions and notions of
development deployed by the government), local coherence (how Correa explains social
and political events to the audience), and social actor description (how Yasunidos and its
allies are described by Correa on the Enlace).
My methodological framework used to study the EC has included ethnographic
participant observation and media analysis with respect to the ways in which Yasunidos
was depicted. During the span of time covered by this case study, I viewed 20 live
broadcasts of the EC (approximately 60 hours of airtime) on television. I observed and
took notes about the ways in which Yasunidos was framed and depicted. I then went back
to the recorded programs and selected eight (two to three episodes for each phase of
conflict between the government and Yasunidos) between August 24 and May 3, 2014,
for a more in-depth analysis. The phases, as laid out in Chapter Two, are: 1) the
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emergence of Yasunidos; 2) the signature collection phase (including the culminating
march in which the signatures were delivered to the Elections Board); and 3) the
“Democracy in Extinction” phase, when the Elections Board disrupted the process, and
the Enlace was used as a key podium from which to damage Yasunidos’ positive
reputation.
For the analysis of the EC, three broad questions were posed: 1) What were the
strategies the government used to delegitimize and criminalize Yasunidos; 2) How were
other oppositional actors depicted (private media, indigenous movements, ecologists,
foreigners); and 3) How did the government frame development in the Amazon.
Additionally, I analyzed the events surrounding each EC, as Correa is always
reacting to specific events that occur just before during the EC. The mediated
delegitimization and criminalization of Yasunidos was not disconnected from the face-toface, physical aspects that were also employed by the government. As such, I bring into
the analysis the diverse ways in which statist power was used in conjunction with statist
media power. A detailed study was conducted that enumerated the various mechanisms
of “psychosocial” repression that were used on Yasunidos, their allies, and the general
public (Vázquez, 2015). While the report does list mediated forms, it foregrounds other
aspects of repression: control of public space; counter-marches; utilization of police to
limit social participation; physical force (policy, army); generating a context of
uncertainty among the public; following and obtaining information about Yasunidos;
closure of Pachamama, an allied organization; forcefully removing signature-gatherers
from public spaces; harassment and intimidation of activists; illegal detention of
signature-gatherers; physical and verbal aggression against members of Yasunidos;
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infiltration into Yasunidos’ headquarters; and finally, electoral fraud (Vázquez, 2015).
Taken together, such use of statist power, amplified by the mediatization of events from
the government’s perspective, generated a social and political context that truly shook
Ecuadorians to the core. Given the highly visible nature of the signature-collection
process, an element of continuous drama was added to actions – by the government and
Yasunidos - that occurred on a weekly basis.
The following table details each phase, the dates, the number of ECs analyzed,
and important events that took place within each phase.
Table 3d. Analysis of Enlace Ciudadano programs during case study
Phase and Dates
Emergence phase

# of Enlaces Summary of key events within this phase
analyzed
3

Correa announces the end of Yasuní ITT
initative, declaring interest in its exploitation;
government media blitz; candlelight vigils;
Yasunidos collective is formed; first wave of
protests; zapateadas and other performative acts
by Yasunidos; Yasunidos formally solicits the
Constitutional Court for permission to collect
signatures toward a national referendum on the
Yasuní.

3

From start of national signature collection to
delivery of signatures; the National Assembly
votes in favor of exploitation; two other groups
begin signature-collection processes; Yasundos
members are harassed, illegally detained, and
surveilled.

2

CNE annulation of signatures; criminalization
of Yasunidos; drilling license awarded to
Petroecuador; Yasunidos appeals to
international courts; Ethical Tribunal on Yasuní.

August 15-October 14, 2013

The signature collection phase
October 15 – April 12, 2013

“Democracy in Extinction”
phase
April 13 – August 15, 2013

The following sections highlight the ways in which Yasunidos and its allies were
delegitimized and criminalized, and how the concept of development was deployed. For
each phase of the conflict between the government and Yasunidos, as played out on the
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EC, Table 3e contains many more details about each phase, including quotes (my
translation from the Spanish) and the events just prior to the EC.
3.5.3.1 Phase One: The emergence of Yasunidos (August 15-October 14, 2013)
The first phase of the conflict between the government and Yasunidos was
marked by widespread vigils and protests, which quickly spread across Ecuadorian towns
and cities. The mediated strategy on the EC was first and foremost to delegitimize
dissenters. Correa used that opportunity to place blame on his opponents (rather than
young people, who were initially framed as manipulated), the press, other political
parties, and legendary contestatory social actors. A typical strategy used on the EC is to
call attention to and insult specific individuals. This was meant to convince young people
and the general public that the protests had reduced numbers, and were led by the “los
mismos de siempre” (the same folks as always, a common refrain used by Correa.). For
example, on EC 336, Correa said
About 26 people get together at events against the exploitation of the Yasuní. And
who are they? Youth? It is a strategy, to pit the youth against us. And there is the
“youth” Julio César Trujillo (an activist-lawyer in his 70s). Don’t be deceived,
these are the same stone-throwers from the MPD (left-party made up of many
students). Young people, don’t be manipulated by these broken politiqueros! (EC
336, August 24, 2013).
While protesters are depicted as violent, there is a direct warning to citizens that if
they get involved there will be repercussions:
What they are looking for is for someone to be killed or injured, that the police
lose their patience or calm. For four hours they attacked the police. … Parents,
watch out. Kids that go out (to protest) will lose their spot (at school). Be very
careful as those irresponsible ones from the MPD are hoping for a youth death,
generating violence. And as no one pays them any attention, they protest for any
reason. (EC 337, August 31, 2013).
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In this EC, Correa’s also mocks Diario Hoy:
The opinion polls put us in a good mood; they are so ridiculous they make us
laugh.. Diario Hoy is an insult to statistics, to ethics. They have a preselected
sample….they only call groups who are against the government….they are
politicizing the theme…Everyone is an ecologist.
Correa also sought to demonstrate that he had support from the Amazon. During
EC 337, a video was shown in which Amazonian mayors declare their support for the
exploitation of the Yasuní (these mayors would go on to lose electoral races six months
later). The video also insists on the low impact that exploitation will have on the Yasuní,
and attacks the urban middle class for not understanding the importance of resource
extraction for the Amazon. This statement, made by President Correa on EC 341, on
September 28, while discussing the benefits of a hydroelectric project, is representative of
the way in which Yasunidos and other ecologists were depicted:
If we condemn everyone to live like Tarzan, we wouldn’t have roads, universities
with grants in the exterior, hospitals. In other words, the real buen vivir (good
living) increases options, but they would condemn us to slavery. Ask these
neoecologists how many of them took cold showers this morning. When they
want to condemn us to poverty they take our freedom. On the contrary, when one
can live with basic services, those that want to, like these people, can live in the
jungle. You shouldn’t pay any attention to these people. This is the real
ecologism.
Repeatedly, Correa equates resource extraction to the concept of Buen Vivir,
which is usually meant to denote harmony between humans, other beings, and
ecosystems. Simultaneously, he depicts Yasunidos and their allies as being out of touch
with the needs of Amazon dwellers. This both of these frames were wholeheartedly
rejected when Amazonian women and their children marched from the Amazon to Quito
to express their opposition to extractivism, and their agreement with Yasunidos.
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Participant observation at protests, public forums and other related events, and
social media monitoring from August 25, 2013 through September 30, 2013, indicates
that there were at least three kinds of effects of the government’s media campaign: first,
the government was successful in fostering fear in potential Yasunidos supporters. In
Quito, the number of protesters visibly diminished (this could also be attributed to protest
fatigue or the increasing perception that Yasunidos events were just for young people, but
many people I spoke with expressed reluctance). Social media monitoring of Yasunidos
evidenced a reduction in the number of conversations, shares and “likes” on their
Facebook page. Many individuals admitted that they were hesitant to go to the marches
for fear that they or their families would lose their jobs. Secondly, government
communications about ‘cutting-edge technology’ that would lessen environmental
damage in the Yasuní, and the financial benefits that would be directed to the Amazon
region seemed to gain credibility. People began to repeat lines from the ECs, such as ‘we
need the money’ and ‘the damages won’t be so bad.’ Sentiments on this issue would shift
again, as Yasunidos continued to organize (See Table 3e at the end of the chapter).
3.5.3.2 Phase Two: The signature-collection process (October 15, 2013 – April 12,
2014)
The second phase is delimited by the six-month period in which Yasunidos had
the challenge to collect signatures equaling 5% of the electorate. And while protests had
diminished by this stage, many artistic and cultural events were held. The Caravan for the
Yasuní also began to travel through Ecuador. While the group faced constant harassment,
surveillance, and physical aggression at signature-collection points, the EC depicted
Yasunidos as hypocrites, and as against the good of the nation. Correa also sought to
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prove that resource extraction was an absolute necessity if Ecuador were to advance its
goals, among many other topics (the typical EC broaches dozens of themes each week).
For example, in the following quote, there are many different ideas that Correa is
expressing:
There is a radical change in the manner of development in the Amazon. Don’t be
deceived, gringos with full bellies come here saying that ‘nothing should be
touched, no cutting of trees, don’t exploit, die of hunger but I will have where to
go as a tourist. You have always been poor, its part of your environment.’ Let
them live in conditions that our Amazonian peoples face. What racism. They
come to defend using the name of Amazonian peoples. Don’t be deceived, we
have the right to live well. They are hypocrites. They come to complain because I
had to make the difficult decision to exploit the Yasuní. How many people are
here [at the EC], 800-1000? Exploiting the Yasuní is like affecting one person
here. That is the compromise….These hypocrites come and say ‘don’t touch the
Yasuní’ these gringos! And I ask, how much jungle do they have in the U.S.?
How many uncontacted tribes do they have?….No government has done more for
the uncontacted indigenous groups! (EC 357, January 18, 2014).
In the signature-collection phase, Correa increased attacks on foreigners –
international media, NGOs such as Pachamama Foundation (which was subsequently
shut down by the government on December 4, 2013), and scholars and activists that had
originally been with the government, but had since changed their positions due to
extractive and other policies. Criticisms of Pachamama Foundation were launched on the
EC prior to and just after they were shut down. In EC 351 on December 9, 2013, a video
shown alleged that members of the Pachamama Foundation (who denied that people in
this video were part of their organization) being acted aggressively to foreign miners. The
video characterizes the foundation as inciting violence and financing protest, and argues
that anti-extractivist groups do not have support in areas where there is planned
extraction. It calls foundations like Human Rights Watch, Pachamama, Acción Ecológica
liars. It also mentions that Yasunidos is part of these foundations. Correa argued:
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All is planned, they have manuals for these things, lets see the manual made by a
foreigner living in Intag (a region threatened by mining. The “foreigner” is a
Cuban American who has lived in Intag for 30 years). (EC 351, December 9,
2013).
And in reference to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, he stoked
anti-imperialist sentiments:
When I took the sovereign decision to exploit the Yasuní.… the Inter American
Commision on Human Rights sends a letter asking for an explanation as to why
we have made this decision. Hahaha. Check yourself! First let them tell me how
many countries they ask that, and then they put a deadline. … Mind your own
business, not that of a sovereign country like Ecuador.
As time advanced, and Yasunidos collected more signatures, the attacks became
more vicious. 191 television and radio spots were released by SECOM in March, and
several actions by other social actors provoked a great deal of confusion. Two other
groups that were also engaged in signature collection for different referendums
plagiarized the Yasunidos form, which served to confuse many citizens, who became
reluctant to sign anything. Additionally, there were many reports from Yasunidos
signature collectors that the other groups would try to convince citizens that they were
part of Yasunidos, to secure their signatures.
Despite all of these formidable challenges, Yasunidos held a vibrant march to
deliver 757,623 signatures to the CNE on April 12, 2014. (See Table 3f at the end of the
chapter).
3.5.3.3 Phase Three: “Democracy in Extinction.” (April 13 – August 15, 2014)
During this third phase, in which the CNE would reject thousands of signatures,
and President Correa would announce that a national referendum on the Yasuní would
not be put to citizen vote, the EC featured many videos, produced by SECOM that
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depicted Yasunidos as a violent group that has committed fraudulent activities. The EC
and other media content released by CNE, SECOM and other government entities
worked together to try to destroy Yasunidos’ reputation, and bring an end to the hope that
the Yasuní could be saved through popular vote. The attacks were so virulent, Yasunidos
denominated this as “democracy in extinction.”
Three days after the April 12 delivery of signatures, CNE released a video that
explained just how signatures might be eliminated. Sensing a death foretold, members of
Yasunidos showed up unannounced at the CNE, and found that their boxes of signatures
had been tampered with. In fact, the identity cards of the individuals who had collected
most signatures, were missing (thereby eliminating those forms). On April 26, in EC 371,
Correa sought to delegitimize Yasunidos and the process:
They have lied to us, but not only that. If it is a collective with 100 members,
maybe there are 10 are authentically concerned about the Yasuní. Moreover, they
go in their 4x4 cars, or take hot water showers. They are not coherent. But if
those 10 without coherence are authentic, that’s a lot. 90 of them are the same
stone-throwers as always. The MPD is there trying to damage the government,
Carlos Pérez Guambatel (President of ECUARUNARI), Patchakutik, they are
against everything. Don’t be deceived. There is nothing about this that is a youth
collective, it’s the same pack as always. These are the ones that lose all of the
elections….
On May 3, during EC 372, Correa continued the campaign of delegitimation:
What do mines and oil have to do with salaries, but certain ecologists just don’t
get it. Because I also consider myself an ecologist. The Yasunidos Collective is
creating a scandal about fraud, international observers…. Because they know that
they didn’t collect enough signatures and want to start a political scandal… The
most ecological thing Yasunidos has done is to have recycled the MPD.
At the same time, Correa continued to insist that there would be very little
damage done in the Yasuní, and that resource extraction was necessary and positive:
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(speaking of schools) there is so much to do and that is why we need billions of
dollars. That is why we should take advantage of our natural resources… I would
never let the Yasuní be destroyed…it is in exchange for millions of dollars for
Millennial schools for our children, hospitals for our families, for roads, for our
communities, for services that are urgently needed. (EC 371, April 26, 2014).
This phase constituted a long and painful period for Yasunidos and for hundreds
of thousands of citizens. Yasunidos attempted various campaigns such as “Democracy in
Extinction” and “What happened to my signature.” Unfortunately, many agree that the
attacks and campaigns of delegitimation were partially successful. However, many others
were critical of these campaigns, but nonetheless were discouraged by the overwhelming
forces against a popular vote on the Yasuní. I argue that, at that moment, statist power
and statist media power, were able to interrupt democratic processes from below.
However, this is also a story that contained many successful mediated practices
that Ysunidos enacted that served them well for most of the process, actually until CNE
would not let the practice continue on its democratic path. The rest of the chapter is
dedicated to exploring how Yasunidos was able to visibilize their movement through a
range of communicational strategies. (See Table 3G at the end of the chapter).
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I focused on the reconfiguration of media power in Ecuador since
Correa came to power in 2007. I extended Couldry’s (2003) and Freedman’s (2014)
theoretical constructs to consider a scenario in which media power is a constituent aspect
of statist power, and therefore a dominant part of the journalistic field. I found this
necessary, given that media power is largely theorized from contexts of western liberal
democracies, with a focus on corporate media power. My conceptualization of statist
media power emerges from another context, one in which Ecuador, a Latin American
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progressive government has broken the century-old alliance between the government and
private media. While originally lauded as a measure of transparency never offered by
previous governments, Conaghan and de la Torre (2008, p. 281) realized early on that the
media practices of the Correa government created an “uneven play field” for those who
oppose government policies and actions. By virtue of their high office and their
newsworthiness, incumbent presidents or prime ministers always enjoy an inherent
advantage in getting their messages out to the public. But that advantage can turn highly
disproportionate when incumbents use the resources at the disposal of their government
to saturate the public with marketing campaigns.
In a context of hyperpresidentialism, and concentration of powers in the
Executive branch, unprecedented funds for media budgets, and a Secretary of
Communication that views communication as propaganda, the Ecuadorian government
has extended the depth and breadth of its reach enormously.
As access to media is a powerful resource, I also sought to analyze statist media
power empirically, and gain an understanding the properties of the government’s
discourse about Yasunidos and about development in the Amazon. I examined the
various mechanisms through which it is deployed: symbolic, legislative, media ownership
and media production practices. Each dimension was analyzed separately, with concrete
examples. Another way in which I sought to understand media power was to move
beyond the analysis of the relationship between the government and private media, which
dominates the scholarship on media reforms in Latin America, to look at the implications
that media power has had in the case of Yasunidos. To carry out the analysis, I worked
with the EC, which is Correa’s main discursive platform. I contextualized the mediated
154

discourse with an analyis of the events surrounding each EC analyzed, and the various
other ways in which statist power was deployed off-line.
Through such empirical study, we have learned of the unprecedented nature in
which media power has been reconfigured, and concrete ways in which it is used to push
an extractivist agenda. We have also seen how statist media power has been used in an
undemocratic fashion, when it has sought to stifle protest, criminalize individuals and
equate democracy with elections.
For a thorough analysis of state-social movement relations, and its mediated
dimensions, it is necessary to understand the nature of the government’s
communicational arsenal. Such understanding also facilitates an understanding of its
limitations, particularly the innovative ways in which Yasunidos interrupted that power
and deployed their own conceptions of democracy from below. As such, I also examined
how Yasunidos has confronted the government’s media power.
Table 3e: Phase One: The emergence of Yasunidos (August 15-October 14, 2013)
Phase
One

Events prior to the EC

Government
Strategies

What Correa says on the EC

August
24, 2013
EC 336

8/15 - Declaration of plans to
exploit the Yasuní, and
candelight vigil by protesters

Delegitimization
of leading
ecologist group,
connected to
Yasunidos.

2:03:31. I have not lied … but Action
pathological (a play on Acción
Ecológica) says there is no
technology that would reduce the
impact…they are saying such foolish
things…they don’t know what they
are talking about…they are
irresponsible…

Delegitimization
of national
newspaper Diario
Hoy.

2:11:55. The opinion polls (stating
that people don’t want to exploit the
Yasuní) put us in a good mood; they
are so ridiculous they make us laugh..
Diario Hoy is an insult to statistics..to
ethics. They have a preselected
sample….they only call groups who

8/17 – Nationwide protests
begin
8/18 – Yasunidos Collective is
born
8/22 – Yasunidos solicits the
Constitutional Court to gather
signatures of the electorate
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are against the government….they are
politicizing the theme…Everyone is
an ecologist.

towards a national referendum.

August
31, 2013.
EC 337.

8/27 – Gran Manifestación
(Large protest) for the Yasuní.
Police force used (Paint ball and
tear gas) to prevent protesters
access to the Plaza Grande.
Government publicity in favor
of exploitation cover the Plaza
Grande.
8/28 – SECOM broadcasts antiprotest videos on national
television and radio.
Regulations on social media are
announced.
Ministry of Interior threatens
private media

Dismisses the
notion that youth
are protesting,
points to other
social and
political actors,
appeals to young
people to not be
manipulated.

2:17:38 About 26 people get together
at events against the exploitation of
the Yasuní. And who are they?
Youth? It is a strategy, to pit the
youth against us. And there is the
“youth” Julio César Trujillo (an
activist-lawyer in his 70s). Don’t be
deceived, these are the same stonethrowers from the MPD (left-party
made up of many students). Young
people, don’t be manipulated by these
broken politiqueros!

Insults

2:19:10. [names various student
leaders]. Stone throwers who don’t
know how to open a book, but they
know how to speak stones…these are
the ones … in the Yasuní. Don’t
permit them to politicize something
so sensitive that has hurt all of us.

Delegitimization
of private media
(who mostly
cover Yasunidos
positively).
Again,
constructing the
media as both a
political actor,
and delegitimate
actor.

00:28:30. Prohibido olvidar (It is
prohibited to forget, another common
refrain), so you can see their doublemoral, the lack of ethics …these same
champions of democracy now want a
popular referendum on the Yasuní.
Don’t be lazy, go out and collect
signatures . Lets go, stop throwing
stones and go collect signatures, and
we will see you at the polls.

Criminalization,
framing protesters
as menacing,
violent, with bad
intentions.

2:34:36. What they are looking for is
for someone to be killed or injured,
that the police lose their patience or
calm. For four hours they attacked the
police.

Framing actors as
illegitimate,
because they lose
elections.

2:34:36. Young people of the nation,
do not be deceived, these are violent
people, sick people, people that lose
elections.

Threats to citizens 2:56:26. Parents, watch out. Kids that
go out (to protest), they will lose their
spot (at school). Be very careful as
those irresponsible ones from the
MPD are hoping for a youth death,
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generating violence. And as no one
pays them any attention, they protest
for any reason.

Sept. 28,
2013. EC
341

Protest actions continue. Sept.
27 Yasunízarte event.
Reporters now have restricted
access to the Yasuní.
The pro-drilling Amazonian
mayors begin their own
referendem process called
Amazonia Vive. Another group
begins a counter-referendum
that would ban all extractive
activities (Frente de Defensa
Total de la Amazonia).

Showing support
from the Amazon

2:56:27. A video is shown, in which
Amazonian mayors declare their
support for the exploitation of the
Yasuní (these mayors would lose
electoral races six months later). The
video also insists on the low impact
that exploitation will have on the
Yasuní, and attacks the urban middle
class for not understanding.

All of the above
strategies are
used. In addition,
there is a marked
increase in
discourses that
celebrate
development by
resource
extraction

1:39:50. Extols the virtues of a
hydroelectric project, followed by the
comment, “If we condemn everyone
to live like Tarzan, we wouldn’t have
roads, universities with grants in the
exterior, hospitals. In other words, the
real Buen Vivir (good living)
increases options, but they
(opposition to extractivism) would
condemn us to slavery. Ask these
neoecologists how many of them took
cold showers this morning. When
they want to condemn us to poverty
they take our freedom. On the
contrary, when one can live with
basic services, those that want to, like
these people, can live in the jungle.
You shouldn’t pay any attention to
these people. This is the real
ecologism.

Table 3f: Phase Two: Signature collection phase. (October 15 – April 12, 2013)
Phase Two

Events prior to the EC

Government
Strategies

What Correa says on the EC

December 9,
2013

12/4 – The Ministry of the
Environment shuts down
Pachamama Foundation via
Decree 16.

Position foreign
NGOs and nonEcuadorian
nationals as
threats to the
nation.

2:53:10. A video is shown that alleges
that members of the Pachamama
Foundation (who denied that people in
this video were part of their organization)
being acted aggressively to foreign
miners. The video characterizes the
Foundation as inciting violence and
financing protest. It calls foundations like
Human Rights Watch, Pachamama,
Acción Ecológica liars. Correa proposes

EC 351

Yasunidos has received
referéndum signature forms
on 10/1 and have begun
collecting signatures
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“All is planned, they have manuals for
these things, let’s see the manual made
by a foreigner living in Intag (a region
threatened by mining. The “foreigner” is
a Cuban American who has lived in Intag
for 30 years). It argues that the
opposition does not have support in areas
where there is planned extractive
activities. Correa mentions that
Yasunidos is part of these foundations.
“Broken political parties in the polls go
to the foundations.”

The National Assembly
votes in favor of” national
interest” to exploit Yasuní
An intelligence report on the
Yasunidos is leaked in
social media (11/5)

January 4,
2014. EC
355

Yasunidos collection site in
a public park is forcefully
removed by the police.

Defending the
government’s
notion of
development.

1:43:00. Please lets not waste our time in
stupid discussions [about natural gas] and
those that don’t want things to change.
Those that are doing well while others
live in misery, lets not pay attention. Our
country needs those natural resources to
get out of poverty….our country needs
the natural resources, those that say
otherwise are lying.

Defending the
government’s
notion of
development
and its actions.

11:40 – Correa discusses how the
Amazon has changed, that the
government has brought (governmentrun) millenium schools to the region,
how the cities are being organized.

Oil drilling
brings
prosperity

1:51:10 – (In saying that children need a
decent place to study) certain people
oppose this….let people die of hunger,
but we are environmentalists. They need
to understand that the most important of
the Pachamama are human beings, are
children, that people live in a dignified
way to overcome poverty so that our
children have more opportunities than we
did.

The definition of ethnicide
is modified in the Penal
Code by the National
Assembly
(12/14)
The Caravan for the Yasuní
begins its route through
coastal Ecuador (12/27)
January 18,
2014
EC 357
Broadcast
from Morona
Santiago
(Amazonian
province)

President Correa criticizes
the international media

1:54:20 – I believe the Waorani will be
the first [indigenous group] to overcome
poverty because they live in the Yasuní.
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1:56:20 – (showing a thatched roof hut)
was Panacocha before. Now thanks that
it is part of a strategic oil project, oil is
no longer a curse; these natural resources
are a blessing. (now the image is
switched to that of cement homes).
1:57:10 – If we have to cut down a tree
so that people have better lives, we have
to do it. Let’s be clear, compatriots, we
will do it with environmental care, but
with social responsibility. People have
the right to live well. We should all be
ecologists.
1:58:20 – My dream is that the first
region to conquer poverty is the Amazon,
because that is where the natural
resources are.
2:48:54 – Only a demented person could
say how great it is that oil reserves will
run out, while the more oil we have, that
is good news. Thank God we have
discovered new sources, that is why it is
important to explore the Southeast
(region area of the Amazon).
Delegitimizing
anti-extractivist
activists and
foreign support
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1:39:40 Correa discusses the
inauguration of a (government-run)
millennium community in Sucumbios.
“There is a radical change in the manner
of development in the Amazon. Don’t be
deceived, gringos with full bellies come
here saying that ‘nothing should be
touched, no cutting of trees, don’t
exploit, die of hunger but I will have
where to go as a tourist. You have always
been poor, it is part of your
environment.’ Let them live in conditions
that our Amazonian peoples face. What
racism. They come to defend using the
name of Amazonian peoples. Don’t be
deceived, we have the right to live well.
They are hypocrites. They come to
complain because I had to make the
difficult decision to exploit the Yasuní.
How many people are here [at the EC],
800-1000? Exploiting the Yasuní is like

affecting one person here. That is the
compromise….These hypocrites come
and say ‘don’t touch the Yasuní’ these
gringos! And I ask, how much jungle do
they have in the U.S.? How many
uncontacted tribes do they have?….No
government has done more for the
uncontacted indigenous groups!
2:23:00 – (Speaking of bad roads in the
Amazon) This is what the stone throwers
want to conserve. That we live in the
past.
Appealing to
anti-imperial
sentiments.

When I took the sovereign decision to
exploit the Yasuní.… the Inter American
Commision on Human Rights sends a
letter asking for an explanation as to why
we have made this decision. Hahaha.
Check yourself! First let them tell me
how many countries they ask that, and
then they put a deadline. … Mind your
own business, not that of a sovereign
country like Ecuador.

Table 3g. Phase Three: “Democracy in Extinction.” (April 13 – August 15, 2014)
Phase

Events prior to the EC

Government
Strategies

.

Delegitimization, Overview: In the third phase, Correa
Criminalization
sought to justify the terrible treatment the
of Yasunidos.
government gave Yasunidos. The
delegitimization and criminalization
increased.
Development
ideals of the
government

Points of signature collection
are openly surveilled

Delegitimization, 2:47:40 – Lets go to another video, there
is that youth collective gathering
Criminalization
signatures for the Yasuní. They are trying
of Yasunidos
to make us believe that it is oil or the
Yasuní. That’s a lie.

Three
Democracy
in
Extinction
April 13 –
August 15,
2014

What Correa says on the EC

EC 371,
372
April 26,
2014 (from
Italy). EC
371

Other groups begin to collect
signatures near Yasunidos
sites, creating widespread
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confusión. Yasunidos forms
are plagarized by these
groups, so they look almost
identical to Yasunidos forms.

They have lied to us, but not only that. If
it is a collective with 100 members,
maybe there are 10 who are authentically
concerned about the Yasuní. Moreover
they go in their 4x4 cars, or take hot water
showers. They are not coherent. But if
those 10 without coherence are authentic,
that’s a lot. 90 of them are the same
stone-throwers as always. The MPD is
there trying to damage the government,
Carlos Pérez Guambatel, Patchakutik,
they are against everything. Don’t be
deceived. There is nothing about this that
is a youth collective, it’s the same pack as
always. These are the ones that lose all of
the elections….

Yasunidos members receive
threats.
Month of March – 191 spots
in favor of exploitation of the
Yasuní are broadcast by
SECOM.
4/12 – National march to
delivery 757,623 signatures.

[This is followed by a video that depicts
Yasunidos as violent].

4/15 – A national cadena
is broadcast that explains
how signatures might be
eliminated. Yasunidos
detects un muerte anunciado
(a death foretold), arrives at
CNE and finds the security
bands on some of the boxes
have been broken.

4/15 – Identity cards of
individuals that have
collected the most signatures
are mysteriously missing
from the boxes (thereby
anulling the signatures they
have collected).

May 3,
2014

2:56:01 - They wait until the police come,
that there are deaths so they can become
victims at the international level. Did you
see the shot where pregnant women are
creating the disturbances? They want to
be victims. They can’t win at the polls, so
want to do it with blood, with violence.
But they won’t topple us, this revolution
won’t be stopped by nothing or nobody.
(2:56:09).
Benefits of
Development

43:50 – (speaking of schools) there is so
much to do and that is why we need
billions of dollars. That is why we should
take advantage of our natural
resources….I would never let the Yasuní
be destroyed…its in exchange for
millions of dollars for Millennial schools
for our children, hospitals for our
families, for roads, for our communities,
for services that are urgently needed.

Criminalization

2:23:05 – What do mines and oil have to
do with salaries, but certain ecologists
just don’t get it. Because I also consider
myself an ecologist. The Yasunidos
Collective is creating a scandal about
fraud, international observers….Because
they know that they didn’t collect enough
signatures and want to start a political

EC 372
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scandal….The most ecological thing
Yasunidos has done is to have recycled
the MPD.

Development
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2:23:05 – This is the great opportunity
that Latin America has to achieve
development without exploiting our labor
force, our natural resources….But
because we can raise salaries, because
thanks to our natural resources we have
cheap energy, we have roads, we have
ports, airports ….That is what they don’t
understand, that if we wouldn’t have had
natural resources, the capacity to generate
cheap energy, we wouldn’t have the
highest salaries in the region.

CHAPTER 4
MEDIATED CULTURAL POLITICS OF POST DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter Two, I presented a panoramic view of the first year of Yasunidos, as
well as the historical context of ecological activism; the Yasuní ITT conflict; and the
movement’s emergence, identity and practices. This present chapter goes into more depth
on Yasunidos’ visual, embodied and mediated practices, and the post-development
imaginaries their creative expression evoked. It investigates my research questions: How
has Yasunidos confronted the government’s media power, and the subquestion: how has
Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural politics of post-development, thereby challenging
the state’s extractivist discourses and practices? To address these questions, I revisit my
theoretical framework of mediated cultural politics, and deepen it by analyzing how
Yasunidos’ movement practices express post-development imaginaries. To do so, I
visually analyze the kind of art that Yasunidos has chosen to represent these imaginaries.
I also contrast these imaginaries, and the values they represent, with the government’s
extractivist discourses and values. In the second part of the chapter, I examine
Yasunidos’ media practices, both in terms of how they leveraged the attention they
received from private media, and also how they strategically made use of the enormous
visibility they got on the EC. Methodologically speaking, this chapter mainly relies on indepth interviews with Yasunidos and allies, and ethnographic participation in the
marches, performances, zapateadas, artistic events, and press conferences. I argue here
that the role of performance, ritual, art making, and the use of other visuals such as
posters, have been a key element in movement-building, by making visible the cultural
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battle being waged between the government’s extractivist agenda and Yasunidos’
invitation to consider a post-extractivist future. Their movement practices have also
served to communicate a set of values and imaginaries that envision another way
forward.
Mattoni and Teune (2014) contend that social movements are nothing less than
visual phenomena, and that transdisciplinary attention to the visual (and I would add,
embodied practices) is an important, evolving field of research. They also argue that such
expressions must be seen as situated within a web of social practices. Following their cue,
in the following sections I articulate the context and content of the art that Yasunidos has
chosen to utilize in its campaigns.
4.2 Yasunidos, mediated cultural politics and post-development imaginaries
In Chapter One, I introduced the concept of mediated cultural politics, a
theoretical rendering that brings together Alvarez et al.’s (1998) cultural politics
framework and Jesus Martin-Barbero’s (1987) notion of mediation. Mediated cultural
politics refers to movement practices that interrupt dominant meanings, values and
discourses, which are then amplified by circulation across multiple media platforms. I
propose that this concept can elucidate how Yasunidos, with no substantive media power
of its own, was able to interrupt hegemonic meanings of development that were
powerfully deployed through statist media. I contend that Yasunidos’ mediated cultural
politics has been able to resignify not just development, but also democracy and citizen
participation. They have done so, in part, through creative, performative expressions and
visual arts, what I have come to conceptualize as post-development imaginaries. Such
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concept brings together Escobar’s concept of post-development, with Gaonkar’s (2002)
and Taylor’s (2002) re-elaboration of the concept ‘the social imaginary.’
With respect to the term “post-development,” this is a concept that Arturo
Escobar coined in 1991.58 In a recent text, Escobar (2014) explains that from the outset
the concept has sought to displace “development” from its centrality, both discursively
and in practice.59 Along with a critique of capitalist models of development and related
ideas of growth, progress and modernity, the concept suggests that “it is possible to
imagine the end of development” (Escobar, 2014, p. 31). Such discourses and practices,
according to Escobar, emerge from ontologies and epistemologies generated by social
movements and ancestral communities. I agree with this proposal and in Chapter Two, I
established that Yasunidos is a new social movement actor that is part of the “vanguard”
(Escobar, 2014, p. 14) of imagining and enacting practices that point toward a postdevelopment scenario.
In tandem with the concept of post-development, for the concept ‘imaginary’, I
draw from Gaonkar (2002) and Taylor (2002), who have conceptually reworked
Castoriadis’ (1987) theorization of the social imaginary. Though these authors are
analyzing shifting social imaginaries of Western modernity, their conceptualization is
relevant to my work on post-development imaginaries. For these scholars, social
imaginaries “refer broadly to the way a given people imagine their collective social life”
(Gaonkar, 2002, p. 10). They are “the means by which individuals understand their
identities and their place in the world” (p. 4). They are manifested in images and
58

Escobar acknowledges the claim that the concept emerged at around the same time at an international
gathering in Geneva in 1991.
59
Many scholars and ecologists also use the concept of alternatives to development or post-extractivism
(Acosta, Gudynas, Martinez). Like Escobar, I see these as complementary concepts.
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symbols, and are spread by mass media. Importantly, transitions from one social
imaginary to another necessarily take place over long periods of time. For Taylor (2002,
p. 106):
[It] is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a
widely shared sense of legitimacy. In addition, we should note that what start off
as theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary….
Using these authors’ characterizations as a point of departure, I propose that the
concept of post development imaginary involves a diverse range of cosmovisions,
discourses, practices and resistances enacted by social movements and ordinary citizens,
that visibly manifest the world they seek to actively create, one in which relations
between human beings and other living beings are more harmonious and respectful, and
one in which human beings are guardians, not owners, of other life forms. As such, I
propose that Yasunidos’ movement practices embody a post-development imaginary.
I further argue that such imaginary has recently taken root in Ecuador, particularly
in young people. This relatively new imaginary has come about, in part, because of
indigenous, ecological and feminist social movements’ strong critique of hegemonic
notions and practices of development, as well as their ability to bring forward ontologies
and epistemologies that generate alternatives. This shift is taking place transnationally,
but I suggest that Ecuadorian social movements are at the forefront of this imaginary,
given the contexts I described earlier (Chapter Two). Key to the shift has been the
institutionalization of these movement’s proposals in the 2008 Constitution (and rights
that it purports to safeguard: the Rights of Nature, the right to previous consultation on
issues of extraction in one’s territory, cultural rights, territorial rights, etc.). The Yasuní
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ITT initiative, and the government’s earlier promotion of it, has also played a part in this
shift in social imaginary.
Eduardo Gudynas, in a recent conference about the Rights of Nature (July 12,
2016, FLACSO-Ecuador) suggested that there is perhaps no other country in which so
much has been learned from indigenous communities, although he still considers the
rights of Nature to be a minority ethos. He argued that in terms of rights and protections
of Nature, no other Constitution is so advanced, and Ecuador is often invoked as an
important reference. The problem, he added, is in the application of the Constitution.
I also do not propose that a complete shift in the social imaginary has taken place.
Rather, the post-development imaginary is in conflict with, and still dominated by the
more entrenched, extractivist imaginary. Gudynas (2012, p. 256) speaks to such
entrenchemnt across the whole region:
In South American social imaginaries, the idea that it is necessary to exploit
Nature is strongly rooted…. From this point of view, the problem is not to avoid
extractivism, rather it is to see how to strengthen it, to make it more efficient and
obtain more profits. It is also common that this position is strengthened by
invoking supposed scientific-technological advances and the promise of economic
growth.
In the cultural battle being waged between Correa and Yasunidos, these are
precisely the two imaginaries that are in dispute The following section examines the
differences between them.
4.3 Dominant and alternative conceptions of development
Since June 26, 1972, when oil began to flow out of the Ecuadorian Amazon
through a 312-mile pipeline, the rentist state embraced the promise of economic
development, financial prosperity and capitalist western modernity. While, indeed, many
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Ecuadorians and transnational corporations have profited from oil, extractive activities
have left the majority of affected areas in the Amazon with massive contamination that
has negatively impacted the lives and health of indigenous communities, animals, flora,
fauna, and all living beings (Acosta et al., 2013). Many areas in the northern part of the
Amazon, the first to be exploited, are company towns commonly identified as oil blocks,
with pipelines running along side most roads, and the prosperity of the inhabitants is
nowhere to be seen.60 There have been virtually no Ecuadorian governments that have
been opposed to oil drilling, including the Correa government. Once celebrated as an
exception to such extractivist perspective of the region, its practices have increasingly
contradicted its own 2008 Constitution and Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 2009-2013
(National Good Living Plan), in which it pledged to change the extractive model to one
of alternative development models.
The focus of Buen Vivir rejects the developmentalist conception that has ruled for
the past 60 years, and that was based on an extractivist vision of natural resources,
the expansion of agricultural soils, and the massive, intensive exploitation of
mining and fishing resources. The new constitutional mandate, prevention and
precaution are institutionalized, and the way of seeing the natural patrimony
beyond the so-called resources to exploit. (Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 20092013, p. 217).
The underlying values and ideals that are behind the extractive model and its
accompanying discourses are rooted in various sources. They represent a combination of
ideals of western capitalist modernity; economic theories of growth and modernization;
advances in science and technology, and the continuation of colonial practices that were
set in place in the Amazon in the 19th century (Espinoza Mora Bowen, 2010; Gudynas,
2013). Extractivist discourses and practices also emerge from post-neoliberal discourses
60

As part of my ethnographic fieldwork, I visited the northern Amazon and affected communities.
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of governments that identify as 21st century socialist projects, in which an emphasis is
placed on the ‘return of the state’, and with it, state-led development that allegedly brings
profits to citizens rather than transnational corporations. Another source of these values
comes from dominant conceptions of sustainable development in which there is an
assumption that new technologies can lessen the harmful impacts of development.
As analyzed in Chapter Three, many of the extractivist perspectives are regularly
voiced on the EC by President Correa and his ministers. They include: an anthropocentric
approach to Buen Vivir in which people supposedly come first, even if detrimental to
other living beings and ecosystems. This discourse contradicts how Buen Vivir, or Sumak
Kawsay, is understood by indigenous cosmovisions, in which it refers to harmonious coexistence between humans and other beings. A related discourse about drilling in the
Yasuní is that the profits will benefit Amazonian communities. One of Correa’s main
arguments relates to the hegemonic notion of sustainable development, that “cutting edge
technology” will lessen the impact on the Yasuní. Moreover, officialist discourse
proposes that natural resources are strategic resources over which the state has exclusive
rights. This is why, in part, the government was opposed to a national referendum (in
addition to fearing that Yasunidos would win). Discourses of capitalist modernity,
progress and growth; decades of government promises; and an elite that has profited from
oil revenues; have all greatly contributed to the continued hegemony of extractivism.
However, such hegemony is eroding. I propose that when Yasunidos came along
in 2013, a partial shift in the social imaginary had taken place in the national
consciousness (especially among young people) with regard to ecological matters. Values
that undergird this imaginary include a non-capitalist, biocentric concept of Buen Vivir
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that emphasizes harmonious co-existence between humans and other beings; viewing the
role of human beings as guardians, not masters, of the rest of the species; a belief that
resource extraction ultimately does not benefit the majorities, and it is not the answer to
Ecuador’s economic development; the belief in the need to overcome oil dependency; an
emphasis on biodiversity and territorial rights, and therefore the non-commercial value of
the Yasuní. Another key value is that of democratization: which includes public control
over resources and solutions from below (Acosta et al., 2013). The table below contrasts
the extractivist perspective with post-development values.

Table 4.3. Extractivist Perspective vs. Post Development Values
Ecuadorian government development ideals,
values, discourses

Yasunidos post-development ideals, values,
discourses

Based on a combination of ideals of western,
capitalist modernity; economic theories of
growth and modernization; normalization of
colonial practices; post-neoliberal thought
(strong state leads and reaps profits from
resources); dominant conceptions of
sustainable development which believe that
new technologies lessen the harmful impacts of
development; rational appropriation of nature

Based on Indigenous cosmovisions;
transnational feminist, ecologist, territorial
rights social movements; Latin American postdevelopment and post-extractivist approaches;
Ecuador’s institutionally-backed discourses of
Indigenous rights to their ancestral lands,
territorial rights, and rights of Nature; the
protection of non-contacted Indigenous groups

Notion of Buen Vivir that is anthropocentricput people first, they need to live well (even
though, in reality, few people live well in
communities where there is oil extraction).

Closer to indigenous cosmovisions Buen Vivir/Sumak Kawsay – biocentric,
harmonious co-existence bet human beings,
other beings, nature to maintain biodiversity.
Kichwa principle of relacionality.
Selva Viviente or Kawsay Sacha (living forest)
philosophy of the Kichwa Sarayaku. There is
no “centric” rather there are no divisions; the
space of life of all beings, all are in all parts.

Extracting natural resources will bring
prosperity to the Amazon and to Ecuador

Resource extraction is not the answer. We need
to transition from oil dependence to viable
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alternatives.
Ecuador gains profit, not transnational
corporations

Non-commercial value of keeping the oil
underground.

Natural resources are strategic resources over
which the state has exclusive rights

We have an ethical responsibility to indigenous
communities and the rest of the species to
safeguard nature for future generations,

Ecologists want to keep Amazonians living in
the past. They are unrealistic about ending
extractivism.

Respect for cultural diversity, territorial rights,
cultural survival.

The government has the approval of the
Ecuadorian people as it voted in this
government.

Questions who has power, who makes
decisions. The “Democracy in Extinction”
campaign proposes that Ecuadorian people
have the right to decide the fate of the Yasuní.
Democratization from below also involves
public control over resources, and citizen
involvement in the transition away from oil
dependence. It should not be the state that has
this role.

New, cutting-edge technologies lessen the
harm done to human beings and the ecosystem.

No technology can prevent the enormous loss
of biodiversity; resource extraction endangers
the very survival of indigenous communities
(contacted and non-contacted), their cultures,
and milenary practices that have cultivated, not
destroyed, diversity.

“Scientific evidence” and pro-extractive
experts propose that the cutting-edge
technologies will only damage one in a
thousand.

Interculturality as valorization of traditional
practices and knowledges that have taken care
of the biodiversity of the Amazon

This government is the most ecologically
friendly ever.

The government is engaging in ethnocide and
destruction of fragile ecosystems.

In line with transnational hegemonic discourses
of benign sustainable development; overlooks
environmental concerns and destruction of
cultures; ignores connection between extraction
and inequality.

In line with transnational discourses of
alternatives to development; post-development;
post-extractivism; the interdependence of
rights; indigenous rights, climate change,
cultural diversity, biodiversity.

In the next section, I analyze how the post-development ideals, values and
discourses translate into the creative expression of post-development imaginaries.
4.4. Yasunízarte! Movement-based post-development imaginaries
After the first wave of protests that followed President Correa’s decision to
commence extractive activities in the Yasuní, protest fatigue coupled with government
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efforts to argue its pro-drilling stance and delegitimize protest, increasingly gave way to
more sustained, diverse movement practices that integrated artistic and cultural
interventions. These practices included weekly zapateadas61, concerts, art exhibits,
carnivals, flash mobs, theater and street performances. The greatest, prolonged and most
effective practice was the occupation of streets and plazas to gather signatures for a
national referendum. These creative expressions, which came to characterize Yasunidos,
communicated their values directly to citizens, brought heightened visibility to the
movement, and helped them build a stronger base of support. Public calls to attend these
events, and the sharing of images and videos after they took place, were circulated across
media platforms, mainly Facebook, nationally and internationally. In addition to the
protests and and spontaneous happenings that involved art, there were countless planned
artistic events throughout that first year. Many of them took place simultaneously with
signature collection. They included: the Yasunízárte, a concert benefit, in which some of
the most popular performers entertained a sold out venue (September 27, 2013); A day of
artistic protest outside of the National Assembly (October 3, 2013); a Yasuní caravan that
travelled coastal towns and cities; and dozens of zapateadas.
The majority of the images, videos, graphics, events, and actions that were
disseminated on multiple media platforms by Yasunidos and others did not depict oil
contamination. Rather, very much in the spirit of prefigurative politics, they often chose
to highlight healtlhy indigenous communities, diverse wildlife, clean rivers, the cultural
survival of the isolated indigenous groups, and other positive images of the Amazon.

61

Joyous protest events in which people bring instruments and zapatear, dance in a circular motion. This
Andean dance is practiced in community, often during Inti Raymi. Another meaning of the zapateada is
that it helps participants push through difficulties and gather strength for the struggles ahead.
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Created and circulated by artists, citizens, children, and people of all ages, diverse artistic
and cultural expressions resonated widely with Ecuadorian citizens. On their website and
Facebook page, in their press conferences, public appearances, and on the street,
Yasunidos always literally and symbolically set a stage imbued with images that
presented alternatives to the kind of development now being proposed by the
government. And, try as the government would to criminalize Yasunidos, these cultural
mediations helped to counteract negative representations of the collective. And, it was
difficult to criminalize that which the government once promoted.
Other social movements, with a few exceptions, have mainly utilized the more
traditional confrontational protest strategies such as militant-style marches and alignment
with specific political parties; also road closings and the occupation of institutions.
Regarding the last two, this is far less common now, after the Correa administration
revised the Penal Code. Such formerly common movement practices as occupation of
public buildings and road blocks are now considered to be terrorist acts and carry stiff
prison sentences (for example, in the last Indigenous national uprising in August 2015,
hundreds of indigenous activists were detained and jailed).
However, Yasunidos was not the first social movement in Ecuador to utilize
creative expression. Before Yasunidos, indigenous, ecologist, and feminists movements
also occasionally integrated performative actions into their repertoire. For example, in
Vázquez (2015), ecologist Ana Maria Varea recalled a march led by Amazonia por la
Vida (a direct precursor of Yasunidos) in which women dressed as petrol workers. One
interviewee recalls:
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Acción Ecológica, in a certain moment, released rats in the Congress, there are
many of these kinds of symbolic acts. Yasunidos has been nurtured by this. Some
of Yasunidos are children of the women of Acción Ecológica.62 (Alberto Acosta,
personal communication, April 10, 2015).
A woman involved in both Amazonia Por la Vida and Yasunidos analyzes some
of the key differences between older and newer movement practices:
Sure, we (feminists) used to go out a lot to do graffiti. I remember that we did
graffiti actions. One time we put a sign on the Virgen del Panecillo (a prominent
statue of a virgin in Quito’s historic center), announcing where to get safe
abortions. In a march about three years ago we dressed as nuns and played
drums….What I do see as a first are many people, many young people, mobilizing
for a territory, for its biodiversity, for the defense of nature, and for the isolated
indigenous groups…and these are mainly urban mestizos that don’t live in this
territory. But they have been able to recognize the importance of this territory for
the peoples that live there, and for their own lives. So, these characteristics seem
new to me, of what I have seen of other mobilizations.
And also what is new is that there are various artistic expressions, including
musicians, and a diversity of creative spaces … they have linked their art work to
this struggle. Creativity flourishes. I remember that there were a group of young
painters there, painting signs, and they called on people to do theater….These
were people from diverse collectives, not just the campaign…Each one felt it
important to express their rejection. And this was very different from the march
that supported Correa’s declaration, who were there with their green flags…
The other [difference] is that we have said no to flags, no to martial marches, no
to the typical slogans, no to the typical voices. We do things in a different way –
with song, joyously giving this movement an identity with art, costumes, theater,
music and also diversity…I believe these are new tendencies that we haven’t seen
in other spaces….these are new tendencies that break with old structures…. (RG,
personal communication, March 12, 2015).
The above extended citation is important on a number of levels. The interviewee
is analyzing the new, creative modalities that are enacted not only by Yasunidos, but by
many groups of young people (many of whom had not been politically active, like many
Far from there being a split between ecologists and feminists, Acción Ecológica, one of Ecuador’s most
important ecologist organizations (now 30 years old in 2016), was founded by a group of feminists.
62
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members of Yasunidos). When she discusses how urban youth mobilize for territories
that are not their own, including for uncontacted indigenous groups, she is describing a
shift in the social imaginary, in which such actions against Nature, against indigenous
peoples, are viewed as unacceptable, as illegitimate.63
Regarding the creative movement practices, older generations of activists did not
always understand these new forms of protest. One activist from an older generation said
of the zapateadas:
We didn’t understand them, the old politicians didn’t understand…for me it was
something strange...To me it didn’t have a meaning….It was for them, but not to
join in. The zapateadas were never massive, but they did given an identity to
Yasunidos. It gave them strength, but it didn’t give them the possibility of
expanding…(Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015).
Unlike Acosta, I do believe the zapateadas helped them expand, in that it
attracted other people of their generation, or others that share a post-development
sensibility.
In Chapter Two, the discussion about movement identity and practices, I
examined the candlelight vigils, zapateadas, initial wave of protests, the signaturegathering process, and the ebullient march in which Yasunidos delivered the signatures to
CNE, as examples of mediated cultural politics of post-development. In this next section,
I focus on a visual analysis of the art that Yasunidos used in its campaigns, to examine
how they express post-development imaginaries.
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At the time of writing, there has been an ongoing, indigenous-led mobilization against the North Dakota
Pipeline that is attracting support and solidarity by a wide range group of people (including indigenous
Ecuadorians, who were some of the first to show up at the protest site). I see this as another example of the
partial shift towards a post-development imaginary that is occurring transnationally.
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4.5 Art and the post-development imaginary
Artistic expression has been a powerful way for Yasunidos to communicate what
it stood for, and to disseminate post-development imaginaries. Arguably, it competed
with statist media power, given the resonance that it had with so many people,
particularly younger generations. Here, a member of Yasunidos underscores the
importance of the artwork in gathering signatures:
The fight for the Yasuní, and the diffusion strategies that were used did not only
subscribe to the impact that they could generate in public opinion, through the
media or social media. No, the work of the artists was fundamental in all aspects.
In the signature collection, the images that generated impact were the images of
children collecting signatures with their families, and also those of animales.
Artists donated many depictions of animals: dolphins, jaguars, etc. That we would
take and put in the points of signature collection, and that would generate impact.
(BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015).
While much of the mediated cultural politics of the movement rose up
spontaneously, as described in the previous section, there was also a strategic element at
play, in terms of the images that were used in Yasunidos campaigns. They made use of
opinion polls to understand which kinds of images moved people. One member of
Yasunidos analyzes how they sought to have a broad impact:
One of the tools that we used was the polls from different firms that were
dedicated to analyzing Ecuadorian public opinion in relation to different themes
… and with this we could read how we might build our strategies, something that
I feel is fundamental for absolutely any national political actor in whichever
theme that one wants to have incidence. For example, we would see that we had
great acceptation with younger people of 18, 35, 40 years, those who had clarity
about the defense of Nature. We also read that people did not like violence, even
discursive violence. So on these readings we would elaborate our messages, in
defense of Nature….
One thing that struck us, and that I find sad, was that a majority of Ecuadorian
citizens were interested in biodiversity in the Yasuní, the flora, fauna, animals,
etc, more so than the survival of the peoples in voluntary isolation….But it is
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strategic to position a theme and then, the other is derived from it, meaning, if we
are going to position the theme of the isolated peoples, first we are going to have
to deal with the theme of biodiversity. People also preferred colors, proposals, and
joyous, protest, full of music.
Here we see that Yasunidos sought to respond to what would generate positive
impact in public opinion, but at the same time we can see that they had an agenda beyond
success with public opinion. They used their increasing visibility to foreground the issues
that were important to the collective, such as the danger of extraction to the survival of
the uncontacted indigenous groups who live in the Yasuní. I also find it interesting that
opinion polls revealed that people rejected even discursive violence. My reading on that
(not just from these polls, but from ethnographic observation over several years) is that
people were tired of the discursive violence enacted each week on the EC.
Polls also showed that people favored colorful, musical protest, and concrete
proposals. I interpret that as a preference in younger generations for a different way of
doing politics. Recall that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ecuadorian citizens had had
their fill of “politics as usual” and democratically deposed three presidents in one decade.
This sense of disillusionment with politics as usual is still prevalent today, which is
another reason why the mediated cultural politics of Yasunidos was so refreshing to so
many people. Additionally, the desire to see actual proposals, I believe, is partially a
reaction to the campaign of delegitimation of Yasunidos and ecologists in general, in
which they were depicted as ignorant or unrealistic about alternatives to development
(they were often branded as “childish ecologists” on the EC). Citizens were hungry for
actual information about how to transition out of resource extraction.

177

Returning to the question of the artwork, its strategic use in campaigns not only
corresponded to a post-development imaginary deeply felt by Yasunidos (see Table 4.3),
it also corresponded to the preferences of the public, in terms of the kinds of art and
protest they appreciated. One of the most used images was this one below.64

Figure 4a. Yasunizando the landscape
This image has many of the characteristics previously described: the presence of
youth, the theme of the future; a utopic image of a young girl repainting, or transforming,
the old, black and white image of the oil tank that is seen all over the Northern Amazon,
with colorful images of nature (bird, butterflies, the print of a leopard).

Most of this artwork has been created by a movement-allied artist, Angie “Vanessita” Cárdenas Roa. Her
work with Yasunidos and on behalf of many other ecological and feminist struggles can be accessed at
sakuritadesign.blogspot.com.
64
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Figure 4b. Poster for the Second Encounter of “infantile ecologists”
Image 2 is a poster that was used for the II Encuentro Nacional de Ecologistas
Infantiles (II National Gathering of Infantile Ecologists). The very name is a
reappropriation of the insulting way Correa refers to ecologists, “infantile.” Ecologists
have used this denomination to celebrate ecological gatherings. This particular one
advertised in the poster was organized during the early emergence of Yasunidos, two
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months after the announcement of the declaration of national interest to exploit the
Yasuní. This colorful poster depicts the tree of life, filled with animals. Yasuní Vive
(Yasuní Lives) was also used by the government as a slogan in its campaign to convince
citizens that the impact on the Yasuní would be minimal given the “cutting edge
technology” that would be used.

Figure 4c. Together for Utopia
The above image depicts young people, as well as a diversity of generations,
subjectivities, and ethno-racial groups from various regions of Ecuador (there are
characters representing indigenous people from the Amazon and the highlands. There are
mestizos, afro-descendent, white, animals, flora and fauna. The colorful imagery depicts
diverse people coming together to support the Yasuní. It bears the logo of Yasunidos, and
the signature of the artist is also visible in the bottom-right corner.
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Figure 4d. Yasunízarte Concert Announcement
The above image is the poster from one of the first large concerts held in defense
of the Yasuní, and that featured popular local artists. The silhouetted landscape depicts a
sunset in the Amazon, with flora, fauna, and musical performers and notes.
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Figure 4e. Yasunidos Referendum Question
The image’s background shows a landscape which depicts inhabitants of the
Yasuní. The humans in silhouette likely represent the uncontacted indigenous groups,
although their contacted relatives, the Waorani, also use spears for hunting.
Superimposed over the image is the question that was posed in the bid for the national
referendum: Do you agree that the Ecuadorian government maintain the oil of the ITT,
known as Block 43, indefinitely underground? We also can see the Yasunidos logo, the
often-invoked slogans Yo firmo por ti Yasuní (I sign for you, Yasuní) which references
the fact that the uncontacted groups as well as animals and other living beings cannot
sign, but we can sign for them. The other slogan is Resiste YAsuní (Yasuní resists, with
an emphasis on YA [now], translates as Resiste Now as well).
The image below, translated, is Climate Justice from underground. It depicts
indigenous Waorani, or their uncontacted relatives, the Taromenare and Tagaeri groups,
all of whom are inhabitants of the Yasuní.
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Figure 4f. Climate Justice from under the soil
The use of the Yasunidos logo was very important in the art, to verify the origin
of the images because the government had helped to create and promote parallel
movements. These groups also sought to depict a healthy, vibrant Amazon. In the table
below, I go into more detail as to how the post-development ideals, values and discourses
correspond to Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics that express a post-development
imaginary.
Table 4.4. Post-development ideas deployed by Yasunidos
Yasunidos post-development ideals, values,
discourses

Yasunidos mediated cultural politics
themes deployed through images, texts,
artistic actions, political actions that
express post-development imaginary

Based on Indigenous cosmovisions; Ecuadorian
feminist, ecologist, and indigenous. social
movements

The future – the future of peoples who live in
the Yasuní and all our futures.

In line with transnational discourses of
alternatives to development; post-development;
post-extractivism; Indigenous rights, climate
change, cultural diversity, biodiversity.

“one of the arguments for the defense of the
Yasuní is the theme of the future, the future of
the people who inhabit this planet, and the
future of the peoples who inhabit the Yasuní.”
(RG)
Zapateadas – symbol of protest and defense
of the Yasuní.

Buen Vivir - harmonious co-existence between
human beings, other beings, and nature to
maintain biodiversity

Posters and art that depict harmonious
relations between humans and other living
beings.
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Resource extraction is not the answer. We need
to transition from oil dependence to viable
alternatives.

One of the most ubiquitous images is that of
the girl transforming the oil well. See Image
1.

Non-commercial value of keeping the oil
underground.

Wealth is having clean wáter, and healthy
lives.
Images that critique putting a monetary value
on the Yasuní.

We have an ethical responsibility to the rest of
the species, and to safeguard nature for future
generations.

Images of animals that inhabit the forest and
the rivers

Respect for cultural diversity, territorial rights,
cultural survival.

Images of cultural diversity, as seen in
various posters (see images 2, 3 and 6)

The “Democracy in Extinction” campaign
There are many versions of the Democracy in
proposes that Ecuadorian people have the right
Extinction poster, most of which show the
to decide the fate of the Yasuní. Democratization wildlife of the Yasuní.
from below also involves public control over
resources, and citizen involvement in the
transition away from oil dependence.
No technology can prevent the enormous loss of
biodiversity, and extraction endangers the very
survival of forest dwellers (contacted and noncontacted), their cultures, and millenary
practices that have fostered, not destroyed,
diversity.

Although positive images are predominant,
there are also mages that show destruction of
ecosystems.

Interculturality - valorization of traditional
practices and knowledges that have safeguarded
the biodiversity of the Amazon.

There is much art that depicts indigenous
peoples that inhabit the Yasuní.

The government is engaging in ethnocide and
destruction of fragile ecosystems.

Las veladas (candelight vigils), peace and
peaceful protest

See images 5 and 6.

Indigenous woman poster: Ethnocide.

Yasunidos was not the only group that was enacting mediated cultural politics. In
the following section, I highlight an important action by Amazonian women, in a key
event that took place in defense of the Yasuní. This event was important, in that it clearly
communicated resistance from the Amazon.
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4.6 Allies from the Amazon march on Quito
On October 3, 2013, the National Assemby, with 108 votes in favor, declare that
it is in the national interest to exploit the Yasuní. The next day, a group of over 60
Amazonian women leaders set out for Quito, walking from various Amazonian
communities, accompanied by their children and the Indigenous Guard. They walked in
order to tell the government they were against exploitation in the Yasuní, as well as the
licitations of oil blocks in their territories. This was a notable example in which mediated
cultural politics of post-development were enacted, not in coordination with Yasunidos,
but with a similar message. This walk was at once an act of resistance against the
political figures in the communities that were giving their blessings to exploitation, and
part of a post-development imaginary in that the women were assuming their power and
putting forth their vision of the Amazon and their communities. The walk to Quito
publicly expressed their rejection of government plans to drill for oil in the Yasuní, as
well as other extractive activities in the Amazon. Their activism is rooted in La Selva
Viva (the living forest), a philosophy in which the Amazon is considered an integral
being, a complex, balanced system. Facebook and Twitter reports from Yasunidos and
other allies tracked their progress every day of the walk towards Quito through photos
and chronicles. Images of indigenous women leaders and the joyous welcome they
received in each town offered powerful testimony and images of their resistance to
extractivist policies. The march signaled that there was opposition coming from the
Amazon, despite government attempts in the ECs and elsewhere to present a picture of
solid support.
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The indigenous women’s arrival to Quito was greeted by a well-attended march
organized by a several collectives and organizations.65 While in Quito, the women met
with diverse social actors, Yasunidos included. A drive for warm clothing and food to
support their stay in Quito spread virally throughout social media. They came to meet
with Correa personally, but the government barely acknowledged their presence. The
women were finally granted permission to address the National Assembly, though their
passionate statements were met with silence. Nevertheless, the photos, videos and
narrative accounts were generated and shared by supporters, and picked up by private
media. They disrupted government narratives that framed indigenous groups as grateful
supporters of oil extraction. The words and images they circulated spoke of real wealth as
living in harmony with La Selva Viva (the living forest). This kind of symbolic currency
that was generated, exchanged and transformed into on-the ground action and material
solidarity is an example of a way in which mediated cultural politics was collectively
constructed. The visit brought needed legitimacy to Yasunidos; helped build relationships
across ethnicity, class and region; and brought new energy to the movement. Direct
contact with the indigenous Amazonian women, many of whom have been prominent
leaders for decades, helped fill the need for articulation from below between Quito and
the Amazon. I would argue that in this conjuncture, Yasunidos’ mediated cultural politics
trumped the government’s media power. In fact, I suggest it was a political error for the
government to ignore these women and their claims. If they were so concerned about the
Amazon, why did they dismiss the women that walked hundreds of kilometers to Quito.

65

See Coryat (2015) for a previously-published account of this event.
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In addition to the mediated cultural politics, Yasunidos also focused on media
strategies. The rest of the chapter examined the multiple ways that they used media, from
their own practices to leveraging private and public media.
4.7 Confronting statist media power: Yasunidos media practices
4.7.1. Representing the movement
Yasunidos emerged as a movement during the first wave of protests, and given
that the national referendum process got underway nearly immediately, there was very
little time to ponder a media strategy. They literally had to hit the ground running because
of the enormous task ahead of them to collect signatures across the country, which also
involved energizing other Yasunidos groups in other towns and cities. Given the
enormous task of facing statist media power, various members of the collective dedicated
time and energy to crafting the movement’s communicational strategy. They knew that
they had to act swiftly and wisely to counter the mediated insults and attacks. Compared
to the government, Yasunidos had few resources. One member of Yasunidos did have
experience as editor of an ecologist website, Tegantai,
(http://www.agenciaecologista.info/) that disseminated news about on the latest extractive
activities that were taking place or planned across Ecuador, information for the press, and
social movement activities. But most of the members of Yasunidos had little to no
experience relating to the media.
To help craft their strategies, Yasunidos reached out to experienced, allied media
analysts for advice and training. Public opinion polls also provided them with pertinent
information about how the public perceived of them as a group, and whether or not they
approved of their actions. Yasunidos launched a website and a Facebook page very
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quickly, to explain who they are, what they stand for, to answer commonly-asked
questions, and to disseminate information about their upcoming events. The website also
published pertinent reports about extractivism and sustainable options. A member of
Yasunidos describes some of their practices:
We did not have a clear path for where we wanted to go. We did not have
previous experience in relation to spokespeople. Many of the people that acted as
spokespeople during the whole time period, started with the collective in the first
press conferences. Their first brush with the press was with a tape recorder, a
camera. I am talking about young women of 17 or 18 years old. Ten young people
of 17 or 18, that for the first time, faced a television camera as spokespeople for a
collective that didn’t even know where it was headed. I had worked for some
newspapers but I found myself in a much larger communicational scenario, in
which the link with private media turned out to be fundamental in terms of
proposing all that we would go on to propose. (BB, personal communication, May
7, 2015).
I recall the first Yasunidos press conference. They had set up a table in the
backyard of Acción Ecológica, which became their headquarters. During that first press
conference, some of the youngest members were the spokespeople. They received a little
bit of coaching and then, with about a dozen cameras and audio recorders focused on
them, they opened the microphones and began to address the press. While their lack of
experience was evident, their passion for and knowledge of what was going was
impactful. The excitement among those that attended this first press conference,
including the journalists that were present, was palpable. After all, many of the journalists
were also unhappy with the decision to exploit the Yasuni. Over the next few months, I
observed how these and other Yasunidos members sharpened their skills and relations
with the press. They also did not have just one or two spokespeople, rather they rotated
those responsibilities among at least ten people at a time. For Ecuadorian citizens, it was
refreshing to see many young people speaking out on the issues, instead of just one or
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two seasoned political individuals. This practice differed greatly from that of the
government, in which Correa was the main spokesperson, and was also unlike verticallyorganized social movements and political parties. One member comments on this and
other media practices:
One of our main strengths was obviously Facebook. Many people were there, and
I think that was our principal communication channel that legitimated our posture,
because we did not have resources to pay for television. Well, also [important]
was the print media. We gained the respect of the [private] media and they gave
us a lot of space. They would attend our press conferences – they even applauded.
And they interviewed us all the time. (RG, personal communication, March 12,
2015).
Yasunidos’ communication remained singularly focused on the issues, without
personalizing the conflict by attacking President Correa or other members of the
government. Such practice was, in fact, opposite to the way in which the government
communicated, which did personalize issues and attack individuals and organizations
related to the movement. One Yasunidos member describes the conscious decision to
focus on issues, not attack the President:
Many political actors would have loved for Yasunidos to attack the President but
we wanted to criticize a development model that impoverishes, that contaminates
and that eliminates not only the forests but also the populations that depend on
them to exist. (PE, personal communication, April 30, 2015).
With respect to Correa and the EC, Yasunidos developed a strategy that one
member referred to as their “Jiujitsu strategy.”
The collective does not have economic resources; it can’t pay for campaigns in
social media, the collective can’t deploy cadenas nacionales (obligatory national
broadcasts produced by the government) to delegitimize other political actors in
the national political scenario, and we wouldn’t want to anyway. But we did use
other strategies.
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There is a practice in Jiujitsu, the martial art, in which you use the power of your
enemy. The first time that the President attacked Yasunidos (in the EC), it was
totally unexpected, but it was impactful. He referred to Yasunidos as liars that are
collecting signatures, and you know, he would see us at the polls…. and the
moment that he did that, the next day we collected so many more signatures than
we generally did, because people were mad. So, the President would attack us,
and we would use all of that visceral energy in our favor, and get him to speak
about themes that we wanted to position. Then we would use that strength to
collect more signatures, and it was successful, as were a whole bunch of
complementary strategies that served our objectives. I believe that it was a great
success to provoke the agents of power, in social media, in interviews and other
media. (BB, personal communication, May 7, 2015).
Another member of Yasunidos told me that when Correa would attack Yasunidos
on the EC on Saturdays, their phones would ring off the hook on Monday with people
wanting to know when and where they could sign. Another member commented:
At some point, Yasunidos´ great strength was that it was not reactive; the
government was on the offensive. At some point, it was the government that had
to answer to Yasunidos´ claims. (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015).

Another member argued that Yasunidos’ communication strategies were not
limited to media, in fact they could not have been successful without on-the-ground
organizing, and leveraging the family, which is still a dominant feature of Ecuador´s
social structure.
The work was much more that of worker ants, and I think it is more about the
information that people received, and how people communicated that information
to their closest circle. It is what I always said to people. They would ask where
they could sign, and what could they do, and I would always say that the most
important thing they could do would be to convince their whole family and
friends, tell them what is happening, and convince them to talk to their friends and
family….or as they say, radio bemba (word of mouth), and convincing people
like that is the work of ants, and that is what made the signature campaign
successful. We didn´t have television campaigns asking for people´s signatures.
(PE, personal communication, April 30, 2015).
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Instead of a televised signature campaign, Yasunidos did spread the word through
posters that said Yasuni, yo firmo por ti (Yasuni, I sign for you). Many people took
photos of themselves with those words, and circulated them in social media platforms.

Figure 4g. I sign for the Yasuní.
The above photos represent the ongoing campaign in which people in Ecuador,
and internationally, shared their support via Facebook and other social media, in support
of the Yasuni and the signature gathering campaign. The upper left photo is that of
Vandana Shiva. When she was in Ecuador, she met with Yasunidos and other antiextractivist groups.
4.7.2 Yasunidos and the private media
Possessing their own website and Facebook page, Yasunidos used social media to
post, aggregate and disseminate powerful photos, videos, images, graphics, music,
combined with alternative proposals, environmental studies, personal testimonies and
their positions, all of which helped to articulate a common ground of struggle among
diverse sectors of society. However, given that Internet access is not universal in
Ecuador, nor do all those who access the Internet use it to listen to on-line radio or read
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political analysis, Yasunidos’ reach via the Internet was limited (INEC, 2013) 66. So,
while they made good use of their own media (Facebook pages and website), and other
alternative media (mostly other people´s social media sites and blogs; online radio, digital
magazines; posting video on YouTube), these did not constitute the most significant
contributions to circulating their messages. In the first place, alternative media is still not
very developed in Ecuador so while the efforts were helpful and done in solidarity with
Yasunidos, it did not represent the way in which most people found out about what was
happening. In terms of media, the most significant coverage happened through private
media, mostly radio interviews and newspaper coverage (still very popular ways people
receive their news). Yasunidos often did several interviews a day for a variety of different
radio stations.
Private media attention was due, in part, to these media’s desire to highlight
opposition to government policies. In the EC, Correa frequently chided private media and
journalists, often asking since when are private media environmentalists? And public
media, owned, and financed by the government, followed Correa´s cues. Members
ofYasunidos member discuss media coverage:
¨La prensa corrupta¨ (the corrupt press, Correa´s most utilized insult for private
media) was a help, but even they had their limitations, and it isn´t as if they gave
us publicity all the time…. And the space in the daily La Hora cannot compare to
the efforts of the government media, there is no comparison. (PE, personal
communication, April 30, 2015).
Yes, for the [private] media, it was also a way for them to express their bad
feelings, I believe, and to support a struggle that is so legitimate, so morally
strong a theme as Yasunidos, so they said, lets open this space….a space in which
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In 2013, 40.4% of the Ecuadorian population used the Internet in the last 12 months, with 47.6% in urban
populations and 25.3% in rural areas (INEC, 2013, p. 14).
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a movement is so forcefully questioning Correa. (RG, personal communication,
March 12, 2015).

In this section, I have examined some of Yasunidos´media practices. This analysis
has shown that Yasunidos has relied on a great diversity of media that included a mix of
private, public, independent, community allies and outlets. At the same time, we need to
take into account that some of the most successful ways in which they gathered allies,
fans and followers was through radio bemba (word of moutn) by using the strong social
structure of the large, extended families. The Yasuní was part of the dinner conversations
in many urban households throughout Ecuador, and that is a real triumph in movement
standards. Many have agreed, too, that Yasunidos´ greatest source of visibilization was
from the President´s nationally televised attacks on the EC. Yasunidos was able to
perceive a direct connection between the attacks on Saturdays, and the growing citizen
support that poured in on Mondays. Indeed, this is when we can really see the cracks in
the edifice, when statist media power reaches some of its limitations. Such limitations
will be further explored in the conclusion.
4.8 Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been the role of movement-based art, media and
embodied practices in the cultural battle between two competing imaginaries: the longstanding, hegemonic extractivist one, with a newer, emerging post-development
imaginary that has been cultivated by ancestral communities and social movements. After
theorizing the notion of a post-development imaginary, I identified some of the factors
that have led to its emergence in Ecuador. In fact, I propose that Ecuadorian ecologist,
feminist and indigenous social movements have been at the vanguard of imagining,
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proposing and implementing alternatives to development in Ecuador, as well as beyond
its borders. Certainly, Yasunidos has been able to tap into this rising imaginary, and is
one of the reasons the movement received so much citizen support, especially among
younger generations.
This chapter seeks to contribute to the growing attention being paid in social
movement scholarship to the visual and cultural dimension of protest. McCaughn (2012)
argues that the political importance of the images produced by movement artists become
apparent when read against prevailing social structures, regimes of accumulation, and
systems of representation. To undertake such a task, I made explicit the underlying values
of each positon, and analyzed how the poster art used by Yasunidos proposed a different
way forward than the dominant paradigm. I argued that Yasunidos’ mediated cultural
politics of post-development, by engaging with a hoped-for future free of resource
extraction, has been able to challenge and resignify dominant notions of development and
extractivism.
Another contribution of the chapter is that it highlights Yasunidos’ movement
practices within the context of statist media power. At the same time, I do not reduce
movement practices to only being reactive. In fact, for most of the year, the government
was on the defensive. By focusing on the multiple ways in which hegemonic notions of
development have been interrupted, I suggest that the movement’s communication
practices went beyond the use of social media and private media. Certainly, focusing on
the use of social media alone, without taking into account the richness of Yasunidos’
diverse symbolic strategies, would not sufficiently capture their mediated cultural
politics. The dissemination of the images, on the streets, in the plazas, and through
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mediated platforms, worked together in a way that put the society in movement as no
other ecological movement before it has achieved, argues Esperanza Martínez of Acción
Ecológica. One of the most successful aspects of Yasunidos; mediated cultural politics
was its ability to weave all these practices together. This interwoven mediated tapestry
reached almost all citizens in Ecuador in 2013-2014, and still resonates several years
later.
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CHAPTER 5
DEMOCRACY IN EXTINCTION? CHALLENGES TO PROCESSES OF
DEMOCRATIZATION
5.1 The aftermath: the Ethical Tribunal delivers a verdict
On August 15, 2014, exactly one year after President Correa announced that he
was bringing to a close one of the most beloved programs of his presidency, the Yasuní
ITT Initiative, Yasunidos and allied actors held an ethical tribunal for the rights of
Nature. It was preceded by two other ethical tribunals held in Quito that same year; one
on January 17, 2014, presided by Vandana Shiva, and the other on April 11, 2014, led by
Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Since the last tribunal, so much had happened, particularly
the elimination of 60% of the signatures that had been delivered, with joy and hope.
Yasunidos has called this and related actions, “democracy in extinction.” This Tribunal
asked, “What happened with the Yasuní, and who are responsible for what has
happened?” That day, with hundreds in attendance, the tribunal delivered its verdict from
the following material and symbolic spaces:
… from the skin of the pink dolphins, of the howler monkeys, and the free
peoples living in voluntary isolation; from the feet of Yasunidos, all, threatened
by oil exploitation and the destruction of the life of the Yasuní, those who defend
life and democracy pronounce … (Verdict of the Ethical Tribute for the Rights of
Nature, the Yasuni Case, August 15, 2014, p. 2)

The judges of the tribunal went on to list the offenses of the Ecuadorian
government, other governments, as well as private and state enterprises that finance the
depredation of Nature: violation of: the rights of Nature; the rights of the peoples in
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voluntary isolation; the duties of the Constitutional Court to exercise its obligations to
uphold the Constitution; and the rights of political participation.
This tribunal, and others like it, have been held because at the government level
there was and has been until today, complete impunity in terms of these violations. The
signatures were never recounted; the direct democratic mechanism of the national
referendum was severely curtailed in a constitutional amendment, and most egregiously,
the exploitation of the Yasuní began in earnest on March 28, 2016 by Petroamazonas,
Ecuador’s state oil company. Such tribunals are now held to formally register
recriminations and demand accountability. The participation of high-profile activists and
academics such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Vandana Shiva, among others, attests
to the international importance and visibility of the case.
I have chosen to begin the concluding chapter of this dissertation with this verdict
to underscore again what was at stake. Yasunidos, despite the social and political changes
that were put in motion, and their fight against extractivism, was not able to stop the oil
exploitation. This is the sobering reality. At the same time, it is important to account for
the important gains, and also on the limitations - of statist media power, and of Yasunidos
– for they speak to larger constraints in processes of democratization. This chapter brings
into focus my own and others’ reflections about such gains, losses and limitations of
statist media power, but also of Yasunidos as a new social movement in its first year. It
also seeks to outline some of the contributions of this study, and to suggest directions for
future research.
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5.2 Statist media power, mediated cultural politics and implications for processes of
democratization
The Yasunidos case makes visible the rising tensions between the “so-called”
progressive Latin American governments and the social movements that are resisting
large-scale extractivist projects across the Americas. In the Ecuadorian context, although
the government used its full arsenal of statist power and statist media power to promote
resource extraction while delegitimizing those in opposition, it was not able to stifle
activism, dissent or the post-development imaginaries that continue to circulate. What I
have argued throughout this thesis is that we cannot fully understand what transpired that
year without taking into account processes of mediation, on the part of the government,
and on the part of Yasunidos. Chapter 3 focused on the implications of statist media
power. Chapter 4 examined ways in which Yasunidos deployed mediated cultural
politics. I found it necessary to examine its movement practices beyond the media, as
they were so rich, and actually helped to counteract statist media power more so than did
their social media practices.
In addition to protests and other performative mediations, Yasunidos initiated a
direct democracy mechanism, demanding a popular referendum so that citizens could
decide the fate of the Yasuní. While their efforts were blocked at every turn, the process
sparked a national dialogue. The mediated attacks, the many disruptions to the process,
and ultimate annulment of over 60% of signatures evidenced the lack of democratization,
and lack of independence of government bodies. And, while the government might have
prevented a direct democratic process, it has not been without political cost, as these
events continue to reverberate in the collective imaginary. In fact, citizens across Ecuador
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now regularly hold unofficial popular referendums in areas where large-scale mining has
been proposed so that their voices can be heard. The government is not interested in these
processes; in fact, a constitutional amendment that eliminates most referendums was
passed. Extractivist practices also involve the erosion of democratization, though they are
seldom specified as such in the mainstream literature on the subject. Documenting these
anti-democratic practices has also been a contribution of this dissertation.
With respect to statist media power, we have seen in this thesis how the
government put in place a novel form of interaction with Ecuadorian citizens that
removed the ‘middle man’ that has been prominent for over a century, the private media,
once the principal source of diffusion of official and non-official news and information.
After 2007, Correa used the EC to speak directly to the nation. We have seen how such
mediated, but direct dialogue with the citizenry has sought to push extractivist agendas
while delegitimizing its opposition. In Chapter 3, I empirically examined just how media
power has been reconfigured, with the state gaining a great deal of symbolic and material
mediated terrain in a short span of 5 years.
This thesis also suggests the power of the state to shape imaginaries through its
laws, policies, practices and mediated communication. Here we have seen that the
Ecuadorian government, for a brief period, played a progressive, generative role. Though
the government subsequently broke its promises and laws, it undeniably helped to shape a
new generation of ecologists through its support and promotion of the rights of Nature,
the rights of uncontacted indigenous peoples, and the innovative proposal to ‘keep the oil
in the soil.’ This had the effect to help pry open new propositive terrains for citizens to
imagine other ways to understand fragile ecosystems and communities, and our
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responsibility towards them. These spaces originated with indigenous and ecological
movements, and then supposedly embraced by the new political culture. When the
government sought to rescind its pledge regarding the Yasuní, its publicity campaigns
turned out to be more durable. Repeatedly, members of Yasunidos told me that one of
their best allies was the Yasuni ITT initiative’s campaigns produced by the government.
There is also the question of statist media power, and its effect on processes of
democratization. Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that statist power, combined
with statist media power, eroded processes of democratization. De la Torre (2008, p. 281282) very clearly perceived the grave implications that such media power carried:
In Latin America, the rise of an extreme form of the plebiscitary presidency in the
Andean region has turned the permanent campaign into far more than just a
package of techniques used to promote presidential popularity: it is a vital practice
that presidents use to stay in power and to pursue political projects aimed at
reconfiguring power relations. But while the permanent campaign is a tool that
presidents wield in their quest to transform politics, its utility in enhancing
presidential power comes at the cost of exacerbating a broader problem affecting
the quality of democracy in Latin America: the relative absence of functioning
mechanisms of accountability….As executive power increases during the course
of plebiscitary presidencies, the temptation for presidents to abuse the
communications apparatus is substantial. In countries where the struggle for
democratic accountability is still ongoing, the need to wage the permanent
campaign invites an unfair use of government resources and blurs the distinctions
between government and partisan activity. Where civil liberties are not fully
consolidated, the chronically confrontational tone of the permanent campaign
readily turns the public sphere into a chilly environment for free expression. The
polarizing rhetoric characteristic of the permanent campaign runs the risk of
turning the president’s real or imagined opponents—in parties, civil society, and
the media—into permanent enemies.
Ecuadorian citizens, like many others throughout Latin America, are indeed quite
wary of the dangers of excessive executive power. Correa’s campaigns to tarnish the
reputation, insult, and render illegitimate his opponents have made citizens deeply
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uncomfortable. The talk is not just talk, it is enunciated by the President, and the bully
pulpit has often been followed by repressive judicial, legislative and other actions.
While we need to recognize the force of statist media power, I have also argued
that we must attend to the limitations of such power. As Freedman (2014, p. 117) reminds
us, media power is not as “predictable, solid or immoveable” as often thought. He
suggests media power (and I will add, statist media power) is “open to challenge,
particularly when their frames don’t match experiences or aspirations” of its consumers
(2014, p. 119). The idea that oil-drilling is an enterprise that brings wealth to the Amazon
region did not match Ecuadorian’s decades-long experience as a petrol state, in which the
financial resources did not benefit the Amazon region. Even more dissonant, we saw in
Chapter 3 that the government’s vision of development did not match its own previously
stated vision. In the case of Yasunidos, cynicism only increased once the government
introduced the changes, and with them, a media campaign that sought to convince about
the positive aspects of drilling for oil. I would argue that the growing cynicism is a sign
of the limits of media power.
There is also resistance to statist media power. It is not the passive resistance that
is often referred to, as when people critically analyze the media, or just stop listening;
rather it can translate into very concrete actions. In Chapter 4, we read about how, on
Saturdays, when Yasunidos was the target of criticism, the following day they received
even more support. Yasunidos quickly understood that there were positive effects of
having President Correa as their main interlocutor. In fact, once they discovered the
connection, they often planned actions on Thursdays, so that Correa could respond to
them on Saturdays. In Chapter 4, I argued that challenges to media power also arise when
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social movements powerfully deploy alternative conceptualizations that resonate with
citizens. Yasunidos interrupted the government’s nefarious framing of them by deploying
art, embodied actions and media that embraced, and even echoed, post-development
imaginaries that were already in motion. One member of Yasunidos discusses his idea
about statist media power:
I believe that from a cultural viewpoint, especially in the Sierra (highlands,
Quito’s location), Correa’s media power starts to have many limits….Correa
insults a lot, and that does not go with the Serrano culture (highland culture)
which is respectful. Correa’s communication reaches its limits also because of the
lies, like when he denies there is unemployment….The government promotes the
defense of the Yasuní, and then decides to drill for oil. Denying the referendum
also was a breaking point. 82% of the population wanted a referendum, even
Correa followers. This eroded their political support. (PE, personal
communication, April 30, 2015).

5.3 Accomplishments and limitations of Yasunidos
Yasunidos provided a powerful, fresh, and courageous stand against planned
extractive practices in the Yasuní. Their movement practices helped reinvigorate
practices of democracy and citizen participation, at a moment in which participatory
democracy was at a very low point in Ecuador. The following citation from a Yasunidos
member speaks to how their bid for direct democratic processes brought these issues to
the foreground:
With the theme of the referendum, we gained so much support, a lot of affection,
and in the imaginary of the people we were and still signify a space that has
fought so that people could participate, that all people have the right to say what
they want in relation to the Yasuni….Yasunidos generated one of the most
important mobilizations we have had in these times, and there have been others
called by the indigenous movement. We have generated questions about the
attitude of the government with respect to citizen participation. The theme of the
Yasuni has also caused many people to distance themselves from the politics of
the government, because it has shown that it does not want to dialogue with the
people, it doesn’t want to listen, and doesn’t invite participation. That was very
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evident in this case. Also, the level of persecution that could be reached by this
government, this and many other cases.... (RG, Personal communication, March
12, 2015).
Indeed, as I reflect back on my own sense of the potential importance of this
study, I recall that witnessing Ecuadorian citizens reawaken to protest and dissent
impacted me, as I had not seen much spirited protest since arriving a year earlier in
August 2012. Alberto Acosta, an ecologist, scholar and former politician, and one of the
original architects of Yasuní ITT, analyzes the contributions of Yasunidos:
The emergence of Yasunidos was very important for many reasons: in the
first place because it gathers the experience and accumulated history of
resistance and the construction of alternative proposals. Secondly, because
it confronts power and uncovers the lies. And in the third place, and I find
this really important, it is able to resonate widely with the Ecuadorian
society. It isn’t just the people in rural areas, it isn’t just those who were
affected by Chevron-Texaco, but also people who have not directly been
affected by extractivism, and I find this significant. Moreover, it opens the
door toward the creation of a strong movement using the arguments of the
government and tools of the Constitution, in trying to build another form of
democracy, another way to do politics, and this is the great legacy of
Yasunidos. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015).

Another significant point is how Yasunidos not only captured, but helped to
deepen a new ecological spirit, which has been gestating in Ecuador for decades. For an
individual who has worked on the issue of indigenous peoples living in voluntary
isolation for decades, Eduardo Pichilingue saw another contribution:
Before Yasunidos, to speak of the uncontacted indigenous groups was one thing,
and after Yasunidos, it is another, because there are many people that are
conscious about what is happening. This has been an effort of Yasunidos. Before
2013, no one had a clue. (Eduardo Pichilingue, personal communication, April 30,
2015).
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There have been differences of opinions as to whether or not Yasunidos still
constitutes a social movement, as the numbers of people actively involved declined
dramatically after CNE eliminated 60% of the signatures. It is a valid dispute. On the one
hand, there are those like Carlos Larrea, director of the Center for Environmental
Research at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, who proposes that Yasunidos is now
much more than a platform for Ecuador’s youth who want to defend nature. Together
with the country’s indigenous movement, he argues that Yasunidos has become one of
the two strongest social movements in Ecuador (Coryat and Lavinas-Picq, 2016, p. 283).
After listening to many people talk about Yasunidos for several years, I can confidently
argue that whether or not one sees them as a movement, or a collective that led a
powerful “moment”, there is most definitely a before and after Yasunidos. It is also
important to analyze some of the limitations of Yasunidos, their strategies and
campaigns. Yasunidos continues to analyze their role that first year and beyond. There
are various themes here, and given this is a conclusion, I will only foreground a few
perspectives. One theme was Yasunidos’ rejecting the adherence to their movement of
politicians. Alberto Acosta shares his perspective:
I do believe there were errors, because there was not sufficient capacity to
negotiate with certain actors. It was “collect signatures, but you guys can’t present
them….” Yes, there was not enough openness to receive the support they could
have received. There were many people who collected signatures but were not
integrated. (Alberto Acosta, personal communication, April 10, 2015).
Another limitation, which was not discussed in my thesis but is worth mentioning,
is the connection between Yasunidos (and other urban ecologists) and the Amazon. This
topic also points toward the need for further research. This interviewee, who has worked
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for a decade in Amazonian territories, and also embraces an urban identity, shared his
view:
One of Yasunidos’ weaknesses was its lack of connection to the Amazon, If you
don’t have an initiative that is born in consensus with local populations, you will
have difficulties in those territories. CONAIE and CONFENIAE were critical of
the signature collection. For CONFENIAE, it was because Yasundos was entering
into their domain – the complexity of the issue of the indigenous peoples in
isolation. In general, they had a defensive attitude, as all organizations felt very
hurt by the current government. They felt excluded…. Also, these are not
populations that have a black and white position regarding resource extraction.
They have accepted it to a certain extent, and have been deceived. And in some
measure they have accepted it because they haven’t had an actor with which they
could contrast, and analyze the situation. The greatest risk for me is that
ecologists risk divorcing themselves from the local populations because their
agendas don’t necessarily coincide. (SD, personal communication, May 9, 2015).
There were Yasunidos chapters in the Amazon (Lago Agrio, Macas, Puyo, Tena)
but the terrain is highly complex, given community divisions about the issue of resource
extraction. After the CNE disgarded 60% of the signatures, many members of Yasunidos
began to travel to the Yasuní and other parts of the Amazon to work with local
populations. Members of Yasunidos from other regions have continued to work in their
own localities in anti-extractivist initiatives.
Finally, I mention here what was perhaps the biggest blow dealt to Yasunidos, the
way in which they were treated by the CNE and other government agencies after they
delivered the signatures. Some Yasunidos members have seen this moment as its lowest
point. They were so confident that they could collect the needed signatures, they did not
plan for a loss. They didn’t foresee the dirty government campaign that would be
launched against them. This translated into another limitation, not of Yasunidos, but of
the citizenry, the lack of mobilization in the face of such deception. One member
analyzes that moment:
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At that moment I believe that everyone fell into apathy, I even felt apathetic. I had
to fight against my own apathy. I mean, the power of the government seemed so
immense, that we could not stop….we made such a huge effort, we succeeded, we
had it, and it doesn’t function. When that happened, and people began to fall into
apathy, there was a certain break up of some Yasunidos groups in some parts of
the country, and that is the moment in which the government hits us with all their
force, and begins saying that we are losers, that we couldn’t do it, we didn’t
achieve it, and they begin communicating that we are liars… media power and
apathy won. It was a bit of both. The shock of this forced defeat, the media power
of the government, came together at the same point and our “democracy in
extinction” campaign didn’t work. People no longer wanted to be involved. Well,
this has changed over time. This past year (2015) has been important as people
are mobilizing again, and they also mobilize for the Yasunidos. And this is
important, a recognition that we were done an injustice….that we did collect the
signatures but an authoritarian and corrupt government did not permit the
referendum to go through….Yasunidos is far from gone…. (BB, personal
communication, May 7, 2015).
Yasunidos suffered a huge loss; citizens suffered a huge loss; the lack of
institutionalization of state agencies was exposed; and the Yasuní and its inhabitants are
suffering the elimination of the initiative to keep the oil in the soil. Still, people continue
to mobilize, and, what happened still lives in the memory of Ecuadorians. Since then
dozens of local struggles against extractive projects have been waged by Yasunidos and
other collectives. Now, other urban collectives ally with the Shuar communities to fight
against mega-mining in their communities. I conclude this section with the words of a
Esperanza Martínez, who has been waging anti-extractive struggles for 30 years:
There was this strike, and the core group remained together, though the theme is
not currently on the national agenda, it is on territorial agendas. I continue to see
Yasunidos as a social movement. They are a voice, people still want to know what
they think about the issues. I heard one young guy say “we have a brand.” They
have an identity. On May 1st (2016) we went out to march with our drums, and
people felt that they could join in with us, it is a space where people who want
change can be….The impact of Yasunidos has been important. More than
anything I believe that the contribution of Yasunidos was having put the society
in its totality in movement. (Esperanza Martínez, personal communication, July
22, 2016).
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5.4 Contributions of the dissertation
To conclude, my dissertation argues that a communication perspective is
necessary to grasp how the Yasuní mediated ecological conflict has played out. I
examined how the Ecuadorian government has used its expanded media power to try to
convince Ecuadorians that extractivism in the Yasuní brings wealth, development and
Buen Vivir. I then examined how Yasunidos, lacking substantive media power, deployed
mediated cultural politics that project alternative ways of thinking, being, and acting.
Such symbolic power created and circulated by Yasunidos and many others has helped us
understand some of the limitations of statist media power. We have seen how multimillion dollar campaigns can be received with deep cynicism, and countered by lowbudget, horizontal citizen communication and cultural production.
This dissertation project hopes to make theoretical, methodological and empirical
contributions, above all, to the growing literature that analyzes the intersection between
social movements and media. It also contributes to a much needed discussion about the
neo-extractivist politics of the wave of progressive government, and the social
movements that struggle against them. Theoretically and methodologically, I also
contribute to a body of scholarship about media power by mainly focusing on the statist
media power, its excesses and limitations, in a Latin American progressive government.
Certainly, the Ecuadorian media system, and the vast changes it has undergone, deserves
attention due to the complexity of the issues at hand and implications for the
democratization of the media in Ecuador and the region.
Regarding my other theoretical-methodological framework, that of mediated
cultural politics, I have argued and demonstrated that attention to the mediated cultural
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politics of post-development are movement practices that deserve close study. Moreover,
beyond the importance of understanding this new wave of movements, there needs to be
attention to the way in which culture, media and politics are interrelated in current
disputes between governments and social movements. The mediated, embodied and
cultural strategies of this growing continental movement need to be seen as an integral
part of the struggle, and here there is rich material for further research.
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